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Norman Carl Josephs. 
Tanzania and the World Bank Group: 
Socialism and Self-Reliance ? 
ABSTRACT 
Foreign aid plays an important role in the extension and expansion 
of the world capitalist market. Multilateral aid in particular 
reflects the progression toward the centralisation and concentra-
tion of capital on an international level. 
The World Bank Group is now the key foreign aid agency. It is a 
capital fund rather than a bank, providing funds for development 
projects. Since I968 the Bank Group has altered its strategies. 
Its lending for infrastructural projects has decreased and its 
lending for agricultural projects has increased dramatically. The 
Group's concern here is to develop export crop production. A 
double process is at work. First, the Group seeks to develop cap-
italist enterprise. Second, it is experimenting with various 
schemes to increase production and productivity. 
Tanzania is one of the testing grounds. An apparentparadoxexists: 
Tanzania's political leaders claim to be initiating socialist 
policies for development, yet the so-called radical initiatives 
have been deflected by local kulaks and a bureaucratic structure 
which seeks to draw state power to the bureaucrats. These bureau-
crats collude with Bank Group staff to increase agricultural 
production, especially export cash crops. 
Notwithstanding this collusion, a class struggle continues, but 
the degree of Bank Group manipulation can be gauged by the fact 
that the experiments continue. The Bank Group controls the purse 
strings and despite Nyerere's claim to seek self-reliance, Tanzania 
is heavily depend~nt on the World Bank Group. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This work is concerned with several related hypotheses 
which fall into three major categories. 
I· 
One: A world capit.alist market exists wherein capital seeks to 
expand its sphere of influence, and extend the modus operandi of 
its causal mode of production into previously (relatively) 
undeveloped and underdeveloped areas. The modes of ~xpansion are 
two-fold and result in different productive formations. 
First, extended reproduction of a capitalist mode of production can 
be achieved through primitive accumtilation of a self-developing type, 
or through penetration by external capitalist forces which transform 
local pre-capitalist modes. 
Second, pre-capitalist modes have in certain circumstances been 
subjugated within a capitalist market. Herein, no transformation 
of the mode of production has occurred: at most vent-for-surplus, 
or a squeeze on ex~sting productive processes occurs. Merchant 
capital has,. historically, performed this function. In recent 
times new institutions - multilateral foreign aid agencies - have 
been set up to provide this function. 
Two: Foreign aid - a form of expensive credit - is not in practice 
industrial capital. It does represent the interests of inter-
national capitalism •. International capitalism is essentially a 
single system of capitalism comprising several different moments 
in the circuit of capital. The status of foreign aid in this 
circuit is that of finance capital in the form of credit, provided 
for specific - usually non-industrial - projects. 
Multilateral aid is one reflection of the progression toward great-
er centralisation and concentration of capital. It shows -the 
growing extent of co-operation and co-ordination between the 
major capitalist powers. The major concern of multilateral aid 
has generally been tdth stabilising the international monetary 
system, and with providing macro-level infrastructural and agri-
cultural investment. 
The World Bank Group, which is more a capital fund than a bank, 
explicitly recognises its role as providing infrastructural cap-
ital investment and therein creating a safe bridge over which 
private. c~pitai can flow to the Third World. Historically, the 
now underdeveloped world has been a producer or supplier of raw 
2. 
materials and food for use in the industrialised nations; increased 
capitalist penetration, facilitated by the World Bank Group, has 
.. 
tended to be concentrated in this sector and in the service sector 
of Third World economies. 
Three : In Tanzania before Independence, an integration into the 
international economy had been unevenly experienced and only part-
ially effective. Tanzania did, however, experience colonial unde-
rdevelopment. Its post-Independence leaders appeared to attempt 
to break out of the pattern of underdevelopment. They sought to 
initiate what is in essence, a logically incoherent programme of 
self-reliant socialist development based on the country's tradit-
ional dependence on export crops. In effect this represented an 
option for greater incorporation into the international economy. 
The reasons are fairly obvious. Faced with poverty, famine and a 
~-integrated economy_- the consequence of the country's colonial 
past - the leadership decided against autarky. The expectations 
of the population were high, and the populist government feared 
loss of popularity if measures taken to restructure the economy 
... ;, 
were too harsh. Instead it sought to control, or at least mit-
igate, the effects of capitalist penetration of the economy. Its 
plans were based on false premises. 
3. 
The basic assumption was that if the state controlled the surpluses 
produced in the country, integrated socialist development could 
occur. The historically narrow resource base was expected to 
broaden with re-investment of surpluses gained from the agricult; 
ural sector. So-called 'neutral' foreign aid - multilateral aid -
was expected to supplement these surpluses. Crucially, this soc-
ialism, based on rhetorical phrases, explicitly rejected the not-
ion of class struggle. State functionaries, in theory controlled 
by a progressive Party and Government elite, were given the task 
of directing the momentum toward socialism. 
Tanzania has not been travelling along the road to socialism. The 
power of the state has grown dramatically. The-:.peasants and workers 
have become increasingly integrated into a capitalist market, nat-
ionally and internationally, and as a result have become increasing 
-ly exploited. Class forces are crystallising despite attempts by 
the state bureaucracy to limit the development of a private nation-
al bourgeQisie, especially in the agricultural sector. In fact 
herein lies another contradiction insofar as evidence shows that 
in some areas state functionaries have aided local capitalist 
farmers to maintain their power and influence. 
In the industrial sphere, joint-ventures with transnational corpor-
ations (MNC's) are the order of the day, involving the introduction 
of advanced technology into a disintegrated ( at the local level) 
economy, creating perpetual dependence on imported materials ( or at 
best·~ locally-produced raw materials destined for export), imported 
technology and staff, without liberating potential for local dev-
4-
elopment. 
The ~'lorld Ba.nk Group has played a.n imp4;)rtant role in recent 
events in Tanzania. - although not in the industrial sector. It 
has provided infrastructure necessary for development - electric-
ity, roads, ra.il, water, education. However, these inputs ha.ve 
been directed toward expediting the development of export crop 
production. The state planners ha.ve accepted this arrangement • 
. ... -· 
Co-operation between the two groups ha.s been close - viz·:.·::'the 
production of World Ba.nk Group Mission Reports on Ta.nza.nia. with 
the help of local government officials. The Ba.nk Group has a.lso 
provided, with the concurrence of the Ta.nza.nian Government, techn-
ical advice a.nd finance specifically aimed a.t export crop product-
ion, setting up with the local Gover~~ent· institutions for aiding 
and supervising export-based agricultural development. 
Above a.ll, the Bank Group has been conc~rned with increasing out-
put a.nd raising productivity. In the face of national economic 
crises - drought, inflation; and international crises - inflation, 
overproduction, the 'oil crisis'; the national leaders have accepted 
Bank Group thinking on agricultural development. Essentially this 
is tha.t communalisa.tion of production along socialist lines has 
. ' -· 
failed, a.nd in its place ·~·a-operative production based on individual 
holdings, with the development of a richer 'progressive' farmer 
class being encouraged·. Is this the beginning of capi ta.list produc-
tion (ie. the development of a capitalist mode of production and 
bourgeQisie and proletariat, locally) ? Or, is it the hardening 
of pre-capitalist structures involving an intensified exploitation 
of local producers, without the development of a capitalist mode of 
product·ion locally ? If the latter is the case then what is occurr 
-ing is exploitation along the lines of a primitive accumulation, 
wherein reproduction is based on the subsistence sector, but 
surpluses are extracted for the benefit of the national bureau-
cratic elite and the international bourgeoisie to use in the cap-
italist sector, i.e. the transfer of locally-produced surpluses 
out of the country and, therefore, away from local potentially 
productive activities. 
The evidence suggests that the national capitalist development is 
distorted by the presence of foreign-controlled capital, and 
socialist reconstruction is impossible in these circumstances. The 
state's activities are ambivalent, reflecting the control exerted 
over it - with some local concurrence - by the international 
bourgeoisie, and the base of the state's popular political support 
from the peasants and workers. In Tanzania the control exerted by 
the international bourgeoisie has intensified. A resultant loss; of 
popular support has been met with repression and authoritarian 
measures. The international bourgeoisie need not initiate the 
repressive measures: the local bureaucrats will. 
"The post-colonial state which emerges from thi.s process (of 
decolonisation) is faced with the task of disorganising the 
direct producers trtho have begun to assert their class interest:s 
and to keep them under the subj-eQtion,.:.of the internal and 
external exploiting classes. In order to do that the govern-
ing class needs resources not only to expand the repressive 
apparatus which is expected to manage without foreign inter-
vention but also in order to recruit clients who support the 
governing class .for the sake of actual or expected material 
benefits." 
"The actual dynamics of economic and social development, how-
ever are determined by the metropolitan bourgeoisie irresp-
ective of the form in which it intervenes."! 
Overall, the Tanzanian experience represents a clear picture 
of the degree of manoeuvrability available to populist leaders in 
the underdeveloped world. The state, particularly in : ·. ex-colonial 
6. 
societies can choose to open its doors to direct capital penetration 
-as long .as it (the state) creates and maintains the conditions 
making the extraction of super-profits possible. It can attempt to 
mitigate the worst effects of capitalist penetration, and in so 
doing frighten away many would-be investors. It can attempt 
autarky - based on mass mobilisation and participation. It can 
open the back-door instead of the front, which is what Tanzania has 
done - although Tanzania has certain advantages in its strategic 
position in Central and Southe:rn Africa (and latterly North East 
Africa) and the Indian Ocean. Although in theory these choices 
exist, in rea,lity a populist regime has no choice. It is bound up in 
rhetoric~l condemnations of internationaL capital ism whilst relying 
on this very system to support its own precarious position. 
Tanzania's experiences have a clear dependence on events and 
processes of the international capitalist political economy. The 
next two chapters attempt to outline and discuss the history and 
workings of international capitalism with special reference to the 
Third World, and to situate the role of foreign aid within this 
framework. Foreign aid has had a major impact on the Tanzanian 
political economy and it is this which provides the link between 
Part One of the thesis and Part Two. 
Part Two is an appraisal of recent Tanzanian political-economic 
history. We examineindetail the re~ationship between the World 
Bank Group and Tanzania and the consequences for Tanzania's develop-
ment strategies. It is hoped that many of the complexities of 
Tanzania's political economy are highlighted. 
We are aware that our appraisal is a controversial one, but we 
believe that this critique of Tanzania's development strategies is 
a useful contribution to the continuing debates on Tanzania in 
particular, and on development theory in general. 
PART ONE 
The International Setting. 
Chapter One 
Nexus 
MARX'S analysis of the capitalist mode of production involved 
an exposition of its genesis, its ~ .. .o-:: •. :. mechanisms and its 
motivating dynamic. Central to this exposition is the concept of 
reproduction. Reproduction of material objects - in the sense of 
a re-production of categories of objects such as food, people, 
machinery - is necessary for continued survival. This reproduc-
1-
tion is a process of material production - the actions men take to 
harness nature to enable them to make objects of consumption required· 
for survival and reproduction. Production provides the basis of the 
means of consumption: consumption enables the .maintenance, and in 
certain conditions, the expansion ·of production, leading to greater 
consumption. The process of production and consumption inevitably 
involves reproduction, and because we are considering human society 
this is social reproduction. 
The circuit of production and consumption has a social dimension 
also in the light of its being more than a material cycle. Men are 
engaged in social relations as well as material relations which 
interweave dialectically within any given mode of production. These 
two aspects are represented by the social division of labour and 
the technical division of labour. Each sets the limits to the other. 
In capitalist societies the circuit of social reproduction is 
hidden from view by the complexity of the processes of production 
(social and material). An advanced division of labour separates 
producer from producer, and there is little direct contact between 
8. 
producer and consumer. Instead, the circuit of social reproduction 
is refracted through the market, which now links production and 
consumption. 
Within this market system the worker (the producer) is paid a 
value wage equal to the value of his labour power, not the value 
his labour power produces. The difference between the value 
created by labour and the value of necessary commod~ties consumed 
by workers to ensure their reproduction is surplus-value. The 
value of production less the value advanced to bring about produc-
tion accrues to capital in the form of profit. 
Simply, reproduction in capitalist societies occurs on an 
ever-extending scale. The social product is always greater than 
necessary consumption, the surplus (surplus-value) is appropriated 
by capital as profit and is partly consumed by capitalists and 
partly ploughed back into greater production. 
Marx foresaw the growth of the market which would involve the 
reproduction of the bourgeois mode of production throughout the 
world. But what preceded this growth ? 
"We have seen how money is changed into capital; how through 
capital surplus-value is made, and from surplus-value more 
capital. But the accumulation of capital presupposes surplus 
-value; surplus~value presupposes capitalistic production; 
capitalistic production presupposes the pre~existence of 
considerable masses of capital and labour power in the hands 
of producers of commodities. The whole moveme?t, therefore, 
seems to turn in a vicious ·circle, out of which we can only 
get by supposing a primitive accumulation •••• preceding 
capitalist accumulation; an accumulation not the result of 
the capitalist mode of production, but its starting point. 
This .Primitive accumulation plays in political economy 
about the same part as original sin in theology ••• Its origin 
is supposed to be explained when it is told as an anecdote of 
the past. In times long gone by there were two sorts of 
people; one, the diligent, intelligent, and, above all, frugal 
elite; the other, lazy rascals, spending their substance and 
more, in riotous living. And from this original sin dates 
the poverty of the great majority that, despite all its 
labour, has· up to now nothing to sell but itself, and the 
wealth of the few that increases constantly although they 
long ceased to work ••••• In actual history it is notorious 
that conquest, enslavement, robbery, murder, briefly force, 
pJ_ay a great part ••• As a matter of fact, the methods of prim-
itive accumulation are anything but i·d.yllic • 
••• The capitalist system pre-supposes the complete separation 
of the labourers from all property in the means by which they 
can realise their labour ••• The process, therefore, that clears 
the way for the capitalist system, can be none other than the 
process which takes away from the labourer the possession of 
his means of production; ••• The so-called primitive accumul-
ation, therefore, is nothing else than the historical 
'process of divorcing the producer from the means of production. 
It appears as primitive, because it forms the pre-historic 
stage·of capital and of the mode of production corresponding 
"th "t ,I W1 1 • 
This passage from Capital emphasises only one aspect of primitive 
accumulation - that of the self-development into, and reproduction 
of, a capitalist mode of production. Mandel2 suggests that this 
process has a double helix - self-development of capital which Marx 
identifies as primitive accumulation. and another 'primitive accum-
' . 
ulation' - accumulation 'for itself'. Accumulation 'for itself' 
and capitalist accumulation ·through the production and use of surplus 
~alue are distinct but coexist. 
.. 
' 
Kay contrasts accumulation with hoarding, collecting and 
saving. "Hoarding involves extracting wealth from circulation ••• 
IO. 
(but) ••• is the passive amassing of wealth." Accumulation "involves 
an active emphasis on the quantitative aspect of wealth." 3 It is 
essent~ally concerned with quanti ty··not qu~l-ity, unlike collecting. 
Accumulation draws wealth out of circulation and throws it back in 
to breed and multiply. Saving is merely the temporary deferment of 
consumption of wealth. In this comparison Kay is concerned only with 
the capitalist aspects of primitive accumulation. Primitive accum-
ulation, in the sense of non-productive accumulation, is categorised 
by Kay as hoarding or saving. 
The-dil?.e!inria-,_; of this apparent confusion over what constitutes 
primitive.:. accumulation is resolved, in part, by Mandel's attempt 
to structurally link two aspects of the political economy of the 
world market: the contemporary existence of capitalist and pre-cap 
-italist modes of _production. Primitive accumulation - of both 
types - occurs on an international plane, as does normal capitalist 
accumulation. Mandel's argument that in colonial and semi-colonial 
societies primitive accumulation- accumulation 'for itself' rather 
than accumulation tending towar~ self-development - predominates1 
suggests that such societies· are not experiencing the articulation of 
a -locally-developing capitalist mode ·Of production • 
.. . 
Historically, the dynamic of primitive accumulation lay in its 
monopolistic character because in the early days of the development 
of capitalist production no marked international profit gradient 
•. ·.~ 
existed between the industries of various nations to provide a 
growth stimulus. Now however, particularly in the Third World, 
primi ti.ve accumulation occurs under the aegis of a predominant::~:· 
. . 
capitalist mode Qf production, within the overall canopy of a 
-.. 
'·· 
II. 
capitalist world market. Mandel thus maintains that "a dialectic 
unity of three moments' has been constituted through "the internat-
ional growth and spread of the capitalist mode of production for the 
?ast two centuries' 5, between the accumul.ation of capital within 
.. .~. 
capitalist processes of production; primitive accumulation outside 
the sphere of capitalist processes of production; and thirdly, the 
determination and delimination of the latter by the former. 
According to classical Marxist theory, capital radiates outward 
from a centre: 
"It constantly tries to extend itself to new domains, to 
convert new sectors of simple reproduction of commod~ties 
into·· sphere·s of· capitalist production· of commodities, and 
to replace sectors which have hitherto only produced use 
values by tli~ produC?.ti9~ ·of commodi ties.i•6 
This constant extension has two aspects - first by example - ie. 
through self-development, where producers following the search for 
greater surpluses invest existing surpluses in productive spheres; 
and·· second, through the establishment of external control over the 
forces and relations of production. Where neither aspect is deter-
minant, private accumulation of the hoarding and collecting type is 
possible and probable. 
Herein the world economy is thus, 
"an articulated system of capitalist, semi-capitalist and 
pre~capital'ist relations of·production, linked to each 
other by capitalist relations of exchange and dominated by 
the c~p-~tali~t world.·inarket~"7 . (M~nd~l's emphasis.) 
The world capitalist-dominated economy is a dynamic combination of 
capitalistically-developed and capitalistically-underdeveloped 
. ·, 
economies. 
An alternative view is offered by Samir Amin, who suggests the 
existence of two related but differently-motivated systems: one 
being t~_e capitalist developed system; and the other, a peripheral 
-- ... 
!2. 
system. Within a capitalist self-centred system the determining 
. ·-·-. 
relationship is th.at ·which links production of mass consumer goods 
and t~e production of capital goods for use in the production of 
the mass consumer goods. This determining relationship is charac-
. . 8 
teristic of the development of capita~ism at the centre. 
'' .~ •• ' ' I 
Here a necessary relation of reproduction exists between the 
rate of surplus-value and the level of development of the productive 
forces. The rate of surplus-value is the main determinant of the 
··. 
pattern of the social distribution of the national income - between 
profits and wages - and of the demand for goods and services. The 
.. 
level of the development of productive forces is the result of a 
dialectic relationship expressed within the social division of 
labour, between the sectors producing mass consumer goods and cap-
ital goods. The major contradiction "between the productive capa-
city of the system and ~ts capacity for consumption ••• is constantly 
being overcome·;~9, ~t any parti~iar level of development, and is 
reconstructed at a higher level. This is a reflection of the dyn-
amic between the rate of surplus-value and the level of development 
of the productive forces. This represents a cyclical motion of 
extended reproduction. 
The relationship between the developed system and the periph-
eral system is defined by, 
"the external relations of the developed regions as a whole 
wit:t.i the periphery of the world. system remain(ing) quantit-
atively marginal~ ·a·ompared to··· the internal exchange within 
this·· region. In. addition,· ···th:ese. relations •••• spring from 
·priinitive· accuirn.ilation ·and not frQm .extended reproduction •• "IO 
(Emphasls added). 
Here the crux of the matter is simply stated: extended reproduction 
versus primitive accumulation wherein surpluses are not reinvested 
. ~- ·, 
!3. 
in productive activities in the periphery, but are drawn out for 
use in the developed regions. 
"The systematic ••• expansion of the market depends on the 
expansion of the division of labour, ie on production link-
. _ ··,.ages. Consequently, the 'solution' of the market problem 
could no longer be built on the system of 'accidental' ex-
cha~e ·{based on monetary surpluses and shortages) between 
individual 'national' units. Nor the supply of primary 
products could be based on ad hoc purchases. As a suitable 
means the expo~t of investment capital, the creator of the 
first system of-international division of labour seemed to 
offer.itseif. 
. . . ..... -~-. 
On the other hand, the more the internal laws of capital 
accumulation asserted themselves in the most developed 
capitalist countries ••• the more the strange twins of unemp-
loyment and the underutilisation of part of the accumulated 
capital as.its concomitants- along with the falling rate of 
profit - became apparent·. Thus, besides the acquisition of 
external ·resources of raw materials and foodstuffs and of 
foreigi1. markets; an outward oriented capital flow {and ••• ~lso 
a labour flow) as well as the search for investment opportun-
ities promising a higher rate of profit became imperatives. 
The satisfaction of these imperatives/needs by military 
actions o£ imperialist governments and the day-to-day activity 
of monopoiistic companies de-termined the economic functions of 
the subjugated territories, transforming them into suppliers of 
pr:imary products for the metropolitan countries, the markets 
for their industrial products, and the target area for their 
capital outflow and investments resulting (from and in) 
regtilar backflow of profits. 
Capital export, playing the decisive role in this internat-
ional division of labour, has a double function: a) to bridge 
the gap between the increasing need for industrial raw materials 
and the need for e~panding markets for the ·products of modern 
· large-scale industry; and b) to be a safety valve of internal 
over-accumulation ••• a factor·counter-acting the depreciation 
of capital and of the fall in the rate of profit. The former 
aims at ensuring the preconditions fo~ undisturbed reproduct-
ion, ie the marketing condition and raw material supply; and 
the latter aims at defending capital and ensuring profit-
making. There is, however, an antagonistic contradiction 
between the two functions: the operation of the one is 
detrimental to the other."!! 
More narrowly, 
"There is no pressure for central national capital to 
emigra~e as a result of insufficient possible outlets at 
the centre; it will however emigrate to the periphery if 
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it can obtain a better return. The equalisation of the rate 
of profit will redistribute the surplus arising from the high-
er return and use the export of capital as a means to fight 
the trend .of a falling profit rate. The reason for creating 
an export sector therefore lies in obtaining from the perip-
hery products which are the basic elements of constant cap-
ital {raw.:m~terials) or of variable capital {food products) 
,·:·at production costs lower than those at the centre for 
similar products { or obviously of substitutes in the case 
. . . . ~r2 
·of specific products such as tea or coffee)." 
A lack of ,clarity is evident here. Amin and Szentes fail to dis-
tinguish between types of capital - finance, merchant, industrial. 
Consequently the production of raw materials in the periphery for 
\ ... 
consumption in industrial processes.in the metropole is covered by 
the all-embracing, but uninformative phrase, 'capitalist underdev-
elopment through periphery-centre contact'. This, in turn, allows 
the concept of unequal exchange to be used in reference to countries 
which hides the essential contradiction of capitalism - that 
between labour and capital. 
What both are talki~g about is an articulated system of pre-
capitalist formations, merchant capitalism and industrial capital-
ism. The merchant capitalist is situated as gatekeeper between the 
producer and consumer. The concern of merchant capital, as with 
industrial capital, is with quantity - accumulation, money, capital 
- for reproduction on a higher level. The concern of the independ-
ent commodity producer, and of the wage-labourer, is with quality -
the exchange of one commodity for a different commodity for the 
sake of consumption (and thereby reproduction). 
Merchant capital requires unequal exchange to ensure its 
profits. In a simple model: It pays for a single commodity at 
X cost and sells that commodity for X + n price. No value has 
been added, yet the price at which it was sold is greater than 
that at which it was bought. The real situation is more complex 
than this because, depending on the relative strength of merchant 
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capital to industrial capital and to independent commodity producers, 
it may buy at less than value and sell at more than value, thereby 
underdeveloping one ot the actors/sectors by drawing out part of 
the surplus product which could have been immediately reinvested in 
the productive sphere. 
Historically merchant capitalism has proved stronger than 
independent commodity producers, but in the last century-and-a-
half, weaker than industrial capitalism which evolved from it. The 
penetration of the now underdeveloped world by merchant capitalism 
occurred two hundred and fifty years before the triumph of indust-
rial capitalism. Whole civilisations were destroyed ~'n order.-.-to 
satisfy'the·r~pacious appetites for huge accumulations of wealth in 
the hands of the massive commercial empires. A world market was 
created leading to the development of a global division of labour, 
realising increased productivity based on grotesque structures of 
. .. 
exploitation and oppression. The process of control over trade, by 
which me&ls···.m·erchant capital grew, tended toward monopolisation with 
the support of the metropolitan state. (Many of the state-controllers 
were monopoly members). 
However, the relationship between merch~nt capital and the dev-
elopment of the forces of production has always been ambiguous. It 
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breaks up the old economic order from which it came by subjugat-
ing production to the rationality of the market it controls. But, 
because it is not productive capital, it is unable to transcend 
its own structure and, thus, determine the whole sphere of prod-
uction. It creates the pre-conditions for the development of indu-
strial capitalism, yet is not itself that capitalism, and seeks to 
preserve its own power by preventing the realisation of industrial 
capitalism. Further, in the Third World, where it took over the 
superstructure and used the state apparatus for its own ends, mer-
chant capital has become the agent of industrial capitalism. 
"It remained the only form of capital present: but within 
the world economy as a whole it became an aspect of indust-
rial capital."13 
Herein Amin's last statement has relevance. Industrial capitalism 
is concerned with the production of the necessary means of produc-
tion as cheaply as possible - cheap raw materials, cheap food 
(thereby reducing the vaiue of labour power)~ Merchant capitalism 
provided already established mechanisms to facilitate this function. 
Merchant capital, through various degrees of control over the 
'penetrated·' economy's state, uses every means possible to preserve 
the character of the relationship between the metropole and periphery. 
And, it is this which represents for Amin, primitive accumulation 
rather than extended reproduction of a capitalist mode of produc-
tion. 
Industrial capitalism has become, over the last two hundred 
years, the determining force in the world's international economy. 
During these centuries, the direct production of surplus-value 
through large-scale industry was limited,:generally, to Western 
Europe and North America. At the time of the Industrial Revolut-
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ion in Britain primitive accumulation of the self-developing 
type was occurring in other parts of the world, where in some 
situations, peasants and artisans were being pushed out of textile 
production, through the development of indigenous factory-type 
production, with foreign capital playing a very minor role 
initially. We are offered the explanation, by Mandel, that these 
'nascent capitalist economies' were not completely dominated by the 
major industrialised countries because, 
a. Capital accumulation in the industrialised nations had not yet 
reached a :level high enough to export; and 
b. Poor communications in the world generally, and in the Third 
World in particular, prevented cheap mass-produced goods from pen-
etrating these areas. 
Hence, when the export of capital was gradually increased it went, 
first, primarily into foreign railway construction, 
"for the e.x::t;ension of this world-wide communications 
network was a precondition for the gradual extension of 
their (Britain, France, Belgium and Holland} domination 
over the internal markets of the less developed countries 
which had been dragged into the maelstrom of the capitalist 
world economy."I4 
The development of infrastructural transport and communications 
systems did open up these areas, but at the same time they provided 
a stimulus to indigenous primitive accumulation of national capital. 
A time-lag, between I848 - !860 existed wherein the advent of rail 
did not immediately lower the price of imported goods, especially 
perishables. Local merchant capitalists took advantage of th:iis 
opportunity and a capitalist mode of production grew under them 
free from external competition. 15 Mandel's examples of this phen-
omenon are Spain, Italy, Russia and Japan. Also by 1880 foreign 
imports of manufactured goods had destroyed old forms of 'domestic' 
production in these countries, and further "cleared the ground 
for the development of 'national' capitalism",I6 with the result 
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that within ten years local machine industry had taken the place of 
local domestic industry. Further, these particular countries 
were, through the growing specialisation in foreign trade, able to 
capture a share of the world market. The, profits from this trade 
then provided the dynamic for further development and localaccum-
ulation of capital. 
Although the uneven development of the level of productive 
forces gave to the industrial societies higher levels of labour-
productivity, and therefore ensured unequal exchange, the resultant 
4rain of capital from the less developed countries was not great 
enough to prevent an indig~nous and independent accumulation 
of capital - at least where social and political (class) forces 
were structured so that a developing bourgeoisie had the power 
to replace the local artisanate by large-scale industry. Where 
the "state·· was unwilling.or·,unable to perform its role as the 
midwife of modern capitalism11 I7 then national industrialisation 
was sure to fail, i.e. where foreign bourgeoisie controlled the 
accumulation of capital, or where the accumulation was dominated 
by foreign merchant capital. 
Mandel extends his historical analysis by structurallylink-
ing the advent of imperialism to the further development of the 
industrialised nations, and the underdevelopment of the non-
industrialised nations. 
The age of imperialism witnessed a radical change in the nature 
of primitive accumulation within uncapitalised economies. Merchant 
and industrial capital controlled by Western capitalists, became 
the determinant forces in the world. The export of capital from 
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the metropoles began to determine economic development in the 
Third World. But the flow was two-way. The produce from the 
Third World played the role ~f back-up to capitalist production in 
the metropoles because mass production of goods in the centre 
lowered prices, and to make mass production profitable larger 
markets were needed. Thus, capital which was exported went, in the 
Third World, only into enterprises which served this interest. 
Necessarily most local enterprises which conflicted with this 
'need' were· suffocated intentionally through unequal exchange and 
fore~, which led to a decline in the amount of resources available 
for local autonomous development. Those resources which were made 
available were drawn only into highly profitable areas - the 
service industries which provided luxury facilities for local 
elites - and the provision of infrastructure for the exploitation 
of primary products. Thus, two features are immediately apparent. 
First, enclave development. Second, the loss of local economic 
integration. 
The existing local ruling classes were frequently consolidated 
in their superstructural power by the colonial rulers. This served 
the purpose of creating a buffer between local workers/producers 
and foreign interests, and ensured a continuity of administration. 
In the enclave sectors and in theextractive industries, capitalised 
advanced techniques of:production were adopted, ie industrial capi-
tal operated. In other sectors of the economy merchant capital 
operated - the processes of production were fixed, industrial dev-
elopment was stunted at a very early stage. 
"Accordingly, what changed in the transition from freely 
competitive capitalism to classical imperialism was the 
specific articulation of the relations of production and 
exchange between the metropolitan countries and the under-
developed nations. The domination of foreign capital 
over the local accumulation of capital (mostly combined 
with political domination) now subjected local economic 
development to the interests of the bourgeoisie in the 
metropolitan countries. It was no longer the 'light 
industry' of cheap commodities which now bombarded the 
underdeveloped countries, but the 'heavy artillery•· of 
. . 
the control of capital resources. In the pre-imperialist 
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epoch, on the other hand, concentration on the production 
and export of raw materials under the control of the ind-
igeno.us_ bourgeoisie had only been a prelude to the replace-
ment of pre-capitalist relations of production on the land 
in the interests of this bourgeoisie. In the classical 
imperialist epoch, however, a long -term political and 
social alliance between imperialism and local oligarchies 
came into being which froze pre-capit~list relations of 
production in the village. This decisively limited the exte~­
nsion of the 'internal market' and thereby again impeded 
the cumulative industrialisation of the country, or forced 
those processes of primitive accumulation which did occur 
into non-industrial channels."18 
"Foreign capital came into conflict with pre-capitalistic 
••• remnants ••• only ••• ("if)they happened to fall directly 
within the sphere of its own activity. It was not interested 
••• in the complete transformation of the precapitalistic 
relations as its own growth was governed by laws indepen-
dent of the latter."I9 
Hence, the Third World experienced some foreign-dominated 
industrial development and much fixing of pre-capitalist relations 
of production. In this manner the Third World was transformed 
into a predominantly raw material and food/cash crop producer. 
The export of capital to the Third World has gone mostly to the 
discovery and extraction of raw materials, and for the develop-
ment of larger markets. 
Initially, a vent-for-surplus impact of the expansion of raw 
material production enabled non-capitalist forms to predominate 
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locally - such as within a slave economy. But, capitalist devel-
opment at the metropole involved the raising of labour-productivity 
and thereby the relative cost of raw materials rose. Capitalists 
saw the need and opportunity to increase their profits by lowering 
the costs of raw material production. One method was to squeeze 
independent producers by forcing price cuts on them for their goods. 
Another was to raise labour-productivity in the production of these 
goods. The use of metropolitan capital was required to accomplish 
this task. 
"The direct intervention of Western capital in the process 
of primitive accumulation of capital in the underdeveloped 
world was thus determined to a significant degree by the 
compulsive pressure on this capital to organise large-
scale capitalist production of raw materials." 20 
_Labour in agriculture in the Third World has been predominantly 
practised on a small-holder basis. This has been true especially 
with regard to cash cropping. A linked duality exists. Some crops-
are sold for cash, or to pay taxes, etc. but the costs of reproduc-
tion of labour are situated firmly in the non-monetary subsistence 
sector. This ensures that the prices paid for the cash crops are 
significantly lower than would otherwise be the case. However, 
the capitalisation of agricultural production which is represented 
by plantation agriculture places the responsibility for the 
reproduction of labour on the shoulders of the plantation owner. 
The benefits, to the Oliner, and to industrial capitalists in the 
metropole was great enough to negate the added responsibility. 
Greater division of labour, more discipline over the labour force, 
greater overall rationalisation of production and improved account-
ing systems realised greater productivity and greater profits. 
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\ihat is not made clear here is that the degree of capitalist 
penetration of agricultural production was not great - although in 
some areas the plantation system was extensive (south United States, 
Carribean, some African colonies). Although underdeveloped societ-
ies were subjected to metropolitan capitalist organisation of 
other aspects of raw material production, the differences in 
capital accumulation and in productivity levels between metropole 
and periphery became qualitative. This is explained by the differ-
ent momenta which affected metropolitan and peripheral production. 
Unlike fUll industrial capitalist production, the process of capi~ 
talisation of raw material production was not a continually-moder-
nised process because labour, once production had been initially 
capitalised, became relatively cheap again. In other words, local 
con,itions did not determine the level and scope of production. 
So, differences grew between the respective le~els of product-
ivity within spheres, between the metropoles and the satellites. 
Emmanuel makes this point succinctly when he distinguishes 
'backward agriculture' and 'backward industry' from 'modern 
agriculture' and 'modern industry' by showing that in !959, U.S. 
farmers produced, per person, seven times the value of per person 
d f J f t . 2! pro uce o apanese manu ac ur1ng. 
The.impetus .for·the 'jumps forward' in the productivity of 
labpur in the production of raw materials comes from the level of 
capital investment. This increased capital penetration was a 
response to the growing relative cost of raw materials. Mandel 
isolates certain periods over the last century which reflect this 
pattern. 
Between !870 - !880 a massive increase in capital penetration 
of the extractive industries steadied the price of raw materials. 
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However, the equilibrium did not remain steady. Labour-productivity 
in the metropole increased regularly whilst it stagnated in the 
colonies. Thus, the relative cost of raw materials increased 
again. This second rise peaked with the First World War, and 
with the explosive growth of the arms industry in Europe. B.y the 
I940's the fall in profits from raw material production using 
methods dating from the age of manufacturing capi talism .• was 
great enough to represent a break on capital accumulation on a 
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world scale. Mandel identifies in this one more of a series of 
shifts: freely competitive capitalism - Imperialism - Late Capit-
alism. The clear link throughout is the sporadic increase in 
penetration by capital into raw material production. Each time 
this has led to changes in technology, labour organisation and the 
relations of production, both within the sphere of raw material 
production and of industrial production. 
The Third World has experienced the beginnings of industrial-
isation since the Second World War. Labour-productivity - output 
per unit of labour - has been rising in response to the introduction 
of new technology and to increased efficiency in the management of 
the productive processes. Further, the already massive reserve 
army of labour supplies cheap non-union labour which has the effect 
of disciplining the existing workforce; and, allied with the lack 
of 'social wages' has the overall effect: of .lower.~~g the:rela;:~;·~ve costs 
of labour (i.e. in relation to labour in other areas) and perhaps 
even absolute costs. Of course this has the spin-off effects noted 
in Amin's model, wherein the domestic market is restricted by the 
low wage-levels, and as such acts as a fetter on further domestic 
capital accumulation. Local capital is invested only in service 
industries according to this model, with the net effect of ensuring 
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under-utilisation of industrial capacity, further limiting the 
development of the local market, and yet maintaining or even 
increasing the levels of imports from the metropoles because imported 
mass-produced goods are cheaper than those produced locally. 
Under Late Capital ism efforts are made to increase the product-
ivi ty of labour in the Third World. Labour is cheap, and with machinery, 
fertilizers, semi-manufactured goods for local assembly allsupplied 
from the metropole, labour-productivity ought to increase, thereby 
making labour an even lower percentage of production costs -
especially as metropolitan and locally-assembled goods can be sold at 
monopoly prices. In this there is a paradox- namely, that if labour is 
so cheap in the Third World surely it would be in capital's interest 
to industrialise there. 
Some industrialisation has been inevitable, as Kay and others 
have pointed out, and it has become the decisive moment in the 
history of underdevelopment. 
"In fact, industrialisation is now such an integral part 
of underdevelopment that it can no longer be considered as 
its solution, at least not in its present capitalist form." 23 
In the I9th century the exports from the metropoles comprised 
mostly consumer goods, coal and steel. But since the I929 Depress-
ion and the Second World War, the export of machines, vehicles, 
and equipment goods has become a major activity. The latter 
category of goods must be used for industrial activity. In fact, 
the demand for advanced, capital-intensive, labour-displacing 
techniques is great. 
" •• (N)o •• demand exists, (for simple equipment), for where 
firms (in the underdeveloped world) do have a choice they 
generally favour techniques which involve higher degrees of 
mechanisation. Thus •• these methods are the most efficient 
from the point of view of capital, even where labour is 
plentiful and their adoption results in the growth of 
widespread unemployment."24 
Kay is .here suggesting that where local capitalists are able they 
will operate according to the logic of capitalist accumulation. 
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The question remains whether capitalists in the Third World have the 
power to operate freely. The implication throughout this chapter 
has been that the Third World's structures and institutions do not 
operate autonomously;·that capital, controlled from the metropoles 
has distorted local development. 
The trend toward industrialisation does not represent the full 
development of industrialisation in the Third World and the univer-
salisation of the capitalist mode of production, but represents 
the emergence of "new differential levels of capital accumulation, 
productivity, and surplus extraction."25 Present capita:). accumul-
ation in the Third World takes the form, generally, of reinvested 
realised profits controlled by external forces, ie. most imperia-
list investment in indastry/manufacturing comes from the absorb-
tion of part of local surplus-value. In fact, much capital is 
exported from the Third World in the form of salaries, rent, 
interest, dividends and through unequal exchange. 
Because of the declining proportion of labour-cost in the 
production of some raw materials, besides lowering these costs even 
further by capitalising production in the Third World, the metro-
poles have also attempted to manufacture raw materials synthetically. 
This, in part, accounts for the dramatic development of chemical, 
pharmaceutical and other industries replacing natural raw materia~s. 
{The development of synthetic foodstuffs has also experienced a 
recent boom on the u.s. research circuit). This does not mean 
that cheap and strategic raw materials are not still required in 
growing quantities from the Third World. Despite the Third 
World 1 s declining share of world trade, the metropoles are still 
dependent on key raw materials -uranium, iron ore, petroleum oil, 
nickel, chromium, bauxite, etc. 
"But within the framework of the capitalist world economy 
the contradiction between the use value and exchange value 
of commodities is expressed_,in the fact that the increased 
dependence of imperialism on the raw materials exported by 
the colonial countries is accompanied by a relativedecline 
in the prices paid for these raw materials· and a relative 
decline in their value."26 
In other words, increased investment and capitalisation of prod-
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uction techniques has led to a decline in relative price and value 
of raw materials and primary produce. This trend led to a relative 
decline in the rate of profit of the monopolies controlling their 
production. Hence, with the manufacturing sector becomingmore 
profitable - relative to raw material production -investment here 
increased at the expense of primary production investment. Cheap 
prices for raw materials allied to an expanding manufacturing 
sector in the metropole normally resultedina commodity-boom, 
which Mandel maintains occurred between !972 - 1974. Consequently, 
the relative price of raw materials increases again, and investment 
is diverted back to raw material production, and the cycle sets off 
again to alter the organic composition of capital, and thereby, to 
lower the price of raw materials. The boom of the early !970 1 s 
was the third since the· beginning of the !9th. century. 27 
The cyclical movement of the rate of profit is linked to the 
uneven development of the various elements of the overall production 
process. The development of the production of raw materials and 
capital goods is stimulated by the development of the production 
of consumer goods. Initially the rate of profit in the former will 
.. , ~-· 
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be greater than in the latter. The former will become capital-
ised because of the higher rate of profit - investment will go 
where capital obtains the highest return - and so, the organic 
composition of capital· rises. In a situation of increased invest-
ment in·a particular sector, boom and overproduction often occurs. 
The effects - declining investment, rising unemployment - are felt 
first in the consumer production sector. Herein production-cutbacks 
are relatively easily achieved; but, in the capital goods/primary 
produce sector, changes in the level of production require longer. 
time-plans~8 For example, the cocoa growers in Ghana work to a 
seven-year cycle, so that changes in demand etc. are reflected by 
more/less plantings, the effects of which are not felt for seven 
years. 29 In the capital goods sector where the organic composi-
tiQn of capital is high, cutbacks or increases in production also 
require difficult long-term decisions about capital investment, 
which inhibits short-term quick changes in production levels. 
Mandel identifies a cycle of rising organic composition of 
capital in the perpetual drive of capital to increase the product~ .. 
ivity of labour, ie. to increase the rate of surplus-value. The 
process, complex and multicausal, is at work in all departments of 
production, including the production of raw materials and primary 
produce. 
The world capitalist market with its mechanisms for unequal 
exchange fuels the cycle. The market is constantly being expanded 
and extended, both through capitalist take-over of production, and 
through mere geographical expansion - bringing more people under 
the control of the market. Thus, within countries like Tanzania, 
more and more peasants have been dragged into export crop product-
ion, generally not as capitalists, nor as workers in a capitalist 
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mode of production, but as producers experiencing capi·talist 
domination whilst · · employing pre-capitalist methods. 
It is the issue of the world economy being an articulated 
system which is of. great~st significance here. The primary concern 
is ~o examine some of the major structures of this articulation. 
A system of growing importance is the system of international foreign 
'aid', ie. international credit. 
II 
The Role of Credit and Infl~tion. 
The essential requirement of capitalist accumulation is that 
production is greater than consumption, and that the surplus accrues 
to capitalists. Within this process the differential rates of 
development between sectors, and the social relations whichdetermine 
the d~stribution of the surplus, have caused cycles of expansionand 
contraction. 'The long wave of expansion' since the end of the 
Second World War was achieved through 'the historic defeats of the 
working class' enabling 'fascism and war to raise the rate. of 
surplus value• 30 , and through the growing size of the market. Also, 
inflation has provided a stimulus to this development, besides serving 
to raise the level of profits and to moderate crises of overproduction. 
Inflation is aggravated by credit creation, i.e. increasing liquidity, 
and can be useful when it raises production or aids the extension of the 
market. Credit buys labour-power and the means of production- it can 
become productive capital - even where the existence of backup deposits 
is problematic. Credit becomes inflationary when its advance does not 
lead to compensating increases in production. 
The importance of credit to solve liquidity problems was evidenced 
by the IMF' s creation of Special Drawing Rights. The industrialised 
nations sought facilities which enable them to expand money supply in 
order to .expand li'IOrld trade. SDR' s are given to each country according 
to its subscription to ·the IMF, with 70 per cent of the total issue to each 
country being equivalent to the subscription, and the other 30 per cent 
· pure credit. In !969;'" when this facility was created, the industrial-
ised nations feared the relatively .. limi ted growth in money supply would 
lead to balance of payments pro'Dlems·~ _·A;solution was to create money- the 30 per 
* Footnote 3!. 
cent credit. Overnight the U.K.'s reserves were 'increased' by 
us ,Moo million! 
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If a situation of ove-rproduction of manufactured goods exists, 
inflation and credit can brake the effects. What in fact happens 
is that a circular motion is set up wherein paper money is treated 
as capital, and because this paper money, through the very process 
of inflation, becomes devalued the cycle must spiral. However, 
in the short-term the 'overproduction' is absorbed through the 
provision of credit facilities. But, the initial problem of over-
production is not overcome, only reconst'ituted at a higher level. 
Because overproduction is about falling or stagnant demand by 
the consumers, credit and inflation encourage the consumers to buy 
now. This helps to postpone the problem of the decline in the wage 
-earners• share of national income, caused by inflation - ie. more 
inflation helps to delay the immediate problem of inflation. Also, 
the external market is expanded through the provision of credit. 
Thus, in the industrialised countries between I953 - ·:·I963, indus-
trial output increased as a whole by 62 per cent, whereas exports 
increased by 82 per cent, (both figures at fixed prices). Between 
I963 - I972, industrial output rose by 65 per cent, but exports 
increased by III per cent. 32 
"The credit system appears as the main lever of over-
production and over-speculation in commerce solely because 
the reproduction process, which is elastic by nature, is 
here forced to its extreme :·limits ••• the credit system 
accelerates the material development of the productive 
forces and the development of the world market. It is 
the historical mission of the capitalist system of production 
to raise these material foundations of the new mode of 
production to a degree of perfection. At the same time 
credit accelerates the violent eruptions of this contrad-
iction - crises - and thereby the elements of disinteg-
ration of the old mode of production."33 
"The two characteristics immanent in the credit system 
are ••• to develop the incentive of capitalist production, 
enrichment through the exploitation of others •• (and) •• 
to constitute the form of transition to a new mode of 
production. n 34 
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These quotations reflect the expansionist function of credit, on a 
national and international level. Credit and inflation are used 
to extend the world market. Nationally, the state intervenes, 
at least in the industrialised countries, to dreate inflationary 
money, and to provide state contracts to maintain levels of 
production, i.e. to mediate the decline in private and corporate 
investment. On an international level, inflation and credit 
encourage Third World countries to import more, but also means 
that the levels of unequal exchange increase because the costs of 
petty-commodities and primary produce are not subjected to the same 
levels of inflation, particularly \'There the producers are responsible 
for their own reproduction costs. 
Since the Second World War national inflation has been shifted 
onto the international plane. Bretton Woods produced a world monet-
ary system based on international inflation - "the continuous 
creation of additional means of payment" 35_ but set according to 
the stability of a single international currency, the U.S. dollar. 
But, the United States suffered overproduction crises immediately 
before and after this War, and used domestic inflation to moderate 
it. Consequently, the international status of the U ."S,dollar became 
uncertain almost as soon as it was established as the international 
currency, and this brought fresh uncertainty to the international 
monetary system. 
The Marshall Aid Pl~n, and other aid programmes provided credit 
which fuelled inflation, which stimulated production, which 
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increased world trade - i.e. the credit cycle began to condition the 
industrial cycle of ind:ividual economies, and in turn, the inter-
national economy. Without inflation and credit the crises· of over-
production threatened a catastrophic recession. 
The two cycles - credit and inflation - have been co-ordin-
a ted in an attempt to curb the problem of overproduction, but, the 
extension of the world market and the provision of credit facilities 
to the Third World are causing severe problems of their own. (Of 
course, the problems are more intense for the economies of the Third 
World where debt-servicing and· amortisation costs drain surpluses 
out of their economies, and where the decline (relative) in the 
terms of trade for primary produce constrains the internal devel-
opment of their economies.) 
Interimperialist rivalry increased after the War as attempts 
were made to capture shares in expanding markets. Those countries 
which failed in this were subject to galloping domestic inflation 
and/or recession. This, for Mandel, explains in part, the forma-
tion of such supranational entities as the E.E.C. - to help 
rationalise production and to regulate the degree of competition 
between member-countries - on the one hand; and on the other, the) 
two forms of international centralisation of capital in the hands of 
transnational corporations. 36 
The danger of both cycles destroying themselves, that is of 
becoming unmanagable, has to an extent already happened. National 
autonomy has been transcended in many spheres. 
"The international centralisation of capital must be under-
stood as capital's attempt to break through the historical 
barriers of the nation-state, just as national (and tomorrot'l 
perhaps supra-national) economic programming representsan 
attempt partially to overcome the barriers of private owner-
ship and private a.ppropriation·for the further development of 
the forces of production. Both, in Marx's words, :-.are 
attempts to transcend capital within the limits of the 
capitalist mode of production itself. Hence, both merely 
reproduce on a higher plane the internal contradictions of 
this mode of production, above all the antagonism between 
use-value and exchange-value which lies at the root of all 
the contradictions of capitalist commodl ty production." 37 
Mandel sees, 
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"an intensification in the age of Late Capital ism of all the 
contradictions inherent in imperialism: the antagonism between 
capital and labour in the metropolitan countries and the 
semi-colonies; the antagonism between imperialist metrop;wl-
itan states and colonial or semi-colonial nations; the 
intensification of inter-imperialist rivalry." 38 
The truth of the latter statement can be tested only by 
examining the specific histories of particular countries. However, 
on a more general level, Mandel's concern throughout has been with 
u 
Late Capitalism as articulated at the centre, thus scant regard is 
paid to important features of its articulation at the periphery. 
Further, his over-riding concern with industrial capitalism has 
meant that the activities of 'non-industrial' capital are not fully 
headlined. In many parts of the Third World a bastardised form of 
merchant capital operates in the interests of industrial capital, 
although it is not itself that capital. Foreign aid - credit - is 
the mechanism in general by which this manipulation of penetrated 
underdeveloped economies has taken place. The effect has not been 
to extend fully capitalist processes and relations of production, 
but rather, one of the effects of foreign aid has been to fix 
pre-capitalist forms within a wider capitalist-dominated world 
market. 
34-
III 
The Role of the State. 
To understand any particular country's position within the 
framework of the world capitalist market that country's own 
momenta must be grasped. Because the world economy is an art-
iculated system does not mean that the expression of this art-
iculation is universally identical. However, the key element 
around which the issue revolves is the processofclass relations. 
The important and essentially determining relationship is that of 
production. The concern of all classes is the production, 
capture and use of the surpluses from production. Hence, ratherthan 
placing the emphasis in analysis on the nation-state, it is more 
satisfactory to examine political economy in terms of class. The 
state may be of major significance, but its conceptualisation must 
be situated within a class analysis, and must not be offered as the 
point of departure for a theory of political economy. 
As a starting point, class analysis must be related to a given 
mode of production and an historically determined social formation. 
The process of capitalist development and underdevelopment takes 
many forms. Capitalism gained ascendancy by overcoming and revol-
utionising non-capitalist modes of production; sometimes it adapted 
non-capi ta.list forms; sometimes it created new forms. Understanding 
that modes of production represent not only concrete facts but also 
dynamic processes make it possible to comprehend how Terray39 arrives 
at the categorisation of specific socio-economic formations as the 
dialectic imprint (reflection) of more thanone mode of production, 
with one dominant and another perhaps determinant. Thus, a class 
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analysis of any specific formation must proceed from the identific-
ation and analysis of co-existing modes of production- Mandel's 
articulated system - and from an investigation of the processes of 
interaction and articulation between the various modes.4° And 
therefore, of all classes within any specific society within the 
framework of an analysis of the relations of that economy with the 
international economy. 
"The social formations of underdeveloped capitalism are a 
consequence both of Africa's prehistory and of the impact 
of external forces which distorted the development of the 
forces and-relations of production."4I 
If Shivji42 is correct, capitalism has historically served to 
conserve petty commodity production in the urban areas of Africa -
with the minimum amount of capital investment - and preserve non-
capitalist modes of production in the countryside. In other words, 
in many African societies suffering capitalist penetration, the 
. . 
capitalist-mode leaves the production of many commodities to local 
producers - either handicraft indutries or small-scale capitalist 
enterprises. The logic behind this is that fore~gn capital, with 
all its superstructural institutions, sees in the Third World not 
potential fully-fledged advanced industrial centres, but only 
markets for manufactured goods and sources of raw materials. The 
capitalist mode is generally only concerned with the export sector 
and with the consumption requirements of local elites. Mandel's 
work on the concentration and centralisation of capital suggests 
that this pattern is changing. The extension of the market necess-
ary to secure growing demand (and th~refore sales and profits) means 
that the potential--for consumption in the African market must be 
realiseQ. Increasingly all forms of production are taken over by 
capitalists, whether they are local businessmen, foreign firms, 
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state enterprises, or various combinations of all three. Further, 
an essential feature of Il'landel 's general argument is that the 
production of raw materials and primary produce - in the country-
side - is periodically capitalised to 'cheapen' their costs. 
Shivji's thesis is that the form of capital presently operat-
ing in the Third World is not generally industrial capital, i.e. 
capital· which is used to introduce industrial production techniques 
such as new machinery and new organisational patterns whichwould 
revolutionise the whole productive process, and thereby, the rela-
tions of production. The most common form is mercantile. 
Precisely as Lenin has argued, 43 the presence of :merchant capital 
is not a sufficient premise for the development of a fully capi t-
alist mode of production because it does not break up old modes of 
production and replace them by the capitalist mode. On the other 
hand, it is Kay's contention that merchant capital 
"within the world economy as a whole •• became an aspect of 
industrial capital" although after the Industrial Revolution 
"it remained the only form of capital presen-e• until the I930' s. 44 
Because 
"merchant capital has two sources of profits: the surplus-
value of productive capital in the developed countries and 
the surplus product of non-capitalist producers in the 
underdeveloped world,"45 
its concern is to preserve the status quo. However, as Mandel and 
Kay stress, merchant capital is no longer an autonomous phenomenon. 
Since the Depression of the !930' s, with the collapse of primary 
commodity _ _. prices, merchant capital has come more and more under the 
control of industrial aapi tal -in order to ensure the production of 
necessary meansofproduction. The superstructural features devel-
oped by merchant capital to preserve its profits and to ensure no 
changes occurred were taken overbyproductive capital. Merchant 
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capital represses autonomous economic development and at the same 
time reorganises production to satisfy the external interests of 
industrial capitalism. Pre-capitalist local structures have been 
successfully allied and integrated by capital to ensure more 
intense exploitation. 
Productive· capital is the determinant element in the circuit 
of capital, although merchant capital is one of its useful agents. 
Another is finance capital. 
"Finance capital, the banks in particular, are the book-
keepers of social capital. In their roles as lenders 
directing capital from one branch of production to another 
••. they plan the exploitation of labour ••• Their vision is 
not obscured by any of,the considerations of technology 
and labour regulation which necessarily preoccupy the 
productive capitalists ••• Removed from the actual arena 
of value production they have become the main medium 
through which the law of value is communicated to all 
sectors of the capitalist economy ... 46 
The issue, when looking at any particular underdeveloped country~s 
position in the world market, then becomes one of the interplay of 
all the historical factors of colonialism and imperialism and 
domestic class formation. The issue is not one of either merchant 
capital, or some other form of capital operating, but of the total 
system of capitalisms, all involved in a dialectical and exploit-
ative relationship with the country's peasants and workers. The 
level of integration of a particular country into this system 
depends on particular historical events and processes. 
"In general, the extent to which international economic 
relations become or de facto are the built-in factors of 
the-reproduction process of individual national economies, 
or rather vice verse: to which the latter take part in the 
internationalised reproduction process, depends on the 
number and sizes of missing linkages in the 'national' 
system of reproduction process, ie horizontally, or the 
lack of entire producing branches to meet local demands, 
and vertically on the lack of complexity, the discontinuity 
of the various existing branches. Specialisation brings 
about new units as well as missing links ••• (T)he number of 
of missing links is more and more characteristic of all 
national economies. The ••• (country's) position in the ••. 
system of. international cooperation ••• depends to a great 
extent on the lo~ation of the missing links.~ .. • .Competition 
among the most advanced capitalist countries aims.· •.• at 
catching and monopolizing the most important, decisive 
links in the expanding •••• reproduction process- at the 
expense of leaving or creating missing links in less 
important spheres.'.47 
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The point being made is that industrial development is no longer ~ 
'national' phenomenon. The articulated world system determines the 
development of some areas and the underdevelopment of others. 
Underdeveloped '.'countries are doomed within this system to a future 
of disintegrated economic development. 
Within any particular economy there is a need to identify the 
ruling classes (the decision makers), both domestic and external; to 
analyse the modes of exploitation; and to situate the role of the 
state. The state is of singular importance. 
"The State is the product of society at a certain stage of 
its development. The State is tantamount to an acknowledge-
ment that the given society has become entangled in an 
insoluble contradiction with itself, that it has broken up 
into irreconcilable antagonisms, of which it is powerless to 
rid.itself. And in order that these antagonisms, these 
classes with their opposing economic interests may not 
devour.one another and Society itself in their sterile 
struggle some force standing, seemingly, above Society, 
becomes necessary to moderate the force of their collisions 
and to keep them within the bounds of 'order'. And this 
force arising from society, but placing itself above it, 
which gradually separates from it - this force is the 
State. n 48 
"Since·the St~te arose out of the;.need of keeping in check 
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the antagonism of classes; since at the same time it arose as 
a result of the collision of these classes, it is as a general 
rule, the State of the most powerful and -eaonomically pre-
dominant class, politically, ·thereby obtaining new means 
for the oppression and exploitation of the oppressed class."49 
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Chapter Two. 
Foreign Aid. 
Foreign aid has an important function to perform in the 
dynamic toward greater inter~ational capitalist control and 
manipulation of the economies of underdeveloped countries, 
involving disintegration of the national economy and its 
restructuring along vertically-integrated lines favouring those 
institutions whose validity exceeds that of national societies. 
Yet, conservative and liberal theories of foreign aid tend only 
to examine the effects of foreign aid in 'national' terms, ie. 
' 
national boundaries are taken as the point· of departure. Hawkins, 
typical of this genre, 
"is concerned with ••• those changes involving the introduc-
tion of a new element into the international economy -
flows of goods, services and capital that take place unde~ 
the general heading of 'f'ore.ign aid'. It is 'foreign' because 
it originates outside the national boundaries of the recipient 
country; it is called 'aid' because such flows are not 
determined by t:h.e·same principles that govern normal flows 
. of .. trade and· ~api tal."! 
This conce.r.n with geographical boundaries is intellectually limited. 
International capitalist exploitation underdevelops countries only 
in the sens~ of .extracting scarce resources (minerals) and destroy-
ing the local ecology. 
"It seems ••• that the expropriation and exploitation of 
natural resources by foreign capital ••• though normally fused 
with other forms of exploitation can be distinguished as a 
specific form, as a disguised waste of the national assets 
the detrimental effects of which. are felt only when •• the 
growth of the relevant national industry is faced with the 
problem of a narrowing raw material base, and the i~creasing 
'national cost' of raw materials due to the too early 
.2 
and export-oriented exploitation of local resources." 
4!. 
Above all else exploitation is the expropriation of surplus-value. 
Labour alone creates surplus-value, so expropriation of surplus-
value is the exploitation of labour. The geographical unit - the 
country. ·- is only important in respect of the state. The state can- . 
not be postulated as operating independently of the sectional 
interests within society. The state operates and reflects the 
dialectic between class forces in society. 
Capitalist foreign aid is not a transfer of resources (capital, 
technology) from 0n~rco:untry to another country. It is the movement 
and/or reallocation of capital controlled by the international 
bourgeoisie (in the case of multilateral aid) and by particular 
national bourgeoisies (or states) (in the case of bilateral aid), 
to other sectors of economic activity, fmr either direct exploitation 
of labour by international capitalists, or for the use of national 
bourgeoisies (or states) to exploit labour for their particular 
benefit. Clearly these two aspec~s are related and operate simul-
taneously. Hence, the recipient of foreign aid can be expected to 
act in the interests of the donors of that aid, as well as its own; 
a coincidence of interests exists. Here, foreign aid need nbt be 
immediately productive to serve the interests of the donors. 
Military aid, educational scholarships, cultural trusts, food gifts, 
etc. provide a mechanism for integrating the national bourgeoisie 
into the international bourgeoisie. 
Foreign aid is merely a particular form of capital flow. As with 
'normal' capital flow its essential purpose is the extension and 
expansion of the market, and like ~~.normal' capital flow it 
represents the internationalisation of capital. Foreign aid is 
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the provision of credit at below market rates. We hope to demon-
strate that it serves many purposes, not least a political one. 
Donors use it to demonstrate their humanitarianism; their 'recog-
nition' of and reparation for colonial exploitation; their concern 
with the development of the Third World. It is a Trojan Horse. 
Foreign aid covers as great a multitude of sins as straightforward 
colonial exploitation, and is merely the latest device by which 
international capitalism intensifies the exploitation of labour not 
fully proletarianised within a capitalist mode of production. 
The question of whether foreign aid is merchant or industrial 
capital is not at this point a major issue. Only by examining 
particular foreign aid programmes in particular instances can 
conclusions be drawn on which capital foreign aid represents. As 
Emmanuel states 
"The mere arrival of foreign capital does not 'block' any-
thing. It enslaves or develops the country just as much as 
any other capital, neither more nor less." 3 
More interestingly, what special quality separates aid from normal 
capital flow ? 
"Foreign aid flows, to the extent that they offer any 'aid' 
at all, are distinct precisely because the terms that would 
follow from the operation of the market are not supposed to 
apply."4 
The necessary characteristics of foreign aid flows are, according to 
Hawkins: 
"First, they must be flows that would not otherwise take place 
without the intervention of special machinery and procedures. 
In other words, they are to be sharply _disti~guished from the 
flows of goods and services that move under normal trade 
arrangements, or as a result of private activities in search 
of profits. The second characteristic concerns the terms and 
conditions under which such flows take place. If they are to 
be counted as aid then they should be extended on terms and 
conditions .!which differ from those which would normally 
apply to flows of trade and capital between nations."5 
Significantly, the term 'foreign aid' is used to cover only the 
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activities of governments. Where firms;·are involved independently, 
terms such as 'special credit facilities' or 'special loan 
arrangements' are used. These activities of firms are not recognis-
ed within the framework of foreign aid. ·In the world of business 
finance such activities are 'business deals'. On the other hand 
banks, especially consortia of banks, are recogni.sed as foreign aid 
d:onors - because they often provide credit facilities to Third World 
governments. 
Hence, aid has a specific meaning. It does not include in-
vestment by firms and businesses in normal activities. But it does 
cover loans, credits, gifts, grants by governments and bank consortia 
to help mitigate the effects of economic crisies; to 'provide 
infrastructure; for future productive activities; to encourage 
aspects; of production outside the scope·of local productive forces 
(which foreign pr:j..vate, capitalists are~not prepared·.to· invest in); 
to ensure political stability; to ensure a stake in strategically 
important areas of the world. However, above all, foreign aid is 
a process in Late Capitalism of state intervention in the extension 
• 
and expansion of the capitalist market. This occurs on a national 
level - bilateral aid - and on an international level - multi-
lateral aid. 
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The Aid Debate 
The literature _on foreign aid is copious. It is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to examine the particular theories in depth, 
but offered below is a brief outline of the arguments of the major 
protagonists. 
Attempts have been made to review the theories of foreign aid. 
White6 identifies four types of theories, which are reducible to 
two major groups - economic theories and political theories. His 
typology covers the process of aid-giving as a series of transact-
ions between donors and recipients whereby resources are transferred 
from donor to recipient. T~is requires theories about resource-
transfer and theories about the transaction through which this 
transfer takes place. Resource-transfer theories are essentially 
economic - being concerned with the identification of the required 
resources {capital, skilled manpower) and with the relationship 
between these resources and local economic conditions. Analysis of 
aid as a transaction involves political theories - transactional 
relationships are political relationships. 
According to ·this model there are two types of economic 
theories: 
a. Supplemental Theories wherein aid supplements domestic resources. 
b. Displacement Theories wherein aid substitutes domestic resources 
but rather than supplementing these resources it distorts the economy 
by tying loc~l resources into activities which do not serve the 
interests of the domestic economy. 
Two types of political theories are offered also: 
a. Where emphasis is laid on the role of the donor as aid-giver, eg. 
does the donor give 3.id as part of its foreign affairs strategy ? 
b. Where the role of the recipient is highlighted, eg. how far is 
foreign aid used as an instrument of domestic political policy ? 
White is properly critical of any approach which examines 
foreign aid from anything less than a holistic perspective. He 
favours an approach which demonstrates the relatedness of the 
political and economic theories, arguing that the distinction 
between transfer theories and. transaction theories is invalid. 
"Surely the nature of the resources transferred must in part 
be determined·by the nature of the transaction from which the 
transfer arises ? Similarly the· nature of the transaction must 
in part be determined by the nature of the resources at the 
disposal of eac}l party in it ?"7 
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This line of argument is correct but insufficient as an explanation 
of the system of foreign aid. The typology is adequate as a mode 
of categorisation, but fails to grasp any notion of the logic 
behind the relationship between foreign aid and the articulation 
of the mechanisms governing the world market. What must be sought 
is a picture of how and where foreign aid fits in in the processes 
of production and reproduction in the recipients• economies, and 
how this relates to the capitalist world market. 
The experts fall into two major categories. One line main-
tains that although the present distribution of aid suffers from 
many shortcomings, if reforms are initiated - to improve its dis-
tribution; to increase the levels of aid disbursed; to ensure its 
efficient use in the required areas - then the benefits to all 
will be greater than ~ny negative aspects. This scenario views 
the Third World being plagued by low per capita income and low 
capital formation potential, and foreign aid is seen as essential 
to engender economic growth. For this to occur, the terms of 
foreign capital flow must be organised along concessional lines 
and channelled into activities increasing national productivity, 
thereby facilitating a transformation into a healthy developing 
economy. 
The major critical line maintains that at very best foreign 
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aid is only marginally relevant, but at far from worst is harmful, 
particularly to the recipients. Here, aid is seen to distort the 
local economy through the burden of debt-service, the creation of 
vertically-integrated productive enterprises which produce for the 
benefit of narrow sectional interests, and which facilitates the 
transfer abroad of locally-created surpluses. 
A constant theme within these approaches is that most of the 
work done in this field of study is based on neo-classical economic 
theory, whether under the auspices of the radical structuralists 
of the Dependency School, or by conservatives like Bauer. 8 
The end of the Development Decade (I960-I970) witnessed the 
failure of the expectations of the pro-aid lobby: 'development' had 
not come to the Third World. Myrdal9 and PearsoniO explain the 
failure i-n terms of an admixture of technical and psychological 
factors. The Third World otherwise termed 'less developed countries' 
or ~eveloping countries' suffered, according to this view, from a 
shortage of capital for investment in productive activities. In 
such economies, structures for capital formation were said not to 
exist, and what capital and institutions.did exist were in danger o~ 
being swamped by a so-called population explosion. The problems were 
intensified by the decline in levels of foreign aid dispersed to 
these countries. Inflation and the refusal of the major aid donor 
- the United States - to increase its levels of aid are isolated as 
the key factors. 
Myrdal situates the cause of the decline in U.S. aid within 
changes in the 'collective u.s. psyche' resulting from its 
experience in Vietnam, and the realisation that many recipients of 
U.S. aid were far from uncritical of the U.S.'s role as policeman 
of the world. Further, toward the end of the 1960's the U.S. 
economy experienced a slump, which led to a keen national debate 
on the morality of 'giving' money to foreigners while many Ameri-
cans were in need. 
This reassessment by donors found its ideological counterpart 
in the work of economists like Bauer. He maintained that recipients 
of aid are in·many ways robbing the donors by diverting the latter's 
hard-earned scarce resources from advanced productive sectors, in 
the industrialised nations, to backward unproductive sectors in the 
Third World, thereby protecting inefficient producers from the 
beneficial market imperative to progress, develop and advance 
productive activities. His claim was that recipients successfully 
manipulated fallacious arguments - namely that the under-development 
of the underdeveloped areas was caused by the industrially-advanced 
countries during their colonial era - to place moral pressure on the 
latter to all.e:v:iat.e·. their suffering. For Bauer, foreign aid is 
nothing more than charity, and as such tends to create relationships 
of dependency. 
The econometrics of the various approaches are examined by Enos11 
and Griffin1~, who attempt to relate the econometric models to the 
international economy. They conclude that foreign aid is merely a 
mechanism for intensifying the expioitation of labour in underdevel-
oped economies. They call for total default on all debts owed by 
the Third World, and recommend that all future aid be refused. 
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The necessity of situating foreign aid in a perspective which 
involves the analysis of the historical development of the internat-
ional economy is further stressed by Mende13 and Byres14 • Both 
recognise and identify foreign aid as figuring strongly in the 
process of exploitation of workers and peasants in the Third World. 
Mende, however, maintains that in the final analysis, beneath the 
exploitative aspects of the present system of foreign aid, aid is 
- in carefully controlled conditions - a useful stimulant to 
economic development. 
Finally, the structures and role of multilateral aid figure 
strongly in the recent literature. Multilateral aid reflects the 
intensified co-operation, co-ordination and centralisation of 
capitalist activity on an international plane. Just as transnational 
corporations represent the concentration and centralisation of capital 
and with it the internationalisation of the division of labour; and 
political blocs (eg. the E.E.C.) represent the beginnings of the 
transcendence of national political units, so it is intended to show 
that multilateral aid is the co-ordinated attempt by the major cap-
italist powers to manipulate the economies of the underdeueloped 
countries. 
r.rany o:f the pro-aid lobbyists, who favour foreign aid on purely al tit"-
uistic grounds, favour the further development of mul tilateralism. Their 
belief is that if aid is dispersed through supposedly independent agencies, 
then the narrow self-interest so much a part of'·bilateral aid will be 
avoided. It is a v.iew·attacked by NisseJ5, Payei6, Haytei7 , and Cleaver18 , 
who demonstrate that the multilateral aid agencies act in the 
interests of the major donors against the workers and peasants of 
the Third World. 
Toward the Multilateral Aid System 
Following the Second World War and the formation of the United 
Nations Organisation, two major, newly created multilateral aid 
agencies were absorbed as executive agencies of the UNO. One was 
the International Monetary Fund, and the other its sister organis-
ation, the World Bank Group (at the time, simply the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development). 
Other Western m,ul tilateral agencies exist but these are limited 
to particular geographical units with regard to membership. The E.E.C. 
has an agency,;._as does the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development. What is being attempted is a co-ordination of the 
foreign aid activities of groups of countries, by supplementing and 
finally eliminating bilateral aid. Between the various multilateral 
agencies a growing degree of co-ordination is also occurring. 
Johnson attributes this multilateralisation to the impact of the 
Vietnam War - the U.S. being unwilling to act alone in its self-
defined role as ''creator and protector of democracy'I9-:- and the 
liberal fears that bilateral aid represented only narrow sectional 
interests. Between !966 - I97I, as the amount of aid dispersed 
declined, so multilateral aid increased absolutely and relatively. 
In I966 US ~336 million took the form of multilateral aid (ie. six 
per cent of total aid dispersed). By I97I the relative figures were 
20 US ~I,287 million and I7 per cent • To explain this trend by 
reference to the Vietnam War is to miss the point completely. 
During the Second World War, the major capitalist industrial 
powers envisaged, in the light of the Depression, a new post-War 
world economic order. The Bretton Woods package reflected the 
success of u.s. ne·gotiators in establishing a system favourable to 
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the United States. It reflected the confirmation of the u.s. as 
the major western superpower. 
Before I939, in the face of the Depression, Sterling Bloc 
countries hinder~d the import of U.S. goods. This protectionism 
guaranteed Britain the largest market bloc in the world, and 
ensured cheap imports of food and raw materials; but at the same 
time preve~ted the expansion of the u.s. economy. The U.S. feared 
a financial and trade war and called for a greater degree of free 
tr~e to which Britain responded negatively. Fortunately for the 
u.s., World War II arrived which stimulated her economy. By I94I 
the u.s. economy had picked up enough, and Britain's had declined in 
face of the War, for Britain to seek loans from the U .-~. Government. 
Keynes negotiated the Lend-Lease Loan on the basis that unless ample 
aid was forthcoming from the U.S., "the British would have to impose 
even tighter and more stringent financial and trade controls after 
the Wa.r."~:r 
One condition of the Atlantic Charter of I94I {Point IV) was 
that the US. and UK. should enforce after the War, free access to 
trade and raw materials throughout their spheres of influence 
"with due respect for their existing obligations." 22 {Emphasis 
added). Hence, a compromise was reached whereby the US. appeared 
to have failed to achieve what was for them "the key point of their 
postwar construction plans: the destruction of the Sterling Bloc."23 
The US needed free trade policies. 
"To avoid stagnation and depression, the American economy 
required free access to needed raw materials and markets for 
both surplus capital and goods."24 
This was recognised by Hull, in I943 the US Secretary of State, 
forecasting the postwar scenario. 
"Foreign markets will be very important to us then and will 
continue to be essential as far as anyone can see ahead. It 
will be well to have ••• a tested and tried instrument for 
obtaining the reduction of foreign trade barriers and the 
elimination of discrimination against our products.n25 
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During the previous year Britain's war effort had called forth 
greater US support. This gave the US the lever to obtain the deal 
they required. Thus, the final document of the Lend-Lease Agree-
ment (Article VIII) guaranteed efforts toward 
"the elimination of all forms of discriminatory treatment in 
international commerce, and to the reduction of tariffs and 
th t d b . ..26 o er rae arr1ers; .•• 
Before and during the War Keynes and many other economists and poli-
ticians saw the need for policies, internationally arrived at, to 
avoid another Depression. It was envisaged that the development of 
an ever-growing world capitalist market would ~olve ·the problems 
faced during the Depression. Article VII of the Agreement called 
for the world's reconstruction and development through 
"the expansion, by appropriate international and domestic 
. . . 
measures, of production, employment, and the exchange and 
consumption of goods which are the material foundations of the 
welfare and liberty of all peoples ••• " 27 
Besides the extension of a US-controlled market, oil, metals, 
and o~her raw materials were sought, and the reserves of capital 
accumulated by the US during the ~-lar needed an outlet. A US 
Treasury official, White, took up Keynes' idea for a world-wide 
·J;ending bank - an International Central Bank - to oversee the 
workings of international finance. It would serve to stabilize 
prices, buy~ hold and sell gold, obligations and securities from 
participa~ing e;overnments, and to issue note's and deal in a new gold 
unit. 
(This plan was dropped in I943 after intense opposition from US 
bankers who s.aw it as·:.an attempt-to circumvent the free. enterprise 
. . 
system. Instead they envisaged a strong institution - a conserv-
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ative bank guaranteeing private loans - to stabilize exchange 
rates, control inflation, remove all trade restrictions against 
US exports, with US bankers controlling the bank. This was to be 
achieved by allocating control according to member cpuntries' 
capital contributions to the bank. Because the US was the only 
unravaged industrial powe~ left, it would provide the major contrib-
·' 
ution. The US sought five times the voting power of its nearest 
rival.) 
The British under Keynes presented a counterplan in I94I for 
an International Clearing Union, with the intention of ensuring 
postwar reconstruction with stability. The key features were that 
all countries would have free access to the funds of the bank, and 
no interference in the borrower's domestic policies would be allowed. 
The US plans were all geared to relieving the pressure on the 
expansionary, sur~lus-ridden US economy. Throughout the discussions 
during the War, despite apparent compromises, the US negotiators 
moved nearer achieving this end. Out of the discussions came an 
agreement to create an International Monetary Fund in April I944, 
which sought the elimination of exchange restrictions and •the 
observance of accepted rules of international finance.n 28 The 
compromise met nearly all the US's conditions. The size of the 
Fund was set at US ~8.8 billion- Keynes' figure had been US ¢26 
billion - and interference in the internal affairs of the borrowers 
was a central theme. The only major concession·-. gained by the 
British was that after the War a grace period was allowed during 
which time limited protectionist and expansionist policies were 
to be operated to ensure recove·ry by the British economy. 
A second feature of the US - UK meetings was the concern with 
the reconstruction of devastated Europe. Out of the Bretton Woods 
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Conference, which reviewed and summated the previous meetings, 
came the World Bank. The World Bank's general objective was to act 
as a capital fund to ensure "the provision of financial and 
technical assistance for economic development." 29 It was feared 
that without governmental guarantees the risks for private capital 
were so great as to inhibit normal investment in Europe. Thus, the 
new institution was engaged to use its own subscribed funds and 
mobilised private capital for investment in Europe's reconstruction. 
From the outset the World Bank's function was to act as a 
i•safe bridge over which private capital could move into 
the international field. Indeed, it is one of the unique 
features of the Bank that, although it is an intergovern-
mental organization, it relies mainly upon private investors 
for its financial reso~rces."30 
The loans provided by the World Bank {the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, IBRD) were to be limited to high-
priority productive projects, and would cover only the foreign-
exchange costs of specific projects. Before disbursing a loan the 
IBRD was required by its constitution to 'note' the economic policies 
and prospects of the borrower. Credit-worthy countries would then 
be given loans at below market interest rates - only if capital was 
unobtainable from other sources - and post-loan monitoring of the 
recipient's economy was required. 
At the Bretton Woods Conference a conflict of interest was 
evident between members of the US delegation, especially between 
Treasury officials and US business {particularly the banking commun-
ity) interests. The major bone of contention arose over the role of 
the IMF. The large US international banks sought a return to the 
Gold Standard and the assimilation of the IMF into the IBRD. In 
this way, the .larger US banks would dominate all other banks and 
control the new economic/financial order because only these US 
banks owned large gold deposits. 
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Treasury officials, sensitive to domestic political pressure, 
sought international co-operation to ensure stability and ordered 
growth in trade (in order to appease the smaller banks and labour 
interests which feared that a financial and trade free-for-all 
would harm them). After a protracted struggle the Treasury got its 
way, but with the rider that the US had the power of veto over all 
IMF decisions. It w~s hoped by the larger banks that they would 
retain a large measure of control over the operations of the IMF. 
In effect, however, the IMF was an organ of the US Treasury, and the 
IBRD an organ of US big banks. 
In !945 the setting up of the IMF and IBRD was ratified by 
Congress, on the express condition that the IBRD was not to compete 
with private capital abroad, but was to play the role of public 
guarantor, co-ordinator and risk-taker extraordinaire, and ration-
aliser of international aid, with the aim of developing and assuring 
private capital throughout the world. 
Wall Street controls the IBRD policies to a significant degree, 
which in the past has been bemoaned by British conservatives who 
witness the loss of UK supremacy and autonomy. in the international 
arena. This control was ·achieved indirectly through the IBRD 
raising most of its money by floating bonds on the US capital markets, 
and its success is reflected by IBRD'bonds receiving the highest 
credit-worthiness ratings. 
Thus, out of the Second World War came a new economic order. 
The IMF sought international economic stability (under US control) 
and the IBRD sought the reconstruction and extension of Europe's 
productive capacity, using mainly US capital in the interests of 
US fin~ncial institutions and industries (which would provide.the 
basic goods for reconstruction). Stable, ordered, US controlled 
growth. 
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The IMF obtained its capital from member-country subscrip-
tions, along quota lines agreed at Bretton Woods, according to the 
countries'GNP and gold reserves. Twenty-five per cent of the quQta 
(or ten per cent of the value of the country's reserve.s.-of gold if 
this is the lesser figure) was to be paid in gold, and the remain-
der in the country's own currency. The voting rights are fixed 
according to the size of the quota. A Board of Governors one 
from each member-country - meets to discuss policy, but the Execu-
tive B.irectors retain the power to implement policy and to sanction 
loa~. Of the thirteen Executive Directors, five are appointed by 
the members with the five largest quotas; one by a country with a 
surplus balance of payments; and the remaining seven elected by the 
remaining members. Because the US provides the largest subscrip-
tion - about 25 per cent - it has the power of veto over all 
decisions because an 80 per cent majority is required to pass 
decisions. 
The IBRD, established in 1946, has a government similar to 
that of the IMF. Initially its membership was identical. Originally 
subscribed to US ~IO billion, only 20 per cent was paid in31 , of 
which 2 per cent took the form of gold or US dollars, and 18 per 
cent in members' currencies. The other 80 per cent was not for 
lending purposes , but was to be used as a guarantee to private 
capital in case of default by borrowers on loans arranged by the 
IBRD between private institutions and borrowing governments. l~en 
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the IBRD was set up it possessed only US ¢700 million, and because 
part of the Bretton Woods agreement made the US dollar ~ inter-
national currency, bonds were raised on the capital markets to 
enable greater loans to be made. 
As with the IMF, Executive Directors and Board Members are 
government officials, responsible to their own governments. To 
begin with there were twelve Executive Directors - five from the 
five largest subscribers.32 Voting rights are allocated according 
to subscription quotas, with the same majority figure required for 
decisions to be passed. The initial US subscription was 40 per cent 
of the total, and although this has now dropped to 28 per cent, the 
US still retains the power of veto. 
Presiding over the IBRD is a full-time appointed President, 
whose term of office lasts for five years. This office is in theory 
independent from member-country governments, but all the Presidents 
have been appo~nted by the us. 33 The Bretton Woods deal allowed 
for the US to appoint the early Presidents and to veto later ones. 
Nissen maintains that the structures of these two bodies 
reflected the shift of the centre of the financial world from 
London to the US ... _The next battle was over where this centre 
should reside - the US Treasury or Wall Street. In this internal 
struggle a compromise was agreed upon. The first President of the 
IBRD was to be a Wall Street Banker - Meyer. His term of office 
lasted only six months before he resigned over the issue of the 
corporate structure of the Bank. The IBRD's constitution, giving 
all power to the Executive Dir~ctors, who were~·responsible not to 
the President but to their own governments, meant that the President 
was merely a figurehead, where any decision he made could be over-
ruled by the Directors. Nissen is adamant that the US Executive 
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Director, Collado, virtually ran the Bank single-handed. He was 
responsible to the US Treasury, thus the Bank had become an append-
age of' the US Government. The banking community determined to 
gain control of' the Bank. 
In I947 after several f'rui tless attempts to bring in a President 
who would toe the line of' the Treasury, and yet who was·a banker, a 
new President was. appointed. McCloy, a banker, accepted the post 
on condition that the President· and permanent staff' controlled the 
day-to-day running of' the Bank, and that the Executive Directors 
only laid out medium- and long-term policy objectives. Als~ the 
new US Executive Director, Black, was vice-president of' Chase-
Manhattan Bank (part of' the Rockefeller empire), whioh e:ff'ectively 
gave the banking community control over the IBRD, and relegated the 
Treasury to observer status.34 
McCloy, with Black's support, brought several of' his banking 
associates into key Bank positions, strengthening further the banking 
community's influence. This reflected and was a reflection of' the 
ascendancy of' the banking community in US political circles. The 
policy of' the IBRD sta.f'f' f'rom this time centred~ on making the Bank 
an out-and-out business corporation based on financial practices 
followed by the major banks, i.e. the term 'Bank' became more import-
ant than the concepts of' 'Reconstruction and Development 1 • Policy 
was directed toward taking the risk f'rom private investment overseas. 35 
In I949 Black became President. In I963 George Woods took over. 
He was another Rockefeller man - President of' the First Boston 
Corporation, a joint Rockefeller-Mellon venture which underwrites 
all IBRD debentures in the US. In I968 McNamara, the first non-
banker was appointed President. His previous posts included teacher 
at Harvard Business School and President of' Ford Motor Company. His 
work at Ford's was characterised as a new corporatism. He was 
described as the "dean of the first class of American corporate 
managers. n 36 !J.Ihile at Ford's he 
"worked to convert the incredibly archaic, helter-skelter 
operation of old Henry to the new classic corporate style 
used at General Motors, with its highly accountable 
decentralised units, the different company operations 
turn.ed into separate profit-and-loss centers where each 
executive would be held directly responsible, and where 
slippage and failure would be quickly spotted." 37 
"He was liberal on most things, such as civil rights, but 
on~rganise~ labor ••• his views were ••• hardline because 
labor kept interfering with his cost-effectiveness and 
put pressure on the auto indust:ry."3B 
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He was offered the top Government posts in Defence and at the Treas-
ury by the Kennedy Administration, and took the former. It was 
duringhis period of office that the debacle of Vietnam unfoldad. 
His methods of operation were characterised by systems analysis. 
McNamara "the quantifier who had given us the bodycount in Vietnam" 39 
would "lie, dissemble, not just to the public ••• but •• inside high-level 
meetings, for the good of the cause."40 By !967 he concluded that 
the cause - US defence and prosperity in the world - was not being 
served by the Vietnam War. He publicly opposed President Johnson, 
so, "without checking with McNamara, Johnson announced in November 
!967 that his·Secretary of Defense was going to·the World Bank."4 I 
McNamara offered "mili tary-CIA.:.paramili~ary-type answers which 
can be added, subtracted, mul tipH.ed or divided ••• "42 
"He ·knew nothing about Asia, about poverty ••• but he knew 
a great deal about production technology and about exer-
cising bureaucratic power. He was classically a corporate 
man."43 
As the early machinations of Treasury-Wall Stre'et intrigue 
were reflected in the tJ~e of President appointed, so the later 
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Presidents coincided with changes in Bank strategy and withchanges 
in the relationships between and within the various member-country 
governments. 
Until !949 World Bank ~loans went primarily to Europe. Then the 
Marshall Plan came into operation - suggesting that the IBRD was 
not achieving the required level of reconstruction in Europe. The 
advent of the r~rshall Plan enabled the Bank to turn its attention 
toward 'development'. This reflected the concern being shown in the 
UN for the development of the poorer countries of the world. Since 
!947 the IBRD had been a specialised agency within the UNO, 
functioning as an independent international organisation free from 
UN interference in its activities and policies. But the contact 
brought pressure to bear on the Bank to provide aid to the Third 
World. This demonstrated the interconnectedness of member-govern-
ments' foreign policies and the provision of foreign aid through 
multilateral agencies. 
Since its inception the UNO has been concerned with the need to 
aid the underdeveloped world on favourable terms. Western business-
men were not prepared to invest large amounts of capital, except in 
specific areas and with very strong guarantees of repayment. Nissen 
reports that in the immediate postwar years US businessmen were not 
prepared to invest in the Third World only because of certain major 
constraints: poor communications, (highways, feeder roads, ports, 
rail, telecommunications), and the lack of other infrastructure 
(electric pow~r). The provision of infrastructure has always been 
seen as unprofitable in.'itself, yet the construction, operation and 
maintenance of social and economic infrastructure is necessary to 
attract investment for other productive activities. The public 
sector has always been responsible for the provision of infra-
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structure, (eg. most of the world's railways have been financed by 
the state). In the Third World even the state was generally unable 
to mobilise adequate resourcesformajor infrastructura~ investment. 
And also the British and French Governments were moving toward a 
commitment to decolonisation - under US pressure - and were there-
fore not prepared to invest vast sums in social and economic 
infrastructure in their colonies, even if they had been able to 
afford to do so. The World Bank --decided that its resources could 
be best used to open up this sphere to private investment. 
IBRD loans are made on terms which generally reflect the mean 
market terms for loans. Private loans to African enterprises and 
governments: were usually far in excess of the mean. In consequence, 
duringthe I960 1 s African countries sank deeper and deeper into 
debt and were obliged to seek short-term, extremely expensive loans 
and credits. Loans became even more expensive as governments 
rescheduled or defaulted on their debts and refused to guarantee 
repayment. The World Bank's offers to provide loans to Third 
World governments seemed at first like a godsend. However, it 
became apparent that at this time the Bank was very selective 
in its lending policy. It remained loyal to its objective of 
not replacing private lending if the latter were· available. 
Where its effect was most felt was in the sphere of gargantuan 
infrastructural projects. During the I950's and I960's its 
concern spread over transportation, electric power, telecommunic-
ations and irrigation and flood-control projects. But, it loaned 
only to high-priority projects in countrie.-s with economically and 
technically 'sound' policies.* Who decided what was high-priority 
and what were sound policies ? IBRD staff. Who decided what was 
*See Nissen op cit PP53 - 60. Also, World Bank Group: 'Policies 
and Operations' (Sept. I974). 
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meant by the term •credit-worthy' ? IBRDstaff. Credit-worthiness 
- the favourable treatment of foreign private investors -was an 
essential feature in the formation of a good Bank opinion of a 
country. The IBRD continues to follow these prescriptions, showing 
great concern with 
''the manner in which it (the country) is handling its 
economic affairs and the progress it is making toward 
achieving its economic and social goals."44 
The Bank requires full information on the borrower. It seeks 
"a comprehensive picture of the structure and development 
prospects of the economy by assessing its agricultural, 
mineral and human resources, its basic facilities, suchas 
transport and electric power, the quality of its public 
administration and education, its external trade and pay-
ments, and its internal finances."45 
Considering that there are over one hundred countries which 
have borrowed money from the IBRD, its knowledge of the economic 
and political structure of the Third World is very great. The 
question arises: in whose interest does the IBRD operate ? 
Clearly, if its concern is to preserve Western capitalist hegemony, 
the extent of its knowledge is of major strategic importance. 
During its early investigations, the Bank found that govern-
ments • refusal to guarantee foreign private and corporate invest-
ment in the Thi:t"d World was limiting the activities of private 
enterprises there. This troubled US business interests, which 
responded by setting up Congressional hearings in I95I which 
recommended the creation of a second branch of the Bank.46 This 
came to fruition in I956 with the formation of the International 
Finance Corporation 
"to promote private foreign investment by participation 
(only) in private loans and other investments and, when 
private c.api tal was not available on reasonable terms, by 
supplementing private investment f~om its own resources."47 
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The IFC provides small sums for infrastructural investment (machine~, 
buildings, etc.) for industrial development. The IBRD acknowledges 
that the IFC has been most active in South America, where it has 
concentrated on manufacturing and processing activities, encouraging 
private capital to become involved, supposedly bringing with it the 
transfer of advanced technology and management skills. 
In its early years the IFC was prohibited from issuing or 
investing in equities, and relied for finance on IBRD subsidies. 
This limited its scope. The demand for IFC loans rose but by I960 
it had overreached itself. It sought and gained from the IBRD, 
permission to borrow from the Bank four times the IFC's subscribed 
capital and profits. In I96I the IFC was given permission to 
invest in equities in projects with which it was involved. It 
promoted projects itself and reinforced others. As a result its 
own capital was invested in equities and more loans were made with 
IBRD capital. This induced a further growth in its activities. It 
promoted the investment of risk capital by underwriting or acting as 
financial stand~by in projects, and so encouraged the spread of 
share ownership ~nd ris~ of enterprises. It shaped and set up 
projects favourable to private investors.48 The IFC - a more directly 
interventionist body than the IBRD - is, in Bank terms, a catalyst 
for foreign capital to ally with local capital in local investment 
opportunities. For every US dollar invested by the IFC, others 
in~est US ~3. 49 
The creation of the IFC represented one of the multifaceted 
concerns of the World Bank Group: the creation of a small body of 
capitalist entrepreneurs in the Third World, allied to and integrated 
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into the international economy, under the guidance and control of 
western capitalist enterprises. This is clearly shown in the 
constitution of the IFC, and from the attempt by the US Treasury 
to diminish the role played by the IDA and the IBRD in order to 
expand the operations of the IFC. (See pages 72/3 below.) 
The existence of the IBRD and IFC did not alter the fact that 
many countries were still unable to afford the interest rates 
demanded for their loans. As market rates rose so did the IBRD/IFC 
rates. In I958 the US Senate called for the National Advisory Council 
on International and Monetary Affairs5° to reassess the I95I 
Rockefeller Commission's recommendations for the creation of a 
soft-loan agency. 
In I960 the International Development Association was born as the! 
third branch of the World Bank Group, with US ~I billion directly 
subscribed capital, and the promise of future replenishments. 
"The timeliness of the formation of the IDA was underlined 
by the emergence, in the early I960 's of a large number of 
newly independent countriesinAfrica, many of which needed 
finance for development on concessionary terms. 'l'hese countries· 
were not able to rely to the same extent as before on the financial 
support of the metropolitan powers with which they had been 
associated. ~i5I 
The cart is here put before the horse. The Cold War was;reaching its zenith 
in the late I950 's; the old colonial powers surrendered their respons--
ibilities for their colonfes (that is, the least productive colonies) 
to the safe-keeping of the 'capi tali at powers clubs' - the World Bank 
Group and the IMF- and through them, the US. This vietrl is supported by Nissen. 
India, which had strong ties with the West, faced popular 
insurrection over domestic economic crises. Funds were urgently 
needed to postpone the immanent collapse of the social order. The 
US banking community supported - in fact, initiated -a World Bank 
Consortium to aid India. The bankers made this move to secure their 
existing loans to the subcontinent and to maintain a ~uture ~oot­
hold.52 It was out o~ this concern that the IDA grew. 
IDA credits went initially on power, transport and education 
projects. The aim being to provide quickly extensive social and 
physical in~rastructure. The credits were set at 50 years with a 
service charge of 0.75 per cent. In ef~ect the IDA as an instit-
ution represents the easing o~ the debt-servicing problems o~ 
~avoured recipients. 
Its £ormation cle~rly represented a fresh approach by the 
controllers o~ the World Bank. The early days of the IBRD had 
envisaged the extension o~ capitalist ~orces and relations o~ prod-
uction into the Third World. Modernisation drives were attempted 
through the provision o~ massive infrastructural projects. They 
~ailed to achieve their objectives (ie. o~ development) because the 
underlying philosophy o~ the IBRD controllers had always held that 
the development o~ capitalist enterprises in the Third World must 
not be allowed to threaten nor come into competition with industries 
in the West. In short, a vent-~or-surplus rather than trans~orm­
ation toward an industrial revolution was achieved. The ~ormation 
o~ the IFC demonstrated the Bank's concern with the development o~ 
limited capitalist industrial enterprise - to ~orm a bu~~er group -
tied to foreign investment, ~or the purpose of producing some limited 
manu~actured good~ ~or local consumption.53 These manu~acturing 
enterprises covered such activities as re~ining local agriculutural 
and mineral products, assembly o~ imported manu~actured goods, 
manu~acture of luxury items (alcohol,. cigarettes), and some necess~ 
ary goods (clothing, ~urniture). 
The lending policies of the IDA and IBRD are the same in that 
"the Bank's Articles of Agreement require that ••• loans are used tor 
the most productive purposes."54 This does not appear to have 
been the guiding principle. Investment in "the most productive 
purposes" is usually already covered by private or state invest-
ment. In fact IBRD and IDA loans have been used in projects which 
are not at all directly productive. Further, loans often cover 
technical assistance for the preparation of particular investments 
and for general sectoral studies. In special circumstances the two 
agencies (refered to together as the World Ba.nk: Group} "may make non 
-project program loans where they provide the most effective way of 
helping the development of a member country."55 
Such a special circumstance may arise where a country preseDts 
a development programme "judged to provide a satisfactory basis for 
external assistance in a given amount,"56 but the required resources 
fail to materialise. "A close working relationship"'''between the 
Bank staff and ministries within the borrowing countries is deemed 
essential to determine that the ~atisfactory basis' exists, and to 
ensure that a project or progr~mme provides a satisfactory rate of 
return- in the Bank's terms.57 Bank staff feel that this can 
best be achieved by themselves taking responsibility for pre-invest 
-ment and preparation studies. This is achieved through Bank staff 
seeking discussion with a prospective recipient government - the 
politicians - and with the business and financial community. 
These discussions take two forms. First, through regular meet-
ings between resident Bank staff and local politicians and civil 
servants. Second, through World Bank Group Missions, wherein devel-
opment experts including Bank staff, are contracted by the World Bank 
Group to review the recipient country·' s economic and social record 
and prospects. Central to this review is a concern to discover 
"the ability of the borrowing country to make foreign exchange 
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available for (debt)service payments."58 These Missions assist the 
local government in the formation of development plans and projects. 
With this end in mind, the Missi0n demands the right to examine all 
government economic papers. Concerning themselves with economic, 
technical, organisational, operational, managerial and financial 
aspects of projects and development plans, the Missions recommend 
remedies for identified failings in the government's operations. 
Sharkansky and Dresang observe in this context, 
"The World Bank is valued not only for its expertise but 
also for its weight as an ally in intragovernmental politics 
••• The Bank (is able) to bulldoze opposition, if necessary, 
from any quarter."59 
The Missions report to the local governments and to the World 
Bank Group's headquarters. Executive Directors receive 'Final 
Reports'. Other uses are also made of these Mission Reports. The 
World Bank Group organises and chairs many aid-co-ordination groups 
which are presented with these Reports. 
It is the co-ordination of aid which represents an impprtant 
extension of World Bank Group influence and authority. Co-ordin-
ation between the United Nations Organisation and the World Bank 
group is extensive. 
The United Nations Development Programme was set up in !960, 
with IBRD assista~, and the interaction has resulted in many joint 
IBRD/UN agency activities. 
A. IBRD/UNDP: The World Bank often produces pre-investment studies, 
paid for by the UNDP, and then the IBRD finances the actual 
projects. Where the UNDP produces a pre-investment study the 
IBRD is often asked to be the executing agency. The IBRD reviews 
all UNDP pre-investment projects and frequently finances the 
resultant development programmes. 
B. IBRD/UNESCO and FAO: These agencies have been technical partners 
of the IBRD since I964. They provide technical assistance to 
governments to identify and prepare an index of projects needing 
finance from the IBRD. These agencies also provide staff for 
World Bank Group Country Missions - the costs shared 75 per cent 
by the IBRD, 25 per cent by the agency. 
C. IBRD/WHO: Co-operation on water supply, sewage and population 
control projects has occurred since I972. 
D. IBRD/ILO: Co-operation takes place on employment projects. 
E. IBRD/UNIDO: Co-operation takes place on small industrial projects. 
F. IBRD/ITU: Co-operation takes place on telecommunications projects. 
The outline of co-operation shows that the World Bank Group has an 
important function in the UNO. This isreinforcedby its position as 
policy advisor to the UNDP. The President of the Bank Group has a 
seat on the Economic and Social Council and UNCTAD and is a member 
of _the General Assembly. 
Aid co-ordination groups organised· by the World Bank Group were 
initiated in I958 when interested governments (particularly the US 
and Britain) and institutions (DAC of OECD, European Investment Bank, 
European Development Fund of the EEC, Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic 
Development) joined a consortium to pledge emergency financial 
assistance to India. In I960 a similar consortium was set up for 
Pakistan. The formal pledge of assistance has not been used for 
other countries - demonstrating the extraordinary importance the 
industrialised powers placed on preserving stability ih the Indian 
subcontinent. 60 Since that time the Bank Group has organis·ed 
consultative groups which co-ordinate aid coming from bilateral 
commitments between donors and recipient. 
By December I973 the World Bank Group was chairman of I6 aid 
co-ordination groups - for Columbia, East African Community, Ethiopia, 
Ghana, India, Korea, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, 
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Sri Lanka, Sudan, Thailand, Tunisia and Zaire. The Bank Group is 
also represented on similar b0dies for Indonesia and Turkey. 
The Bank Group agrees to participate only if specific conditions' 
are met. First, that the country is receiving aid from several 
sources. Second, that the donors and recipient agree that the Bank 
Group organises the co-ordination machinery. Third, that it is 
likely that the Bank Group will prev:ide some of the finance. 
Finally, that "governmental machinery should be in existence offer-
ing reasonable prospects that co-ordination can have constructive 
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results." 
The Bank Group sees its role as honest broker "to provide 
information and objective analysis" for donors. Also "it assists 
the developing country •• to assess needs and to use assistance 
effectively." 62 "The Bank's approachhasbeen pragmatic." 63 This 
pragmatism has involved the co-financing of projects. Between I969 
- I973the Bank Group joined with Sweden I7 times, Canadai5, France 
24, US !4, Germany 6, Japan 2, Norway 2, UK 8, on projects. Also it 
frequently co-financed projects with other aid institutions. 
Another key consultative group (established by the Bank Group in 
I97I) is that for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). Members 
include the FAO, UNDP, EEC, Australia, USA, Norway, Sweden, Canada, 
representatives from Third World governements, the Ford, Rockefeller 
and Kellog Foundations, and the various regional Development Banks. 
This group has brought together into a single co-ordinated body, the 
cream of the 'Green Revolutionaries', and represents: another step tow-
ard centralised western capitalist controloveragricultural produc-
tion in the Third World. 64 
The Bank Group and the IMF maintain a close working relation-
ship. Continuous consultation and exchange of staff has resulted in 
a high degree of collaboration "with special reference to missions, 
policy matters, and co-operation at headquarters and in the field," 65 
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which has been embodied in a series of joint memoranda. Payer has 
demonstrated the extent of IMF leverage and interference in the 
internal affairs of borrowing countries - how the I~W's primary 
concern has been to create conditions favourable to foreign capital 
-ist control over the domestic economy. This has also been well 
researched by Hayter. 67 Her findings include the World Bank Group 
in this process of leverage and manipulation. Her evidence from 
Latin America suggests that although the IMF was the prime mover in 
manipulating local governments' domestic policies, the Bank Group 
invariably supported the IMF, and whenever possible, attempted to 
reinforce IMF action. This is hardly surprising considering that the 
Governors of the IMF are also Governors of the Bank Group. 
In the next section of this thesis it will be shown that 
although a simplistic anti-socialist, pro-capitalist view of the 
World Bank Group's activities is inadequate, the Bank Group has 
manipulated, distorted and diverted Tanzania's socialist programme. 
After all, the Bank Group acknowledges its concern to act as a 
bridge for private capital. 
Nissen concludes that the Bank Group has a global strategy: 
"The IMF and the World Bank are actively attempting to influence 
the policies of under~~valoped countries today, just as the 
United States forced its desires on England in the 1940's. 
Again the priorities are economic stability, free trade and 
an 'open door' to foreign investment ."68 
"The Bank is much ••• interested in the treatment of the private 
sector of member economies, and almost invariably recommends 
not only the abolition of fiscal trade barriers and the low-
ering of tariffs, but also tax policies conducive to private 
investment, noninterference in the public and private sector, 
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and the like. This protects the second and third of the 
American objectives - nondiscrimination against private 
enterprise and particularly against foreign investment, 
and assured access of private foreign investors to needed 
raw materials."69 
Hence, 
"the World Bank is not a 'development' institution; its 
primary goal is the maintenance of economic stability, a 
pro-Western outlook in the governments of the underdeveloped 
countries, and the preservation of the present international 
trade and investment relations in the capitalist world."70 
If this is the case, why has the US Government become alarmed 
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at the Bank Group's growth and increasing internationalism ? Alan 
Rake, writing in the Guardian (June I8, I976), observed that the 
US Government is now systematically opposing the Bank Group's plans 
to maintain its rate of growth. The US is becoming increasingly 
insistent on making its weight felt on almost every day-to-day issue 
of the Group's operations. This in spite of the US being the major 
beneficiary of the Bank Group's spending on goods and services. The 
last year for which the Group released figures on individual countrj:es' 
loan expenditure receipts was 1963, showing that of the cumulative 
total of US ~5425.4 million, US ~!884.6 million was spent in the US, 
which is triple the UK's figure, its nearest rival. Hudson shows 
that by !969, the US had a net surplus balance of US ~2608 million 
with the World Bank Group. In other words, after subscriptions and'. 
quotas, etc., the US made US ~2608 million out of the World Bank 
. 7! Group's operations. The underdeveloped countries, and perhaps 
other donors, have been exporting capital to.rthe US free of charge. 
Rake's explanation involves an alleged growing inability of the 
US Government to use bilateral aid successfully as a tool for polit-
ical control. The growth of the Bank Group's activities, and its 
easy access by would-be recipients, has weakened the US's bilateral 
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hand. In other words, the Bank Group, although heavily influenced by 
US policy, is not so easily manipulated as normal aid channels. The 
Bank Group has become increasingly internationalised. 
During the Nixon Administration attempts were made to bring the 
World Bank back under the tight control of the US Government, but 
II'IcNamara, with the support of international business groups and Third 
World governments successfully- resisted this attempt, and in fact ex-
tended Group activity. In response the US Congress, in I976, Defused to 
authorise even the 40 percent lower-than-usual replenishment for the IDA. 
A report in The Guardian June I8 I976, by A. Rake, suggests that this 
partly reflected the apparent freedom of action exercised by the Bank Group. 
He maintains that US public opinion shifted after I97 3 into a more confr-
ontationist position against the Third World. The effects of the OPEC 
cartel, and the continuing criticism of the industrialised nations by 
Third World politicians turned US public opinion against aid-giving. It 
also gave the Treasury the impetus to make an attempt to regain control 
of the Group. 
Reports in the financial press following the annual WBG/IMF meeting 
(Financial Times October 6 I976) of I976 show that conservative 
interests have partially succeeded in regaining control over the Group's 
activities. Interest rates have been raised and brought into line with 
market rates; capi t'a.l increase has been severely restricted; loan terms 
shortened; overall making loans credits more difficult to obtain and 
more expensive. Finally, and most significantly, US Treasury officials 
have tried to make the IFC the major branch of the Group, i.e. the US is 
concerned with encouraging small-scale industrial activity requiring the 
importation of machinery and technology from the West. (This. is 
not their only concern, but it represents a major strand in their 
thinking.) In essence this means that international corporations 
are to be even further strengthened in their dealings with 
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and in the Third World. 
The situation is fluid. The Group operates in the interests of 
private capital and strategic interest of the Western powers, but 
the US Government has argued that private capital is now able to 
operate without the help of the IBRD and IDA. The fact remains 
however, that the Group is still the key organisation for penetrat-
ing and directing the economies of many Third World countries. Bank 
Group loans have always committed local capital to projects. This 
tying of local resources creates a process of future domestic 
commitment to running the projects single-handed. If the projects 
are not self-supporting then clearly the country will suffer 
continued and spiralling misallocation of respurces. Over the years 
the Bank Group's strategy has changed, but its primary concern has 
always been to operate in the interests of international capitalist 
trade. 
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Operations and Policies of the World Bank Group. 
The history of the World Bank Group's lending operations 
makes clear that changes in the Group's polices have occurred. 
Particularly, I968 was a significant year in the Group's history. 
McNamara became President of the Group and immediately put all his 
energies and talent into reorganising the Group's structure and 
thinking. {See pages 57- 59.) The idea of an international 
commission to examine the functions of foreign aid and the problems 
of underdevelopment - the ·pearson Commission - was a McNamara 
brainchild. Also, the new strategy of rural development was initiated 
in this year. 
What is clear from Table I is that the Group's operations have 
expanded dramatically since I968. Between the years I945 - July 
I968, IBRD loans cumulatively totalled US ~II,246.9 million. In 
the next eight years alone, loans worth US ~2I,604.5 million were 
made. The IBRD has moved into the very centre of the foreign aid 
system. LikewiseiDA, established in I960, experienced a sixfold 
increase in its credit-giving. activities between I968 I9?6. 
Until I968, the IBRD's priorities can be listed hierarchically 
as electric power, transportation, industry and agriculture. The 
projects here were usually macro-scale attempts to provide infra-
structure and industrial foundations, at the time deemed necessary 
for future development. The IDA also followed this pattern except 
with regard to electric power credits which were not·an important 
feature of IDA activities. 
In monetary terms agriculture has become the most important 
iector for World Bank Group activity. Since I968, some US ¢6,800 
Table I: IBRD and IDA Lending Operations by ~mjor Purpose -
Cumulative Totals in US ~ millions. 
IDA 
I968 
Agriculture 3I0.6 
DFC's 39.7 
Education I27.I 
Electricit~ I22.2 
Industry : 46I.4 
of which: 
Mining 
Iron/Steel 
Fertilizer/ 
Chemicals 
I976 
2974.0 
276.2 
569.0 
782.I 
478.9 
2.5 
423.4 
Transport 6I7.0 2078.9 
Telecomms. 
Water 
74.8 470.0 
34.0 29I.2 
Total IDA credits (Cumulative) 
Total IBRD loans 
Total Operations 
" 
" 
IBRD 
I968 
942.3 
664-7 
34-9 
3826.4 
III7· .• 8 
197 .I 
4I4-3 
II2.0 
I976 
5I42.3 
326I.8 
IOI3.8 
7670.4 
2952.2 
566.I 
844.0 
563.0 
I968 
I252.9 
704-4 
I62.0 
3948.6 
I579.2 
I97 .I 
4I4-3 
II2.0 
BOTH 
I976 
8II6.3 
3548.0 
I582.8 
8452-5 
342I.I 
568.6 
844.0 
986.4 
3639-I 
I44.I 
74.2 
87I2 .8 4256. I I079I. 7 
I264.2 
I372 .8 
794.2 2I8.9 
I08I.6 I08.2 
I968 
1788.4 
II246.9 
I3035.3 
.!2li 
I0090.I 
3285I.5 
4294·I:.5 
Source:·Figures taken from I968, I969 and I976 World Bank Annual 
Reports. 
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million has been loaned in this sphere. Transportation has remained 
another major interest, as has electric power. Industry has been 
relatively less favoured than other spheres, but the increased 
attraction of DFC's (Development Finance Companies) to Bank Group 
staff makes direct comparison difficult because much of the finance 
made available by the World Bank GrouP-inspired DFC's is specifically 
--intended for small-scale activity. 
In terms of relative increases (see Table 2) over the periods 
I945 - I968 (for the IBRD) and I960 - I968 (for the IDA), water 
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Table 2: Simplified Table showing amount (rounded) of cumulative 
lending between I968- I976, and increase (as multiple) overlending 
between I945 - I968 (for IBRD) and I960 - I968 (for IDA). 
US ~ millions. 
IDA Increase IBRD Increase Both Increase Rate Rate:: Rate 
Agriculture 2600 XIO 4200 X 5 6800 X 6 
DFC's 240 X 7 2500 X 5 2940 X 5 
Education 440 X 4 IOOO X30 I440 XIO 
Electricity 660 X 6 3900 X 2 4500 X 2.5 
Industry I8 Zero I700 X 2 I700 X 2 
Transport I450 X 3 5000 X 2 6450 X 2 
Telecomms. 400 X 6 680 X 6 I200 X 6 
Water 260 X 9 IOOO XI5 I260 XI2 
systems, education, telecommunications and agriculture have been 
areas of major growth. IBRD lending for educational projects has 
expanded thirty-fold compared to the earlier period, and for water 
provision, fifteen-fold. IDA creditsforagriculture have shown a 
ten-fold increase, and wa~er supply a nine-fold increase. 
The Tables do not provide a clear picture of the type of agric-
ulture, industry, education etc. projects being financed. The 
motivation behind the expansion of these areas is easier to ascertain. 
We have already shown that the Bank Group 1 s general perspective 
favours the extension and expansion of world trade, and of the 
activities of private enterprise. This perspective is reflected in 
the spheres in which the Group is active, in the types of projects 
constructed with the Group's aid, and in the functions of the Group's 
lending. 
The example of Tanzania demonstrates that the agricultural 
sector has 'benefited' most from the Group's activity, and most 
other project loans (for education, transport, water supply and 
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industry) have been geared toward facilitating increased product-
ivity in agriculture. The types of agricultural systems encouraged 
ny the Group reflect· its philosophy on the nature of development •. 
Individual member-countries of the Bank Group have their own 
views on the uses to which foreign aid ought to be put. The major 
industrialised countries control the Bank Group (with the US dominant) 
through their majority holding of voting rights and their power to 
appoint some of the Executive Directors. Bank'Group staff also have 
some influence over policy and operations. Those at the Washington 
headquarters are responsible for the execution of the general 
policies and Qutlines agreed between the Executive Directors. Bank 
staff in the field are responsible to regional and central head-
quarters for research, monitoring and carrying out the specific pro-
jects and policies agreed in Washington. This system is not so 
compartmentalised as appears here. The staff see themselves as 
being the real experts, and a channel of information exists between 
staff working in the field, headquarters and the Executive Directors, 
ie. the flow of information and pressure is two-way. Staff have on 
occasion opposed the wishes and directives of the Executive Directors, 
and it is certain that in the past, the army of academics and 
technical experts working for the Bank Group have been able to 
convince the Executive Directors of the correctness of staff actions12 
This assumes a gap between staff thinking and Executive Directors' 
thinking. In recent years the US Government has attempted to limit 
the activities of the Bank Group, and has sought to harden the terms 
of aid given, but this does not demonstrate a fundamental ideolog-
ical split. It demonstrates merely that the institutionalisation of 
the Bank Group has meant that staff have a vested interest in 
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maintaining its level of activity. The size of Bank Group activity 
and the influence of the staff has involved a degree of internation 
-alisation, giving the Group an organisational logic of its own. 
Many of the staff are from the Third World, and an ideology of 
.t·globalism' does exist within the Group. However, the divisions 
between staff and Executive Directors are superficial. 
World Bank Group staff, especially in the higher echelons are 
fully committed to a capitalist ideology. At the very top staff are 
power strategists. McNamara's appointment has been viewed as 
"an extension of his authority as principal strategist of 
Pax Americana from national to world scope ••• He was now 
able to lay down explicit social-policy conditions to be 
adopted by all applicants for World Bank loans."7 3 
Obviously one man does not make the Group, but McNamara is supported 
by his political allies in the us, by many Third World Governments 
who need his support to obtain loans, and by the MNC's which benefit 
from Bank Group spending. 
His appointment reflected a realisation that a new strategy for 
maintaining Western influence in the Third ~lorld was required. The 
new strategy is reflected in the earlier Tables - increased Group 
activity, both geographically and financially. However, the new 
strategy found its ideological feet through the Pearson Commission. 
The Pearson Commission 
At the beginning of his period of office McNamara called for a 
wide-ranging UN Commission on Development. The Report of the Commis 
-sion on International Development was published in I969 under the 
title of Partners In Development, authored by the Commission's chair 
-man, L. Pearson. 
The theoretical foundations of the Commission's approach were 
essentially Rostowian. Thus, according to the Commission, the 
'developing' 7 4 countries have yet to reach the point of 'take-off' 
into self-sustained growth. This will be achieved only with the-
advent of a technological revolution in these countries. Unfort-
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unately, they do not have the resources to initiate this revolution, 
therefore, a transfer of resources from the richer- countries, 
combined with great national effort is required'ito boost their econ-
omies into a position where take-off can occur. 
The Commission provides figures showing that 2 pert .-cent of the 
total income of developing countries was provided by foreign aid, but 
that it represented IO per cent of total investment there. Twenty 
per cent of all imports were aid-financed (usually -capital goods, 
food and raw materials). 75 "Except for oil-exporting countries, all 
fast growers have had substantial inflows of foreign resources."7 6 
In this model, overall policies ensuring greater national efficiency 
of resources are required. On an international level, mutuality and 
respect between donors and recipients - somehow ensuring stability 
and continuity- will be required along with the provision of greater 
funds. 
The purpose of aid is, by this reckoning, to decrease inequal-
i ties and disparities in per capita national incomes by helping the 
poorer 'move forward'. Primarily, the Commission's overt reasoning 
for this concern with the development of the underdeveloped world 
is a moral concern for the less fortunate members of the 'Community 
of Nations'. The secondary reasonisthat enlightened self-interest 
is viewed as a valid basis for international relations. 
... _ ' 
·--
"If the developed nations wish to preserve their own position 
••• in the world, they must play their full part in creating a. 
_world order within which all nations, and all men, can live in 
freedom, dignity and decency."77 
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This argument encapsulates the view that ~rade follows aid', and 
that greater contact between nations lessens the threat of inter-
national conflict. Thirdly, the Commission argues that develoP-
ment is part of the process of independence sought by former colon-
ies. Foreign aid is identified as one of the methods of achieving 
this goal. 
"Can the majority of the developing countries achieve 
self-sustaining growth by the end of the century? For 
us the answer is clearly Yes ... 78 
Like Myrdal, the Commission saw a crisis in the foreign aid 
system. Official development assistance had risen between !956 -
I96I from US ~3.3 billion to US ~5.2 billion; more slowly between 
I96I - !967 from US ~5.2 billion to US ~6.6 billion; and then 
declined in !968 t.o US ~6.4 billion. 79 However, private investment 
and commercial lending had increased, especially in extractive 
industries and in particular to rapidly developing countries such 
as Brazil and Mexico. The poorest relied on foreign aid. 
Despite the poorest relying on fpreign aid, the terms on which 
it was made available had hardened, with 84 per cent of aid in !967 
tied to donors' exports - which effectively reduces "thereal value 
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of aid by at least 20 per cent". Further, the decline in amount 
of official aid, its growing cost, the difficulty in obtaining aid, 
were heightened by the effects of inflation. 
The explanation offered for the failure of the so-called 'dev 
-elopment impetus' to be continued during the late I960's is 
situated firmly in the unwillingness of the donors and recipients 
to co-operate. Political attitudes in the. donor countries had been 
adversely affected by the failure of 'instant' development; by the 
use of aid for short-term political favours, for strategic advantage, 
and for providing cushioned, guaranteed markets for donors' exports. 
Sr. 
The-arguments offered for strategic foreign aid were weakened 
by the events of the Vietnam War, which spilled over into an 
attack on all forms of foreign aid. The vast sums of military 
and financial resources pumped into Vietnam were classed as aid. In 
fact 20 per cent of US foreign aid was going into Vietnam during 
the late I960's. The arguments held true of other aid donors also. 
In essence, cynicism pervaded the relationships between donors and 
recipients, reinforced by misappropriation of funds by recipients• 
leaders and bureaucrats. 
(The cynicism had. a sound grounding in fact. MYrdal cites Gaud -
President Johnson's Administrator of the US Agency for International 
Development: 
"The biggest misconception about the-foreign aid program is 
that we send money abroad.··· We don't. Foreign aid consists 
of American equipment, raw materials, expert services, and 
food - all provided for specific development projects which 
we ourselves review and approve ••• 93 per cent of AID funds 
·, ~re spent directly in the US to pay for these things." BI) 
Other reasons are offered as explanation fo·r the failure of the 
Deve~opment Decade also. 
"There has ••• been a lessening of support for genuine devel-
opment aid, in part at least due to the increasing complexity 
and seriousness of domestic (US) problems - the deepening 
commitments to abolish poverty and deal with such questions 
as civil rights, economic discrimination, and urban and 
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environmental problems." 
Further, 
"It is not only among the developed countries that the climate 
has deteriorated. On the developing side too there are·. signs 
of frustration and impatience ••• There is a sense of disillusion 
about the very nature of the aid relationship."83 
According to the Commission, the plame· ,could be laid at the 
door of the recipients, althou'gh their too-:high expectations were 
changing into a more realistic approach. 
"The developing countries have ••• come to recognise that 
their economic policies must look outward and strive for 
competitive strength; that agricultural growth is indispen-
sible in order to raise levels of living for ••• their 
populations and to provide markets for their growing 
industries. The most cumbersome controls have been 
relaxed, and much more attention is paid to the mobil-
isation and allocation of resources through incentives 
to ind"ividual effort." 84 
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Perhaps this represents the clearest ideological expression of 
~he Commission's approach. Development here means the development 
of free enterprise, a capitalist market economy. (Byre•s excellent 
critique of the Commission makes the point that Imperialism had 
Kipling as its bard, and neo-colonialism has the Pearson Comm-
ission to provide an ideological tract on its behalf.85) Nowhere 
in the Report is mention made of the mechanisms by which the world 
market operates, nor of the relationships of unequal exchange, nor 
of the power relationships between the MNC's and Third World 
countries. The concept of leverage appears not to. exist. 
Further evidence of the Commission's ideological setting is 
apparent in the recommendations for future strategy. These recomm-
endations were recommendations to the World Bank Group, and part-
icularly to the Executive Directors. The Bank Group set up the 
Commission to canvass the opinions of the capitalist world's leading 
development theorists. It was always borne in mind that the Group 
would initiate the policies recommended. Hence, the recommendations 
for future strategy were to condition future Bank Group activities. 
An increase in the level of world trade was the primary re-
commendation. Trade needed to be freed by abolishing import taxes 
- which hold down consumption levels in the Third World - removal of 
tariff prefer.ences against goods from the Third World, encoura«e-
ment of regional trade, increases in the export of manufactured 
goods from the Third World. These objectives were to be achieved 
by negotiatioB• No other offering was given in explanation. 
A second major feature of the recommendations concerned the 
promotion of private investment. Foreign private investment and 
investors must be ~etter treate~', and a better 'investment climate' 
created based on 'favourable' industrial and financial policies -
namely, reduction in taxation and dismantling of protection systems. 
What is really being called for here is that the state in Third 
World countries ensure that foreign investors are given a free 
hand in appropriating surpluses. In line with this, foreign aid 
is again seen as a prerequisite for private investment. 
Increased volumes of aid weu encour~gedB(i with the proviso 
that the donors administered aid more stringently. The system 
recommended for restructuring the aid system was the further devel-
opment of the multilateral aid system! For the Commission, only this 
system could ensure unbiased leadership - under the co-ordinating 
and guiding auspices of the World Bank Group - with an international 
corps of personnel dedicated to development free from parochial 
interest. 
The Pearson Report set the stage for future B~ Group thinking. 
The changes in Group policies and operations reflected the determ-
ination of McNamara to bring to this organisationhis:known talent 
for corporate reform and modern technology. The Pearson Report 
gave the Group direction for its future activities. Its expanded 
operations reflect the reforms initiated by McNamara and the 
direction given :it by the Commission. 
Although general characteristics are discernible in the 
policies and operations of the Bank Group, various fonoes are in 
contention within the Group, and from without. {Those under great-
est pressure are staff in the field, where parochial interests are 
likely to register as large as overall Group interests. It is 
partly for this reason that staff are moved from one area to another 
regularly - about every two or three years.) Changes in strategy 
and policy are not simply mechanical adjustments by the five powers 
which control the Group (us~ UK, FRG, France and Japan). Changes 
are the result of a dynamic caused by necessary adjustments/comprom-
ises within the Group and with donors and recipients. 
Hence, given the strategy and policy outlines laid out in the 
Pearson Commission, and the compromises resulting from interaction 
between the various actors, a simplistic approach to the policies 
and operations of the Group is inadequate. Perhaps a satisfactory -, 
starting point would be to examine the Group's own explanations for 
changes in its activities. 
"As newly independent countries joined the Bank and IDA, 
and rapid rates of population growth put increasing 
pressure on the world 1 s ••. resources, •• the requirements 
of such sectors as agriculture, education and industrial-
iEation, were recognized by the Bank and IDA to be 
crucia'l to social and economic progress."87 
Toward this end, 
"Great emphasis was •• placed by the Bank on technical 
assistance to help developing countries in formulating 
effective policies ••• , identifying and preparing projects, 
establishing appropriate development institutions and in 
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other complex tasks." 
This 'new' impetus was well thought out. A recomposi tion and 
revamping of Bank Group activities could serve the purpose of out-
flanking criticism and opposition to bilateral aid, could show the 
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the Third World that the rich nations were preparing to make a 
concerted effort to aid their development, ·and could serve to 
bring.· a· degree of stability to Third World countries facing domestic 
political unrest. 
The Bank Group is not shortsighted. Particularly after I968 
attempts were made to envisage development progress over a long 
time span. The Group's first Five Year Plan (I968), sought to 
"assist the poorest ·and 'least developed' member countries"~9 Thus, 
"~t.~ps were :taken to .~mprove the qualitative impact of 
institutions' activities ••• ~)perations greatly increased 
i~ the areas of agriculture and education, and much more 
attention was paid to the social aspects ~f economic 
development, including population growth, employment, ••• 
~ls~ the pattern of lending for urbanization projects 
was changed ••• to new concepts for relieving urban 
pressures." 90 
The new trends covered: 
"Agriculture~ The emphasis ••• shifted from infrastructure 
(large da~s and irrigation works) toward providing increased 
inputs of use to the individual farmer (farm credit, ~echnical 
services, stora~;. facilities, seeds, fertilizer, and pest-
icides), toward .smallholder d~elopment ••• "9I 
Education. Curricula development envisaged greater use of non-
formal teaching methods, and the relating of subject matter to 
local (agricultural) needs. 
"Industrialization. A new dimension has been added to the 
Bank's work in ••• heavy industry (mining, steel, fertilizer, 
pulp and paper). Projects are plan~ed in such a way that they 
will ••• be in line with industrial developments in the outside 
world. Also, a new emphasis has been placed on labor-intens-
ive small-scale industrial enterprises and others that are 
primarily ~xp~~-orie~ted ... 92 
Population planning (ie control) was to be fully encouraged. 
Urbanis~ti~n was recognised as an area of great significance~ 
"The endless stream of homeless and jobless immigrants from 
the countryside to the cities made it necessary to seek 
out new ways of dealing with urbanisation problems ••• The 
object is to help the urban poor to help themselves in 
buildi~g and improving their homes."93 
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What these new trends really signify is that an important new dimen 
-sion·had been added to Bank Group thinking. Still the concern was 
with increasing productivity and· production and thereby maintaining 
and exten~~ng ~~rld trade a favourite Bank Group concern. Now 
- . 
. added to this concern was a view to solve some of· the problems of 
unemployment in the Third World. Rather than large-scale farms and 
industrial projects, labo:ur-intensive. proj"eci;s were encouraged. It 
was hoped thai such projects-would curb the flood of migrants to 
the cities. 
More significantly still, labour-intensive agriculture as came 
•,.• 
to be practiced in Bank Group projects meant export crop agriculture. 
·$xport crop production of a particular type. The costs of reproduct 
-ion of labour are. forced onto the subsistence sector, ie the crops 
are produced by peasant farmers; or by estate workers; or by organ-
ising smallholder production on large settlement schemes, thereby 
facilitating economies of scale for production whilst not breaking 
the peasant producers free from the shackles of pre-capitalist 
relations.· of production. This strategy has been experimented with 
in Tanzania~ 
"The Bank is now the largest single external source of funds 
for direct investment in agricu_~ ture "in developing countries 
•• _.(There. has been) a deliberate shift in the Bank's policy 
over the last five years (I9~9-I974,CJ) that has been reflect-
ed in changes in the lending program ••• The share of agricul-
ture has increased from·6% of total Bank lending in fiscal 
I948 - 60 to I&% in fiscal I97I ~ 72 and 24% in fiscal 
I973 4."94 
In the Bank Group's own words, 
"the· Bank's changing philos.ophy on agricultural develop-
ment has resulted in: ••• pover,ty-oriented ·projects •• getting 
an increasing share; ••• and projected net output increases 
well above the 5% target suggested by the President (McNamara 
in Nairobi, Sept.I973)~~n95 . . . . 
The concern with agricultural development is encompassed in the 
catch-phrase, rural development. 
"Rliral development is a strategy designed to improve the 
economic and so~al life of a specific group of people -
t~e rural poor. -It involves extending the benefits of 
development to the poorest among those who seek a liveli-
hood in the rural areas."96 
The strategy requires, in part, the "transfer of people out of low 
productivity agriculture.into more rewarding pursuits." 97 
"Th~. Bank's present approach to rural development has a 
sound economic basis ••• The problems of poverty in rural 
areas cannot, of course, be solved in the rural areas 
alone; a dynamic, expanding, non-agricultural sector is 
essential for providing employment_opportunities for an 
increasing population ••• (l:)ncreasing the on-farm product 
-ivity of small-holders remains a central ••• element in the 
Bank's lending program in the rural sector."9B 
This concern with shifting some of the rural poor from agriculture 
to other activities is not contradictory to the theme of encouraging 
small-scale farms because in many areas land scarcity is already a 
problem, so a need for other employment opportunities is necessary. 
However, the·:·theme stressed most often is that of increased prod-
· uctivity and increased production-in the agricultural sector. 
Although the strategy is concerned "with the modernization and mon-
etization of rural society, and with its transition from traditional 
isolation to integration with the national economy"99, the real 
concern is with more intense integration of pre-capitalist relations 
of production within an overall capitalist market. 
The Bank Group identifies what it considers to be the critical 
problem - the land:man ratio has been steadily worsening despite 
increasing migration from the land. Because of this it is argued 
that greater output must come through increased productivity per 
acre. This can be achieved through tre provision of capital and 
new technologies to introduce more modern agricultural systems, 
within the existing relations of production. 
"The new seed-fertilizer-wate;r.technology for wheat, rice 
and maize provides· the first major opportunity for extend-
ing science-based agriculture: to low-income, small-scale 
producers of traditional crops."IOO 
88. 
An essential ingredient for the successful use of these new varieties 
is heavy application of fertilizers allied to carefully-controlled 
irrigation. Success is therefore, dependent on certain orga11isat-
ional conditions. 
"The planning and implementation of rural development 
programs involve adequate regional planning, strong 
central co-ordination, effective local level organ-
isation and the participation of the rural people in 
planning and implementation processes."IOI 
The World Bank Group here recommends s~rong central co-ordination, 
recognising that the role of the state is crucial. It (the Group) 
will provide the initial capital required to organise the settingup 
of the machinery; it will also train the staff· to. rlin it; it will 
provide credit to the state to disburse to the farmers. The 
state's role is to mobilise the population. It is suggested 
that a super-office be established to co-ordinate national 
efforts in this area.I02 This appears to represent even the 
transcendence of the state. Instead, the super-office would 
direct the state on the policies it must follow. At the same time 
local level co-ordination- allowing for mul tisectoral programmes 
is encouraged "through.a substantial increase in decentralization."I03 
At this level, co-operatives are recommended because they ensure 
local participation and enable economies of scale to be made in 
the provision of services, and in marketing; and, they ensure 
that responsibility for credit etc. i-.s based communally. Thus, 
the rhetoric of local producer-control is soon exposed as a hollow 
sham: 
"Training facilities are needed to prepare full-time staff, 
and to improve the effectiveness of community leaders, school 
teachers, religious leader:!=~ and other: agents of change."I04 
Herein the producers - the peasants - are not recognised as initiators 
of change: they .need leaders to change them. The Group's thinking 
here suggests that those already in positions of authori~y are 
interested in altering the status quo. The evidence from Tanzania 
(se~ Part Two) suggests that where local elites are 'given' a 
responsibility for initiating transformationist reforms, they 
frequently distort the direction of change to enhance their own 
position. 
The picture being built up by the Group's literature is that of 
a 'global village', with the Third World p~~ducing export crops-for 
use in the First World. The World Bank Group as the co-ordinator and 
operator of the machinery of manipulation brings upon itself power 
and influence not experienced since the days of Empire. The super-
offic.es directing development in the Third World countries, occupied 
by B~_!lk .G:rq.:u:p-:t~~i:n~d staff,. financed with Bank Group funds, will be 
responsible not to the local,governm~nt but to the Group's Headquar-
ters. 
The Group has show~ itself to be concerned with maintaining 
political and social stability. Even reforms (eg. land reform) 
.... .. 
recommended by the Group have never been transformational. Feeding 
a starving population and expanding the market economy have served 
in the short-term to preserve this "stability with growth."I05 
"Recognizing the high priority of _food production, the 
Bank looks upon the need to reduce poverty in rural areas 
and to increase food .pr_~d~ctj,.?,p as twin goals. (This may 
necessitate) ••• lending •• ~for large-scale farmers when it 
·' 
is necess~ry to raise their production in order to increase 
domestic food suppl~es and/or contribute to exports."I06 
Three major programme designs are envisaged to make use of loans 
and credits.'for. qroup agricultural projects. First, a minimum 
package .approach, wher~: only a single basic item - eg seed - is 
. . ... ,-
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provided. Second, a comprehensive approach, in the form of nation-
ally. integrated programmes or country-area development schemes (e=g. 
~heat ~n ~pt). -.Third, sector/special pr~grammes such as education 
... or public wprks to ___ aid d~yelopl_llent of the agricultural sector. 
Unfortunately, 
"l.i ttle -is known of the extent of farmers' needs for insti t-
··•· .. -~ .. 
utional credit, of·the uses to which borrowed funds are put, 
or ••• of the impact of credit on output and productivity."I07 
Yet, at the same time the purpose of credit is clear. 
"Credit is often the key.element in the modernization of 
agriculture. Not only can the credit remove a financial 
restraint, but it may accelerate the adoption of new 
technologies. Credit facilities are also an integral part 
!08 
.of the process of commercializa~ion of .. the rural economy." 
For a. producer to receive credit: 
-"The World Bank has consistently emphasised that the repay-
ment capacity of a borrower should be determined by appraising 
the .productive _capacity of ~i-~ h~lding, and that this should 
substitute as the .. essential criterion for securing loan 
de~isions."I09 
This __ ~olicy of 'giving most to those who already have' is reinforced 
by the method of evaluating the borrower's ability to repay the loan 
and interest rate. 
"In strictly economic .. ter.ms, ••• interest rates in agriculture 
• • • should cover the cos,ts of capital and ••• of associated 
services. (Then), the interest rate would represent the 
cost of making capital available, thus facilitating the 
allocation of capital in line with. its most effective use. 
An .·.interest rate t.o cover the cost of capital would 
include: 
I. The opportunity cost of capital ••• 
2~: :.,~e costs of administering cr.~dit ••• 
3. The-costs of risks and defaults ••• 
-In"sum,. total real costs for an efficient institution could 
be between I5% .and 22% •••• costs of lending to small farmers 
·u ~~~-well be higher."IIO -·-. 
"Insofar as the World Bank is concerned, it expects to work 
toward-a long-run objective of positive int~rest rates which 
reflect the costs of lending."III 
9I • 
These statements beg many questions, not least of which is, how is 
a poor peasant farmer. - the person supposedly in whose interests 
these. loans are made - to afford such exorbitant interest rates ? 
Second, the Bank Group has generally made profits, so its cost of 
lel'l:ding is small indeed. These statements clearly indicate the 
Group's concern with ~iding the richer farmers. Where aid is to go 
to the poorest farmers, the co-oper~~ives are to be used - ~merein 
any individual default has to be paid by the whole community. 
· .~e Bank Group informs us that "to encourage better behaviour 
.• ... :-·· ' . . .. 
-· I~ . 
patterns" lenders {the Govez:P!Dents 1:.~ ~' w~~m loans are made) must 
have greater control and_~pervisio~ over the producers. This will 
be achieved through "special. crop and project authorities"II3 
providing supervision and advice. 
"Ari i.mportant.qualif.ication migh~ be that such credit should 
. ,no1; .. ~nly re~~te to ·t.he needs of producing the cash crop, but 
also· to the- 'subsistenc.e -· crops grown _f_~~ the farmers'· own use. 
Repayments for both would be deducted from the cash crop 
proceeds."II4 
.. T~?-e two strands of World Bank Group thinking on agricultural prod-
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uction are manifested here. Under the super-office monitoring 
general development come special crop autho~ities controlling 
production. Then, credit is provided to encourage export crop 
production ~- subsistence production, the cost of which is taken 
from the cash crop proceeds. At 22 per cent interest rate, it is 
difficult to imagine the farmer getting anything for the cash crops 
he produces. The aim is the production of cash crops from a 
subsistence crop base. Yet, the Bank Group is still not satisfied. 
"The World Bank will encourage governments to develop 
systems of lending through co-operatives and/or groups 
of small farmers •••• At the same time, it should be re-
cognised that co-operatives perform poorly in most dev-
eloping countries and ways need to be found to strengthen 
th ,.II5 em. 
"The Bank will continue to support special project author-
ities, ••• a~ instruments to draw farmers from. subsi~tence 
to commercial agriculture. At the same time the Bank will 
encourage the development of apex institutions which can 
promote, oversee and service such enclaves within national 
. II6 
programs." 
Toward this end the Bank Group envisages lending, between !975-79, 
US ~7000 million for projects, costing an estimated US ~!5000 million, 
of which half will ·go d~rectly for agriculture and half for general 
rural development. However, 
"a great number of low-income persons in rural areas ••• will 
seldom benefit from ~.hem ••• They will have to be aided by 
other means." 117 
Cleaver, comme~ting on the Green Revolution, of which post-1968 
World Bank Group agricultural policy forms an integral part, reveals 
that 
"the Green Revolution has been paid for and staffed by some of 
the major elite institutions of the American ruling class. 
The goals of this agricultural strategy based on a new technol-
ogy are to increase social stability, spread capitalist 
markets into rural area~ and create new sales and invest-
ment opportunities for multinationa+ agribusiness. So 
far the Green Revolution has been successful in raising 
food output in only a·few countries. The immediate pay-
offsinterms of increased corporate investment and sales 
have also not been as ~eat as hoped. On the other hand 
new technology has been partially successful, and there 
iha.ve been sisable:· increases in food production in a few 
of the largest and most important of the Third World 
countries."IIB 
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The Green Revolution and Bank .. Gro1,1p strategy are based on 'building 
on the best•. Pakistan, Mexico and Bangladesh are cited as good 
examples of growing disparities between rich and poor farmers, ex-
acerbated by the cr~dit and crop systems encouraged by the Bank 
Group. The overall outlook ,points to a considerable rise in rural 
unemployment, especially where mechanisation proceeds rapidly to 
make the most of new techniques and credit facilities. Rural un-
employed migrating to towns to be unemployed lumpenproletariat may 
suit the interests of MNC's ready to capitalise on cheap labour, 
but it creates political and social instability. 
"This is part of the .spe_cter t}lat has produced urgent rounds 
of discussion of land reform and mechanisation policy among 
.••• planners of the Green Revolution. Sharply differing points 
of view are currently generating a heated debate ••• On one side 
are those who think that nothing can really be done to slow 
down the trends in land tenure and mechanization, even if it 
were.desirable. Mechanization ••• is helping increase product-
ion, which is the primary aim of the Green Revolution. Land 
reform is impractical--because- the landed· elite· still 'hold 
too much. power and can block any effective legislation. What-
ever problems of unemployment may exist should be dealt with in 
separate programs like rural public works. On the other side 
----- .. . - . 
are the.reformists ••• Mechanization still has a long way to go, 
••• and most labor-displacing equipment is imported and could 
be blocked ~.prohibitive tariff duties or local taxes which 
would equalize private and social costs. (Worries about the 
mechanization problem are leading some of the economists 
working on the problem to ••• damn the funding agencies which 
go on financing equipment imports, and the 'production is 
our business'~ -attitude of. international agribusiness when 
they_are reproached .for selli:ng·labor-displacing equipment.) 
Land reform must also be achieved because, even with the dev 
-elopment of rural workshops (to make tubewell pumps and 
equipment ge~r~d to bullock power) and public works, there 
simply will not be enough jobs • 
•••• One indicator of the seriousness with which the ruling 
class is listening to the debate is the large amount of new 
money now being poured into pertinent research by the found-
ations, AID, ~he OECD, tp.e UN., .. and the World Bank ... II9 
The World Bank-Group ~ppears to have found a partial solution in 
its agricultural strat~gy experiments in Tanzania. Large-scale 
'development villages' acting as centres for the provision of 
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services and credits, and ensuring economies of scale in marketing, 
collection and distribution of export crops·have been cre~ted. Also 
the further extension of the system whereby the production of export 
crops is made and kept cheap by the cost of reproduction of labour 
being retained within the subsistence sector has eased some of these 
problems. Mechanisation is not an issue in Tanzania, labour-
intensive production avoids the issue of surplus labqur. 
The history of World Bank Group involvement in Tanzania is one 
of manipulation and leverage. Whenever Tanzania has made attempts 
to break the dependency it has on the Group, the Group has always 
been in a position to take. over control again within a short space 
of time. 
PART TWO 
The World Bank Group and Tanzania. 
Introduction 
"Aidan Foster-Carter •••• argue(s), with uncomfortable plaus-
ibility, that the portrayal of Tanzania as a country making 
the 'transition to socialism' is and always has been a myth, 
and that the reality is that it is one of the last of an old 
line of populist regimes, stretching from Sukarno through 
I Nkrumah, and one whose days are also numbered." 
THIS section looks in detail at the evolution of the present 
structures and processes of the Tanzanian political economy. Those 
structures of the·Tanzanianpolitical economy which the international 
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capitalist system has created and/or directed, penetrated and integrated· 
are outlined and analysed. The World Bank Group has come to play an 
increasingly important role in the country's political economy and this 
is one of the key features of the recent history of the country. 
Several themes will be presented: Tanzanian class structures and 
the nature of the productive forces; socialist construction; the nature 
of the Tanzanian state and its 'freedom' from the international bourge-
oisie~ 
Tanzania's political leaders frequently state that the country's 
interrelated goals of Freedom, Self-Reliance and Development can only 
be achieved through socialist construction of the underdeveloped dis-
integrated economy and society. This section is above all an attempt 
to analyse and evaluate the Tanzanian experience. 
"A new note of 'undisguised bias among many (of the Bank's) 
top officials toward the more daring attempts in Africa at 
rural and industrial development' has been detected ••••••• 
Tanzania received a $310 million loan for resettling millions 
of peasants in planned villages and according to ••• (a Bank) 
official, 'an awful lot of things the Bank hopes to be doing in 
the future are now being done in Tanzania!112 
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Tanzania is one of the testing grounds for the World Bank Group's 
future development strategy. This becomes clear from an examination of 
the World Bank Group Mission Reports examined in this section. That the 
Tanzanian state. is prepared to participate is a reflection of its own 
ambivalence and uncertainty over whatcconstitutes socialist development. 
Th~ Bank Group is prepared to provide relatively cheap long-term 
capital loans. The Tanzanian leadership believes it needs such capital •. 
From a careful breakdown of World Bank Annual Reports from I954 to I976, 
it is evident that total Group loans and credits have reached US $350.2-
million for Tanzania, and US $244.8 million for the East African Commun-
ity (a third of which is reckoned to accrue to Tanzania). Over this 
period Tanzania received US $139.1 million from the Group for rural and 
agricultural development. 
Wherever the Bank Group has a large interest in a country it often 
setS''UP a regional headquarters. Tanzania is a country which ranks high 
on loans and credits from the Group, so a permanent Mission has been. 
established in Dar-es-Salaam to monitor Group-financed projects, and to 
advise the Government on economic policies. Permanent Bank Group staff 
perform these tasks and help to produce in-depth studies for the Bank's 
use in the preparation of future strategy. However, the Group also sends 
regular Missions to its borrowers to eva·luate the progress of economic 
development. These Missions are made up of academics and Group staff. 
Aft'er a short period discussing general issues with the resident Bank 
Group staff, the Mission proceeds to produce a report on the country. 
Usually, they visit various locations and hold discussions with local 
interested groups. The evidence collected is then compared and 
contrasted with official Government documents and plans. 
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On completion of the Mission's visit various reports are presented. 
Before any report is presented a general meeting is called representing 
the Mission, the .resident Group staff and the local Government. The 
Mission's findings are discussed and agreement reached on the final 
content of the reports. At this stage future Group strategy is also 
discussed, but actual changes are not yet instigated. All major decisi-
0ns are made in· Washington, by the Board of-Executive Directors and the 
Policy Department. This involves complex procedures of negotiation 
between national representatives and the Group's policy-makers, the 
results of which have to be accepted by the Group's President and the 
Board of Governors. 
Three World Bank Group Missions have reported on Tanzania: 1960, 
1970 and 1974. Irt particular, the last two Mission Reports are discussed 
in this section. The 1970 Mission Report covers the years 1964-1968/9, 
and attempts to ·evaluate the progress - or more properly, the lack of 
progress - made during the period of Tanzania's First Five Year Plan. 
It identifies the key sectors of the economy and proposes specific 
changes in policy for the Second Five Year Plan, I969-1974. Also it 
outlines the general type of development projects it finds suitable for 
Tanzania. 
The 1974 Mission Report takes a more interventionist stance, largely 
because the Second Five Year Plan failed to achieve any of its major 
targets. The Tanzanian planners, and the I970 Mission Report, had 
failed to predict actual development trends. They had miscalculated on 
almost every issue. In particular, the Ujamaa Programme had failed to 
bring about an increase in the production of export crops. The Programme 
was abandoned. This Mission Report accords the Government's shift 
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toward the development of individual smallholder production in specially 
-created villages, much praise. By 1974 socialist construction had been 
dropped and proto-capitalist production encouraged. 
These Mission Reports are made in collaboration with the Tanzanian 
Government, hence their analyses carry much weight. To argue, however, 
that Tanzania is a pawn in the hands of the World Bank Group is to over-
state the case. The evidence suggests a full measure of mutuality. Two 
interviewees·- both of whom have WQrked for the Tanzanian Government3 
and one for the World Bank Group - stressed this aspect. The Bank Group 
prefers persuasion to bullying. Thus, the ideological orientation of 
the Tanzanian policy-makers is of crucial import. 
This raises another issue. Is it possible for an underdeveloped 
country to break its dependency and integration with the metropolitan 
capitalists? How much freedom of action does such a country have in 
directing its economy? The state mediates this dependency relationship; 
what powers does it have, and does it wish to break with the capitalist 
powers? 
It is for this reason that the content of the World Bank Group 
.. 
Mission Reports wi~l be ou'l;lined in such detail. They are a clear 
exposition of Group thinking on Tanzania. Their concern with, and 
identification of, key trends (in their terms) at least partly reflects 
the concerns and thinking of the Tanzanian policy-makers and administr.a- . 
tors. The activities of the national policy-makers and administrators 
will also be exposed in detail. 
A general concern, in the Bank Group and in the Tanzanian camp, is 
the problem of how to increase the production of export crops. The Bank 
Group is not primarily concerned with social·issues. Its function is, 
in this instance, to produce technical reports, advice and finance, 
leaving the 'social' side of development to the local Government. More 
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clearly, the Bank Group has produced in the -Reports, what it considers 
to be, objective analyses of Tanzania's economy. This 'technical' product 
shows that to achieve a given end, 'this or that ought to be done!~ The 
Group rarely commands Tanzania to do anything; instead, it recommends 
and suggests that if certain steps are not taken then certain consequences 
are inevitable. The 'choice' is then left to the Tanzanian planners, 
bureaucrats and poli ticiansr"about how best to implement or not implement 
these policies. The Group does not say 'Drop Socialism', but it does 
say that the policies being implemented are not solving the problems. 
It then offers alternative strategies to solve the agreed problems. 
An informant explained that the Third Five Year Plan was postponed from 
I974 to I976 because of a balance of payments crisis. This Plan envisaged a 
balanced industrialisation programme, based on foreign aid. However, the 
required amount of capital to meet the recurrent expenditure targets was not 
available. It is arguable that the heavy emphasis on :increasing production of 
export crops, the postponement of socialist policies, and the reorganisation 
of investment policy toward capitalist enterprise, which i.e:; evident from a 
reading of the1974 Mission Report, are due to this crisis. Such a view is far 
too narrow. Tanzanian planners and Group staff were searching for solutions to 
the country's problems, but the underlying causes of the crisis were not spon-
taneous. They were the consequences of the colonial and post-colonial policies. 
The abandonment of attempts to initiate a socialist construction had 
occurred within two years of the Arusha Declaration. Mwongozo represented 
the fin~l attempt by radical elements of the leadership to initiate a 
socialist struggle. (Chapters 4 - 6 of this section of this thesis deal 
in detail with the subject of the Arusha Declaration and Mwongozo). 
The Bank Group has no specific strategy for Tanzania. We hope to ·J 
prove that the Tanzanian leadership has no overall strategy either. The 
theme linki~g the two sides is the desire to increase agricultural 
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production. On both sides the policies pursued have been ad hoc and 
opportunist. Any wide generalisation is misleading because not all ~nk 
Group projects have been based on, say, profit maximisation. This incon 
-sistency enables the Group to be flexible in its dealings with 
Tanzania.· The only real consistency appears to.be the Group's deter-
mination to avoid conflict with the Tanzanian Government. Direct 
pressure on the Tanzanians is likely to be counter~productive. 
The evidence suggests that the Bank Group has increasingly ~orne to 
the fore in the construction of Tanzanian strategy and policy-making. 
How far this.collusion has developed, ·and will develop in the future, 
depends on the independence of the Tanzanian planners. This in turn 
reflects their ideological stance, and crucially, .the degree of man-
oeuvrability available to an ex-colonial economy which has become 
increa~ingly locked into the international economy. The Bank Group 
holds about one-third of Tanzania's total external debt. Obviously, this 
involves a great measure of control. This is reinforced by the areas 
over which the Group has most influence - the foreign exchange earning 
sector. The Group has invested heavily in the production of export 
crops; Tanzania faces a balance of payments crisis and is dependent on 
its export crops to bring in foreign exchange. So long as the Bank Group 
is prepared to supply funds, or is prepared to find donors who will 
provide them - as through the East Africa Aid Co-ordination Group -
which ease the most pressing effects of the crisis, but which at the 
same time increase the country's dependence on ever-increasing levels of 
foreign· aid, then initiatives toward self-reliant socialist development 
will always be undermined. 
Many of the initiatives instigated by the Tanzanian Government have 
been double-edged. On the one hand they can be viewed as elements of the 
struggle toward socialism; on the other, they can be seen as tokens. 
Perhaps the key issue is whether socialism was ever a realistic possib-
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ility, or whether the so-called socialist measures were merely a 
rationalisation of bureaucratic-bourgeois rule. Did the possibility 
ever exist? Was there an opening for socialist reconstruction which 
has since been closed through the entrenchment of the bureaucratic 
bourgeoisie? Certainly,the Bank Group works through and with this 
group. A close relationship exists between the resident Bank Group 
staff and the local administration. In 1974, in the face of local 
famine, the World Bank Group, for the first time in its history, made 
a loan to a country to import food. Tanzania received US $30 million. 
We shall argue that, .bearing in mind that the Bank Group operates 
in open collusion with the state apparatus in Tanzania, it is not 
enough to a~gue that there are differences of opinion between them 
which there are - because without state collaboration the Bank Group 
could not operate in the first place. The bonds and links are greater 
than the differences. This again raises the issue of the role of the 
state in such societies. The Bank Group has encouraged and aided 
certain types of development, with the support and/or acceptance of the 
state, which are compatible with, and are a reflection of the development 
of a particular form of capitalist exploitation, involving the preserv-
ation of some old superstructural forms and the creation of newer ones 
which combine to heighten the exploitation of the peasants and workers. 
Chapter One 
World Bank Group Loans_and Credits to Tanzania and the EAC. 
·-, 
.. •:·. 
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The World Bank Group is the largest single holder of Tanzania's 
external debt. The Tanzanian Government has become dependent and reliant 
on the provision of foreign aid both for its development programmes and 
for non-development expenditure. The Bank Group organises 'the provision' 
of most of this aid. 
Tabl~ 1 outlines the development of the external public debt bet-
ween 1968 - 1974, for Tanzania and the EAC, according to figures given 
in the World Bank Group Annual Reports. Tanzania's debt has grown five-
fold, from US $210 million in 1968, to US $1100 million in 1974. The 
EAC's debt increased 75 per cent over the period. In more detail, it is 
noti'ceebl'El that the proportion of debt held by private creditors decreased 
for both; and that for Tanzania multilateral debt has increased nine-fold, 
whilst bilateral aid has risen six-fold. For Tanzania, bilateral debt is 
still greater than mpltilateral debt. The converse is true for the 
EAC. 
The growth in the amount of debt owed to multilateral aid donors is' 
partly explained by the. overall growth in the scale of multilateral 
operations in the Third World generally. That the composition oftheEAC's 
external public debt is different from Tanzania's is explained by 
the different structures of the two entities. The EAC is made up of 
three East African countries - Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya. Loans made 
to the EA6 are generally geared toward providing common services for 
the members of the Community. Roads, telecommunications, electric power 
etc. take up most of the loans. These projects are usually very expens 
-ive, large and 'unprofitable' in the sense that the returns on capital 
outlay are not forthco!I!ing except in the extreme long-term. Hence, 
,. 
private donor1; and-bilateral donors are not usually prepared to lay out 
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the amqunt of capital required. Table 4 shows that between 1954/5 and 
1975/6, the average cost per project by the World Bank Group in the EAC 
was US $24.5 million, whereas for Tanzania the cost per project was US 
$11.3 million. Tanzania did receive finance for two major projects from 
bilateral donors. The Tanzam Railroad, built with finance and some lab-
our from the Peoples' Repub~ic of. C.hina, is estimated to have cost at 
least US $400 million; and, the United States, in co-operation with 
Sweden, has constructed a parallel road. These two projects apart, 
Tanzania has been heavily dependent on multilateral aid to finance its 
development programmes. 
Tables 2 and 3.show the extent of Bank Group holdings of Tanzania's 
public external debt. Nearly all the multilateral debt is owed to the 
Bank Group, al:hhough recently the IMF, UNESCO and other organisations 
have increased their involvement in the country - often in collaboration 
with the Bank Group. The extent of the Group.~s holdings of total 
Tanzanian debt - ie. Tanzania's own plus one-third of the EAC's -has 
risen \'ll'ith the ext·ension of its activities. 
These Tables underrepresent the extent of the Bank Group's involve-
ment in Tanzania and the EAC. Relative to its per capita population 
Tanzania gets far more than its 'fair' share of World Bank Group funds. 
The EAC is ranked 34th in its total receipt of IBRD loans; Tanzania is 
ranked 29th according to total funding, but seventh by IDA credits.5 
The 1976 WorldBank Group Annual Report implies that more would 
have been given to both the EAC and Tanzania but for persistent wrangles 
between the partners of the EAC. Normal lending to each country and to 
the EAC was delayed between 1975/6, but "Normal lending was resumed to 
the members early in fiscal 1977," after, "the partners agreed to support 
their (joint) services and to meet their (joint) external obligations in 
an orderly and timely manner."6 
Table 1. Tanzania and the EAC: External Public Debt Outstanding. 
31Dec.1968 - 1974. US$ millions. 
EAC 
~968 Multilateral- 61.7 
Bilateral 49,9 
Private 82.1 
Total ~94.6 
1969 Multilateral - 95.1 
Bilateral 48.5 
Private 75.6 
Total 219.4 
1970 Multilateral - 146.3 
1971 
Bilateral 
Private 
Total 
32.1 
67.5 
254.8 
Multilateral - 144.4 
Bilateral 44.6 
Private 62.7 
Total 251.7 
1972 Multilateral - 175.7 
Bilateral 30.2 
Private 57.6 
Total 263.6 
1973 Multilateral - 205.1 
Bilateral 50.8 
Private 49.2 
Total 305.1 
1974 Multilateral - 202.9 
Bilateral 100.8 
Private 
Total 
55-5 
359.2 
TANZANIA 
Multilateral- 31.8 
Bilateral 133.5 
Private 44.6 
Total 209.8 
Multilateral - 59.3 
Bilateral 156.9 
Private 58.7 
Total 274.9 
Multilateral - 99.6 
Bilateral 
Private 
Total 
390.8 
85.3 
- 575-7 
Multilateral - _109···3 
Bilateral 429.1 
Private 75.0 
Total 613.4 
Multilateral - 123.9 
Bilateral 464.7 
Private 54.3 
Total 645.9 
Multilateral - 160.9 
Bilateral - 588.9 
Private- 44.1 
Total 793.9 
Multilateral - 295.6 
Bilateral 768.7 
Private 
Total 
32.0 
- 1096.3 
Source: World Bank Group Annual Reports, I968 - 1974. 
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NB. The totals include both disbursed and undisbursed loans/credits. For 
Tanzania the average proportion of disbursed:undisbursed loans/credits is 
between 4:6 and 5:5. The EAC ratio is about 3:7. 
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Table2. Tanzania and EAC: Public External Debt Outstanding and Debt held by the 
World Bank Group. US $ millions. 
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
a. Total External Debt (Dec. 31) 
Tanzania 112~8~.209:·8 .274.9 575.7 613.4 645.9 793-9 1096.3 n.a. n.a. 
EAC n.a. 194.6 219.4 254.8 251.7 263.6 305.1 359:'2 n.a. n.a. 
Total Tanzanian debt -·.including one-third EAC debt. 
., 
n.a. 274.7 348.0 660.6 697.3 733.8 895.6 1216.0 n.a. n.a. 
b. Debt. held by Wor~d Bank Group (June 30) 
* "'"' 
. Tanzania 10.0' 31.7 53.0 60.5 102.8 113.5 134.3 184.3 282.6 347.7 
EAC n.a. 51.0 51.0 86.0 138.2 142.2 185.5 212.2 208.6 210.8 
Total T~nzanian Debt held bl World Bank GrauE ... ie plus one-third EAC debt. 
"'"'"' n.a. 48.7 70.0 89.2 148.9 160. 9 . 196 • 1 255.0 352.1 418.0 
"'"'"'"' c. Total External Debt held by World Bank Group as percentage of total.(Dec 310 
Tanzania 18.5 20.2' 20.7 14:2 "17.6" 19.2 20.1 21.3 n.a. n.a. 
EAC n.a. 26.2 31-.2 44.0 55.8 62.2 65.2 58.6 n.a. n.a. 
Total Tanzanian External Debt held by the World Bank Group, as percentage 
N.A. 2~.6 22.9 ~8.0 22.2 24.3 25.2 25.0 n.a. n.a. 
·!-· 
Sources: World Bank Gr.oup Annual Rep'6rts and A. Coulson 'Decentralisation and the 
Government Budget.' 1975. 
~ 
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Table 3. Tanzania and EAC: External Public Debt Outstanding. Percentage 
held by Multilateral Donors and the World Bank Group. (From Tables 1, 2.) 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 
Multilateral 
Tanzania 15.2 21.6 17.3 17.8 19.2 20.3 27.0 
EAC 31.7 43.4 57.4 57.4 66.7 67.2 56.5 
Total Tanzania 19.1 25.9 22.5 21.1 24.9 25.6 29.9 
World Bank GrouE* 
Tanzania 20.2 20.7 14.2 17.6 19.2 20.1 21.3 
EAC 26.2 31.2 44.0 55.8 62.2 65.2 58.6 
Total Tanzania 21.6 22.9 18.0 22.2 24.3 25.2 25.0 
*For explanation of disparity between total multilateral debt and WBG 
debt see notes to Table 2. 
Table 4. World Bank Group Aid to Tanzania and the EAC. By Sector, 
1954/5 - 1975/6. 
IDA IBRD No. of projects. 
US % million 
EAC 
Transportation 165.9 5 
Telecommunications 55-9 3 
E.A. Development Bank 23.0 2 
244.8 10 
Tanzania 
IDA IBRD 
Agriculture 109.1 30.0 9 2 (one.~o~nt) proJ c 
Transport 49.2 7.0 5 1 
Education 34.2 5 
Services 8.5 40.2 1 3 
Industry 6.0 30.0 . 1 .2 
Other 6.0 30.0 1 1 
2U.O 137-2 22 9 
Total 350.2 31 
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World Bank Group Loans to Tanzania and the East Afr~can 
Community. 1952 - 1968/9. 
The relationships between the members of the EAC are complex and 
the cause of much tension. Briefly, the British East African High 
Commission was set up in 1918 by the British to facilitate easier ad-
ministration. Since then the three members have been subjected to 
different development strategies by the colonial administrators and the 
independent governments. White settler populations in Uganda, and esp-
ecially in Kenya, ensured that a greater degree of capitalist develop-
ment occurred there than in Tanzania. Generally, colonial policy aimed 
at developing Kenya as the industrial submetropole and Tanzania as the 
export crop producer. The history of each country partly reflects the 
consequences of this policy. Tanzania and Uganda have for seve~al years 
had a trade deficit with Kenya. Since 1961 Tanzania has applied protect-
ive tariffs against Kenyan goods, and has attempted to develop import-
substitution industries to challenge Kenya's supremacy. The 1967 Treaty 
for East African Co-operation has regularised this situation by allowing 
transfer taxes to be charged if members' deficits becometoo great~ 7 
Until 1962 Tanganyika, along with the other two countries, came 
under the auspices of the British East African High Commission (EAHC). 
After Independence the EAHC changed its title to the East African 
Common Services Organisation, or the. East African Services Authority. 
Its title is now, the East African Community, EAC. 
All loans made to the EAC are equally guaranteed by the member 
countries. This does not mean that the benefits are evenly distributed. 
For example, the provision of telephone services in West Kenya is 
unlikely to directly benefit Tanzania. However, the members are each 
obliged to pay one-third of the costs of all loans and repayments. 
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The IBRD first took an interest in this part of Africa in 1952when 
it commissioned a report investigating the prospects and outlining 
transport projects worthy of its attention. The fruition of this 
interest came in 1955 when .a loan of US $24 million was made to the 
East African Railways and Harbours Authority, through the EAHC and 
guaranteed by the United Kingdom. 
Transport expansion was part of the programme, begun in 1949 by the 
EAHC, designed to ease the growing strain on the area's transportation 
system brought about by the post-World War 11 economic boom in the area. 
Ocean port tonnage doubled between 1945 and 1955. The IBRD's Annual 
.. 
Report for the fiscal year 1955 (July 1 1954- June 30 1955), claims that 
the area was experiencing a boom in import - export trade as a result of 
rising incomes and a growing demand for capital goods (imported) necess-
ary for economic development. The transportation programme was split into 
four-year periods, and the cost of the 1953 - 1957 period was estimated 
at US $100 million, most CJf· which was to be raised on the London capital 
market. The IBRD loan was intended to supplement other loans for the 
provision of deep-water berths at Dar, Mombassa and Tanga; the purchase 
of new locomotives, rolling stock and rail-signalling equipment, rail 
lines and rail workshops; and finally, the purchase of road vehicles and 
spares. 
It was not until the mid-1960's that the Bank Group's activity really 
took off in East Africa. No"·,-· loans were made between 1955 and 1963. 
Then in 1964 Tanzania received its first direct financing from the Group, 
totalling US $18.6 million. One loan for education formed part of a 
programme to increase and expand the number and size of secondary schools. 
The IDA provided US $4.6 million of a total programme c.ost of US $6 mil-
lion. The time was opportune fer an education programme because the 
provision of education represented a powerful political demand locally, 
and because the phasing out of expatriate civil servants necessitated 
109. 
an increased supply of secondary school graduates to replace them. The 
programme, begun in 1962, aimed to increase the number of secondary 
school places to 24,300. IDA's credit would provide places for 6,900 
children. It was hoped that two new boarding schools would be built and 
53 other schools improved. Of the latter, 12 were Government boarding 
schools and 27 voluntary-agency boarding schools. Theotherswere day 
schools. 
The second credit from the IDA amounted to US $14 million. The 
project planne.d was the construction of an all-weather interconnected 
highway system. The quality of the existing roads was extremely poor, 
which in the Bank Group's view placed a severe constraint on the country's 
economic development prospects. The project provided credits for the 
construction/improvement of eight major roads, covering 734 miles. 
These routes served primarily cash cropping areas, and it was envisaged 
that the improved roads would decrease transport costs and facilitate 
faster easier transit for agricultural pro~uce to the consuming areas and 
the ports. Three of these roads radiate from Dar es Salaam through most 
of the major towns and the most productive regions. One extends from Dar 
to surrounding areas where a high potential for market gardening existed. 
Two are for the Lake Victoria region; one serves the good agricultural 
region along the Mozambique border. One serves the Mbeya - Lake Nyasa 
region. 
Also, for the second time the International Finance Corporation made 
a loan of investment capital to Tanzania. Its first investment occurred 
in 1960 when US $2.8 million was loaned to Kilombero Sugar Co. Ltd., a 
company owned in partnership by foreign interests and local private 
businessmen. The terms of the loan were: seven per cent on US $2.1 
million, which matured 1967-73, plus payment of US $0.7 million at a rate 
dependent on the profit level during 1973-75. (Other contributors included 
the Commonwealth Development Corporation and the Netherlands Overseas 
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Finance Company). The 1964 loan was a supplemental investment of us $ 
1.93 million. 
Table 5. IBRD/IDA Financing for Projects in Tanzania and the EAC, 1963/4 
- 1968/9 
: Total ( . ) Project IDA IBRD V 1 cumulatJ. ve No •. of a ue proJects. 
EAC (US $m) 
1965/6 Transport 38.0 62.0 2 
1966/7 Telecomms. 13.0 75.0 3 
Tanzania 
1963/4 Education 4.6 
1963/4 Transp~rt 14.0 18.6 2 
1965/6 Agriculture 5.0 23.6 3 
1967/8 Services 5.2 
1967/8 Transport 3.0 31.8 5 
1968/9 Agriculture 1.3 
1968/9· Education 5.0 53.1 9 
• 1968/9 Transport 8.0 7.0 
• Joint IDA/IBRD project. 
Source: World Bank Group ·Annual Reports. 
The World Bank Group did not finance any projects in· the area in 
1965. But, in 1966 the EAC received its second loan from the IBRD. 
Like the first loan it went to the EAR & H Authority for rail-road and 
harbour improvement, and totalled US $38 million. Tanzania also benefit 
-ted from an IDA credit of US $5 million for short-term financing of agr-
icultural inputs (fertilizers and pesticides) for use by co-operatives. 
The following year was significant in several respects. · The 
new Group President was appointed in November 1967. (NB. The Bank Group's 
year begins in July and ends in June.) Also, Nyerere issued the Arusha 
Declaration, arguing for self-reliance, socialism and development in 
Tanzania, and followed it with a nationalisation programme. The state's 
role in the economy was to be extended to take control of the 'commanding 
heights'. By 1967 Tanzania had received only US $23 million from the 
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Bank Group (excluding the IFC investments and a third share of the EAC's 
US $75 million,) Yet, by 1976 the respective figures were US $350.2 mil 
-lion and U~ $244.8 million. 4967 was a watershed for Tanzania, for the 
World Bank Group and for the relationship between the two, although 
only the EAC received any money this year. US $13 million was loaned by 
the IBRD for a telephone and telegraph system costing US $26 million. 
The first IBRD loan to Tanzania came in 1968. A single loan of 
US $5.2 million was made for the Tanzanian Electric Supply Company to 
improve its services. The IDA gave credits of US $3 million for further 
improvements to the road system. 
Tanzania was able to borrow US $21.3 million from the Group in 
1969. One IDA credit for US $1.3 million aimed to increase the supply 
of locally produced protein through a project to develop livestock 
production by aiding state ranches to provide breeding cattle and to 
fatten stock. A second credit for US $5 million was given toward incre 
-asing the number of teacher-training places available, and to make 
education more 'relevant to the needs of the local population', ie. to 
improve agricultural education. A j.oint IBRD/IDA funding· ·operation was 
approved for the reconstruction of part of the Great North Road, between 
Dar and Zambia, especially the Morogoro -Iyayi section. The US Govern-
ment provided US $4.6 million, the Swedish Government US $15 million, the 
IDA US $8 million and the IBRD US $7 million. 
Thus, Tanzania received, either in hand or as promises, US $53.1 
million from the Bank Group, nearly all of which went on infrastruct-
ural improvements, during the period up to the end of the First Five 
Year Plan. US $32 million was loaned for transport projects; US $9.6 
milliqn for education projects; US $5.2 million for services; and US $ 
6.3 million for agricultural development. The loan by IFC to the 
Kilombero Sugar Company was geared toward private enterprise. In 1968 
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the Government was obliged to take it over as a loss-making enterprise. 8 
It is difficult to make any sweeping generalisations about the. 
Bank Group's lending operations in Tanzania during the 1960's. The 
projects they financed were developmental in the sense that the infra-
structural investment aided the development of export-oriented growth. 
If the finance had not been made available it is probable that the dev~ 
elopment strategy would have concentrated on internal nationally-
oriented policies. It could be argued that the provision of foreign 
capital increases the options open to development planners, insofar as 
more capital means more projects; but it is the nature of these projects 
which is of greatest importance. 
Foreign funds do not operate in a vacuum; rather, they absorb 
domestic resourc~s. Very rarely does a government rely totally on fore 
-ign capital to finance either a project or a programme. The donors 
would not allow it because they need to be assured of the recipient's 
commitment, and they often seek an import component to be written into 
aid agreements. Although the precise figures for the ratio of foreign 
resources to domestic resources in foreign-aided projects are not avail 
-able for Tanzania, it should be borne in mind that during the First Five 
Year Plan, it was hoped that foreign funds would account for 78 per cent 
of the Central Government's development expenditure. In fact, 65 per 
cent of the expenditure had to be raised .locally. This meant that 
while projects and programmes tended to rely more on local capital than 
on foreign capital, the projects concentrated on long-term benefits 
rather than immediately productive activities. 
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World Bank Group Loans to Tanzania and the East African 
Community. 1969/70 - 1974/5 
The period of the Second Five Year Plan (1969-1974/5) witnessed an 
extension of Bank Group lending activities in East Africa. 
Table6. IBRD/IDA Financing for Projects in Tanzania and the EAC, 1969/70 
- 1974/5 
EAC 
Telecomms. 
Transport 
No. of loans/credits 
2 
3 
Other (E.A. Dev't. Bank) 1 
Tanzania 
Agriculture 
Education 
Indu~try 
Services 
Transport 
Other (Special loan) 
Total 6 
7 
2 
2 
3 
3 
1 
20 
Value (US $m) 
42.9 
103.9 
8.0 
154.8 
104.8 
13.6 
~1.0 
43.5 
24.2 
30.0 
237.1 
Source: World Bank Group Annual Reports, 1969/70 - 1974/5• 
· The EAC borrowed nearly US $155 million over this period. All the 
capital, except for US$8 million, went into transport and communications 
projects. Telecommunications here refers to the East African Posts and 
Telecommunications Corporation. The EAPTC received loans'from the IBRD 
of US $10.4 million (1969/70) and US $32.5 million (1972/3). Informat-
ion on the precise nature and purpose of these loans is not available to 
the public, but the 1973 World Bank Group Annual Report states that these 
loans were the second and third instalments of a long-term programme to 
improve telephone services in the three member countries. 
Transport stands out as the major area of interest for the Bank in 
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its dealings with the EAC. The three IBRD loans committed for this 
sector were: East African Harbours Corporation - US $35 million in 
1969/70; and US $26.5 million in 1972/3 - for the provision of three new 
berths at Dar, and improvements to the ports of Mombassa and Tanga. Also, 
Canada provided US $26 million for the 1972/3 project, whose total cost 
was US $70.4 million. The other loan ~as to the East African Railways 
Corporation, totalling US $42.4 million in 1969/70, for rolli~g stock, 
sheds and spares. 
Throughout the history of the relationship between the EAC and the 
rs~,.the general direction of Bank financing has been geared toward 
improving overall communications. This suggests that there was no gene 
-ral contradiction between the Bank Group's policy toward Tanzania and 
the EAC. The overall thrust, with regard to the latter has been to 
develop better methods of transport for the import and export of commod 
-ities. All roads may· lead to Rome, but in East Africa, all roads lead 
to the Coast. The same holds true of all rail and telecommunication 
lines. Another motive, besides the provision of infrastructure to aid 
the development of foreign trade, can be attributed to the Bank Group's 
activities in East Africa in general. The Western powers perceived the 
need to counter Chinese influence in the area, and feared Russian penet 
-ration in the advent of the struggles for the liberation for southern 
Africa·. The western powers were concerned to finance projects which 
were immediately tangible and which were at least superficially devel-
opment-oriented. In fact, only one loan was made to the EAC for indust 
-rial development. US $8 million was loaned to the East African Devel-
opment Bank, in 1970, to encourage private enterprise in the region by 
providing credit for small firms with expansion plans. 
Tanzania, in its own right was blessed with good fortune so far as 
the Bank Group was concerned. The IDA was most active. This branch's 
loans (credits) were (at the time) made on terms of 0.75 per cent 
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interest p.~., a grace period of ten years·, and maturity in 50 years. 
The IBRD's terms were, in 1970 - 6.5 per cent interest p.a., a grace 
period of five years, and maturity in 25 years. By 1974/5 IBRD terms 
had hardened to 8.5 percent interest p.a., and a maturity of 20 years. 
Thus, it suited Tanzania, when possible to obtain IDA credits rather than 
IBRD loans. Over the period of the Second Five Year Plan, IDA credits 
totalled US $127.1 million, and IBRD loans US $110 million. 
By breaking down this total as in Table 7, it is clear that the 
agricultural sector is the sector which attracted most of the Group's 
attention. This is, in fact, a reflection of the attention laid on the 
agricultural sector in the 1970 World Bank Group Mission Report. Further, 
it is this sector which emerged out of the Group's own recomposition in 
1967/8 as being the key sector of Third World economies. A concern with 
the agricultural sector dominates the coverage of the Group's 1974 Miss 
-ion Report on Ta.nzania. 
Of the US $104.8 million loaned to Tanzania for 'agricultural deve 
-lopment', cash crops take the lion's share. In 1970/1, the IDA commit-
ted US $9 million toward a proje~t costing US $14.7 million which aimed 
to increase the output of flue-cured tobacco. The Tanzanian Tea Author 
-ity was granted IDA credits totalling US $10.8 million, in the 
following year for a project aimed at increasing the production of tea 
twenty-fold, through increased smallholder production. It was planned 
that five tea factories would be built, along with the establishment of 
nurseries and extension services. Funds would be supplied through the 
Tanzanian Rural Development Bank to the Tea Growers' Co-operatives 
which represen~ed some 14,000 families. 
Livestock production has always been an integral part of East Afri 
-can agricultural activity, but this sector did not receive Bank Group 
funds until 1972/3 when the IDA granted credits. The credits were linked 
to export potential. The aim was to increase production under a Live-
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Table 7. World Bank Group Financing for Projects in Tanzania and the EAC. 
1969/70 - 1975/6. 
Project IDA IBRD No. of projects 
(US $m.) 
EAC 
1969/70 Transport 77.4 2 
Telecomms. 10.4 1 
1971/2 E.A. Dev't Bank 8.0 1 
1972/3 Transport 26.5 1 
· Telecomms. 32.5 1 
1975/6 E.A. Dev't Bank 15.0 1 
169.8 7 
Tanzania 
1969/70 Transport 7-5 ":" 1 
1970/1 Services 30.0 1 
Education 3-3 1 
Agriculture 9.0 1 
1971/2 . •rransport 6.5 1 
Agriculture 10.8 1 
1972/3 Education 10.3 1 
Agriculture 18.5 1 
1973/4 Services 15.0 1 
Agriculture 17.5 211.0 2 
Industry 6.0 1 
1974/5 Industry 15.0 1 
Special 30.0 1 
Transport 10.2 1 
Services 8.5 1 
Agriculture 19.0 9.0 3 (one joint project) 
1975/6 Industry 15.0 1 
Education 11.0 1 
Agriculture 28.0 2 
Special 6.0 1 
Total 172.1 125.0 24 
stock Development Programme, costing US $24.7 m~llion, of which the IDA 
would supply US $18.5 million. Increased beef production - in particular 
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on large ranches -was envisaged, to the order of 21,000 tons, along 
with improved marketing and processing services, so that import savings 
from this sector would increase by US $6 million p.a.. Also export earn-
ings . were expected. 
A Cashewnut Development Programme lasting five years at a cost of 
US $30.3 mil~ion was part-financed by the IBRD (US $21 million) in 1973 
/4. It was hoped to increase employment in this sector through 
extra cultivation and a greater degree of domestic processing of the crop. 
Output was expected to increase by 20 per cent, and cash income for the 
smallholder farm producer to rise by 25 percent. 
In the same year (1973/4) a credit for US $17.5 million was commit 
-ted with the intention of providing credit to small farmers in 'ujamaa' 
villages to buy fertilizers and pesticides. This credit formed part of 
a seven year scheme- the Geita Cotton Development-Project- costing 
US $23.8 million, the aim of which was to increase cotton and maize 
production. 
Fiscal year 1974 saw an expansion in Group funding of projects in 
Tanzania. The largest project was the Kilombero Sugar Estate Project, 
which received towards its total cost of US $55.8 million, an IBRD loan 
of US $9 million, an IDA credit of US $9 million, a Danish loan of US $ 
17.3 million, and a Dutch loan of US $11 million. 9 In its early years 
the Kilombero Sugar Company was a privatelyowrred (British-Tanzanian) 
firm which had obtained loans from the IFC in 1960 and 1964. In 1968,· 
after many years of loss making it was nationalised, with the owners be 
-ing fully compensated. 
It is this programme which reveals clearly the strategy-experiment 
that the Bank Group has instigated in Tanzania, with the collaboration 
of the Tanzanian planners. The structure of social organisation within 
the ~gricultural sector is made clear: A major large-scale estate is to 
10 be expanded, "with ujamaa farming on outgrower lands" , ie. the main 
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purpose of the 'ujamaa' village is to provide a labour reserve for the 
estate, whilst at the same time providing the major source of subsistence, 
ie the outgrower farms would provide the food for the estate workers. 
The estate workers and the outgrower farmers would be if not the same 
individuals, then at least members of the same families. Herein, 
commercial agriculture is m~xed with subsistence agriculture. This 
apparent 'dualism' - and the term is used only to describe the superficial 
appearance - helps to keep the costs of production below their 'normal' 
level, by loading the costs of the reproduction of labour onto the peas 
-ants. This meshes nicely with the Bank Group's strategy of lowering 
the prices of agricultural goods in the belief that this will increase-
world demand. Further, such a strategy is supposed to benefit Tanzania 
by making it competitive over other rival producers. This in turn 
assumes a world agricultural division of labour. 
(The following chapters deal with these issues in greater depth. The 
intention here is only to provide an outline of the extent of World Bank 
Group activities in Tanzania.) 
The second project receiving Bank Group loans in this year was the 
Kigoma Development Project - immediate cost US $13 million - to which the 
IDA gave US $10 million, and the UN Capital Development Fund US $1.5 
million, (for health and water supply). The intention here is to produce 
a concerted development strategy for a single area. This reflects Bank 
Group experiments with the 'demonstration effect' on development. 
Resources· are concentrated in an area, which is then 'developed'. It is 
hoped that other areas will see the Benefits of this programme and will 
attempt to initiate similar, although smaller-scale projects, using the 
same methods and policies. A technical/economic spread effect is expec 
-ted to occur, leading to backward and forward linkages. A further 
strand in this thinking is that a country like Tanzania does not possess 
the high-level manpower, nor the resources necessary for widespread 
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'transformationist' approaches to development. Hence, the plan is 
to concentrate one's resources into a single area, 'develop' there, 
and then move on to the next area, after self-sustained growth has 
been achieved. 
The methods._employed in the Kigoma Project are based on the 'reset-
tlement' of the region's population of 0.5 million, into 'Ujamaa' 
'11 11 v1 ages, where farmers can possess individual crops of maize, beans, 
cotton or groundnuts. The Kigoma Co-operative Union is responsible for 
buying and collecting all village production, whilst credit facilities 
are provided by the Tanzanian Rural Development Bank. 
The IDA credit was intended to help develop the credit and market-
ing systems, improve village extension services, clear Tsetse fly, 
improve the level of social services, and enable agricultural research 
12 to take place. Part of the credit to improve marketing was spent ·on 
improving 370 kms. of feeder roads and providing a rail spur to the 
East African Railway line. The effect of the latter has been to facil-
itate the movement of the export crops to the ports. 
Projects for education receiving Bank Group support over the period 
of the Second Five Year Plan (1969-74) reflected an interest in agric-
ultural education. The IDA provided US $3.3 million (1970/1) for farm-
training centres and an agricultural institute for extension workers. 
Community education centres were to be established in 'Ujamaa' villages. 
In 1972/3 US $10.3 million was provided by the IDA for a· series of educ-
ation projects •. Secondary and teacher education was to be expanded and 
diversified; new medical education facilities were provided at Dar 
University. 
Loans for Industrial Projects. 
The Bank Group's support for Tanzania's industrial development strategy 
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was limited to two projects. In 1973/4, the IDA gave the Tanzanian 
Investment Bank credit for US $6 million, to provide investment and 
loans to specific productive enterprises. The Annual Report of the 
Bank Group made much of this credit because it was the first time that 
· the Bank Group had financed public enterprise. 
The 1974/5 loan from the IBRD was concerned with the processing of 
domestic textiles. US $15 million was provided by the IBRD and the same 
amount by the Kuwait Fund for Economic Development Fund. Production at 
the French-financed Mwanza Textiles Ltd. plant was increased so that by 
1980 no cotton fabric would be imported; other factories were improved. 13 
It was hoped that 12,000 extra jobs would be created in this sector,--
yet no indication of how the factories were to be organised was given. 
The Tanzania Electric Supply Ltd. borrowed US $35 million for the 
development of its H.E.P. station at Kidatu. The first loan was given 
in 1970/1 ·(us $30 million), and the second a supplemental loan. of US $5 
million, in 1973/4. Both were agreed by the IBRD at an interest rate of 
7.25 per cent. This project was expected to cost US $54 million, with 
Sweden providing much of the remaining required finance. In fact, this 
project was a specially organised join~project between the Bank and 
Sweden. 
Service Sector Loans 
In 1974/5 a credit of US $8.5 million was provided for 'sites and servi 
-ces' by the IDA. One thousand serviced 'sites' (plots of land) were 
provided for house-building by self-help groups, in Dar. Further, 9,000 
squatter settlements in the major towns were to be helped with 'improve 
-ments•. 14 The regional centres of Mwanza and Mbeya were to be further 
developed. 
A nutritional scheme (pilot) was initiated in Dar as the Tanzania 
National Food and Nutrition Centre. The final cost of the projected 
package was estimated at US $16.7 million. 
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Transportation Loans 
Roads and highways are the arteries and veins of trade. The Group 
loans and credits to Tanzania are all co7·ccerned with increasing the 
quantity of trade. Improved transport often facilitates increased trade. 
US $~.5 Million was given by the IDA in 1969/70 for road development. 
In 1971/2 an IDA credit for US $6.5 million was committed for the impro 
-vement of 300 miles of feeder roads around Lake Victoria, which is the 
major cotton-growing area, and also an area where ranching was being 
developed. The World Bank Group Annual Report 1972 is explicit on its 
policies in this area (transportation). 
"The process by which subsistence agriculture is transformed 
into production for the market is closely bound up with the 
improvement of the transport system. For this reason, the 
Bank Group's lending in this area (East Africa), •••• has 
always·included a high proportion for transport, especially 
roads." 15 
Hence, transport projects were geared to encourage cash cropping, and 
more particularly in Tanzania, export cash cropping. 
The final credit for this sector came in 1974/5 (US $10.2 million), 
and was part of a project costing US $12.5 million, for the reorgan-
isation of the Ministry of Communications and Works, (with European and 
US consultants). The credit also.,covers the maintenance of 3,000 kms. 
of primary roads. 
A special loan of US $30 million from the IBRD was immediately 
disbursed ea~ly in 1975. It was thought to be imperative because by 
December 1974 foreign exchange reserves were less than enough to cover 
one month's supply of imports. The Bank Group attributed this to the 
effects of the 'oil crisis', world inflation and a poor harvest allied 
to the disruptive effects of the Ujamaa Programme. It is worth mention 
-ing here that the cost of wheat imports was a key factor in this crisis, 
yet throughout the 1970 Mission Report, the development of wheat produc-
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tion in Tanzania was discouraged. 
Looking at the figures for World Bank Group loans and credits to 
Tanzania and the EAC over the period of the First Five Year Plan, then 
one is bound to conclude that the Group's view of the nature and 
structure of development does not favour self-reliant development, based 
on socialist transformation of economy and society. 
A break-down of Group aid over the period of the Second Five Year 
Plan reinforces the impression that the Group's prima~y concern is to 
ensure an.adequate supply of export crops. Of course, a monocausal exp 
-lanation for this concern is too simplistic, but a strand can be ident 
-ified between the Group's general philosophy and practice, and its 
activities in Tanzania. Tanzania is a testing-ground for Group theories. 
Its concern is to help Tanzania to increase its GNP, and given its 
commitment to capitalist enterprise, this involves the development of 
capitalist activity. Clearly, the issue then becomes what type of cap-
italist activity? Is the Bank Group concerned with furthering the inte-
rests of local capitalists or foreign capital? Is there any distinction 
between these groups in their relationships to Tanzanian workers and 
peasants? 
The answers to these questions can be answered only by a detailed 
examination of Tanzania's political economy. An insight can be gained 
from the Group's own documents. Besides providing technical services and 
finance capital, the Group also offers its planning expertise to recip-
ient governments. Its Missions' Reports examine the country's developm 
-ent plans and offer recommendations for future action. These Reports 
are of major importance: they represent Group thinking and strategy. 
These issues are examined in the following chapters. 
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Chapter Two 
A History of the Tanzanian Political Economy: To Independence. 
The Modern Pre-Colonial Period. 
A p~rsisting, albeit false, image of precolonial African societies 
is that'a single system of agricultural production existed- some form 
of 'pure' subsistence product-ton. 
A paper by Iliffe1 outlining agricultural change in Tanganyika 
during the 19th and 20th centuries shows that: 
a. Significant changes in the organisation and technique of agric-
ultural production were occurring before the period of formal colo 
-nisation; 
b. Population growth and its changing patterns of distribution were 
provided by, and provided a major stimulus for, agricultural change; 
c. Historically, the advent of the Arab and European plantation 
system were key elements in the commercialisation of agriculture, 
with major, although localised effects on the African population. 
d. Regional inequality and the active underdevelopment of some areas 
have been linked through, and with, the growth of commercial 
farming. 
Early 19th century Tanganyikan farmers were involved in various 
agricultural systems, influenced heavily by the local environment. Five 
forms in particular are identifiable: 
1. Shifting cultivation- in areas with low population densities 
and poor soils/environment. This system relied on little labour: 
millet and sorghum were grown for two or three years, then the land 
was left fallow for six to twelve years. 
2. Pastoralism. 
3. Banana cultures - in the ecologically well-favoured areas of 
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Usumbara, Buhaya and Kilimanjaro. 
4. Intensive cultivation - in the irrigated areas of Engaruka. 
5. Integrated livestock and husbandry - around Lake Victoria 
such a complex system was established supporting a population of 500 
people per square mile. 
It has been suggested by Coulson that Group 1 and perhaps 2, were organ-
ised on a communal production basis; and the rest were integrated into a 
2 feudal system • 
That . the organisation and techniques of production were never 
permanently fixed is evidenced by the advent of new crops in the early/ 
middle 19th century, whose spread is accredited to traders. Maize and 
rice were particularly important. Gradually, maize came to replace 
bananas as the staple diet in some areas, eg. the Usumbaras, so that by 
the end of the century it had spread through?ut the country and firmly 
established itself in areas which had the best soil and environment. 
Contemporary with the introduction of the new crops were changes in 
population. In the already more densely populated areas, any increase 
in population encouraged the extension of cultivated land and more int-
ensive cultivation of cultivated land. Further, immigration from other 
areas .(eg. South Africa, Mozambique), migration, warfare, slave trading, 
famine and disease affected population growth. Thus, population growth 
was historically and geographically differentiated. 
Iliffe maintains that the outli~e given above describes the major 
features of indigenous agricultural differences and changes during the 
early 19th century, and warns that: 
"it is important to remember.~·.:that it was not colonial rule 
that introduced Tanganyika to capitalism and the world economy. 
This had already happened through the establishment in Zanzibar 
in the early nineteenth century of a slave plantation economy 
producing cloves for the world market and acting as the focus 
of a long-distance trading system which gradually penetrated 
125. 
the mainland. 113 
The working of the Zanzibari economy drained labour from the main-
land - as slaves and as porters for caravans - and created a market for 
the mainland's agricultural produce. The plantations needed a large food 
·supply and the mainland's agricultural systems altered to meet the demand. 
The effects were differential, but production in the Coastal Regions be-
came commercialised - ·especially in the production of rice, millet and 
sorghum. Linkages from this commercial agriculture spread inward. 
Commodity trade, transport routes and an internal slave trade engendered) 
a domino effect. As the Coast supplied Zanzibar so the hinterland began 
to supply the Coast with other crops after the 1850's. By the 1880's 
trading in grain, slaves and cattle had reached inland to Lake Tanganyika. 
The 'introduction to capitalism' is posited earlier by Coulson. A 
thriving network of trade had been established on the Coast as .early as 
the 10th century, and in the interior by the 15th century, dealing in gold, 
slaves and ivory, controlled by Arabs. After the 15th century the East 
African coast became strategically important in the Portuguese-Arab 
conflict to gain control of the routes to India. However, it was not 
until the 18th century that the interior was ·9pened up to goods from 
Europe. 
A crucial feature of the trade activities during this period was 
that the production of East African exports rarely involved the devel-
opment of skills and techniques on which further local development could 
be based. In return for their exports the Africans were given low-
quality textiles, glass beads, obsolete arms and ammunition and alcohol. 
\\ Consequently, some local societies were disrupted, eg. it was cheaper to 
import textiles than to produce them locally, so in time skills·.,.needed 
in the production of textiles were lost. 
The combined effects of - changing population; shifting population; 
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changing production techniques; increased contact with external forces; 
increasing local differentiation; - all interacted to encourage the re-
structuring of some local socio-political formations, particularly the 
strengthening of centralised, larger village settlements under the cont-
rol of strong chiefs - ie. feudal social structures were extended and 
strengthened. By the time the Germans took over East Africa (1883-5), 
inequality, differentiation and exploitation were well established, 
although to varying degrees in different areas. Many of these features 
were crystallised during the colonial period and have been a major feat-
ure in the failure of the political leadership to inaugurate socialis~ 
policies successfully. 
The Colonial Period: 
The German Period: 1884 - 1918. 
The primary objective of the Germans - and later the British - in 
Tanganyika was to induce the native population to produce more surplus. 
The objective was achieved through tax enforcement, .-,the establishment of 
European capitalistic farms and plantations using local labour, and/or 
through the provision of imported European goods to stimulate the prod-
uction of export crops; ~he sale of the latter would enable Africans to 
buy the former). The latter method involved production by Africans on 
. 4 African land under African control. Tpis led to the development of two 
modes ·of production, one based on a migrant labour system, and the other 
on a distorted ~easant economy.5 The key feature of both modes of prod-
uction was that the costs of reproduction of labour were firmly rooted 
in the subsistence sector. 
The advent of the Germans saw two forms of European settlement -
besides military settlements. Planters were employed by ~~ropean 
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companies to lay out and manage plantations of tea and sisal. Settlers 
were individual pioneers who frequently established coffee estates and 
mixed farms, usually in the more temperate regions. The settlers in 
Tanganyika arrived individually and unsystematically, whereas the earl-
iest European planters settled along parts of the Pangani River in the 
6 1880's, cultivating tobacco and sugar. During the 1890's, European 
coffee estates were established in Fast Usumbara.,- but the major develop 
-ments occurred after 1898 when sisal was planted along the line of the 
Tanga-Mombo Railway. Also, in areas with temperate climates, such as 
Western Usumbara and on the foothills of Kilimanjaro and Meru, European 
settlers established estates. 
It has been suggested that but for a rubber boom between 1907 and 
1·913 Europ~an plantation agriculture would have died out. 7 Even so, as 
late as 1904 rubber collected by Africans in the South from wild plants 
was the greatest single export crop. By' 1912 sisal and plantation 
rubber compr.ised 50 per cent of the country's export income. 8 
With the development of the plantation sector a rival African 
sector grew up at the same time, which Iliffe maintains was able to 
resist domination by the European sector. The plantations were unable 
to dominate all other sectors at this time because of the limi~ed extent 
of European activity. The plantations, generally, were unable to cause 
the proletarianisation of the peasantry through land alienation and under 
. 
-pricing. Most peasants were only marginally dependent on wage labour, 
and with high prices on the world market for commercial crops, local 
producers were able to produce as efficiently as the plantations. Given 
this scenario, a high degree of autonomy for the peasants was inevitable. 
This feature was reinforced by the fact that for local producers food 
production was more profitable than working on the plantations. Only the 
highly mechanised plantations were likely to be more efficient. 
The limited size and intensity of European settlement and the fail-
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ure of the Germans to operate an advanced colonial system which could 
subjugate the African producer, enabled many Africans to maintain their 
economic independence. 9 However, where European settlements were well-
established, such as in the Pangani Region, labour reserves were estab-
lished~dmigrant labour imported. Where plantations existed and the 
local labour supply was limited, compulsion through direct labour dues 
or through taxation was used. 
The British Period·=· 1918 - 1961 
After the First World War, Tanganyika was taken over as a League 
of Nations Trust Territory, under British administrative control. This 
effectively ended German influence, whilst the British - at least initi 
-ally - we~e unable or unwilling to fully initiate their own brand of 
colonialism because their mandate was always open to international 
scrutiny. Consequently, some Africans were able to establish or re-est 
-ablish themselves as independent producers. This was particularly 
true in Kilimanjaro. Richer African farmers were able to take advantage 
of the delay between German control being removed and the introduction 
of British control, to move into the commercial agricultural sector as 
major producers. Hence, Tanganyika was one of the few African countries 
"where neither the European nor the African farmer was able 
to dominate the economy in the colonial period. Instead, the 
economy contained simultaneously a major plantation industry 
and several important areas of African cash crop production, 
so that a constant struggle took place between the two, with 
the European farmer seeking to reduce the African to a prol-
etarian and the African seeking to retain the maximum amount 
of economic independence. 1110 
By 1939 three economic regions can be identified: 
a. Areas concerned with the production of crops for export - the 
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sisal estates and other cash cropping areas - and the towns. 
b. Surrounding areas supplying the export areas and towns with food 
and services. 
c. Peripheral zones providing labour or remaining isolated. 
This pattern of regional specialisation, based ultimately on the export 
sector, structurally resembles the type of pattern developed during 
the pre-colonial period. 
With the advent of British administration, the development of cash 
crop agriculture began a new phase. The stimulation of African prod-
uction ( commercial agriculture ) resulting from a complex of factors 
offered new opportunities for inequality within African societies. 
"As the normal pattern of differentiation in cash crop areas 
(developed) •• : a mass of small growers from among who a few 
11 larger.producers ••• emerged as ••• employers of labour." 
The incre~sed dependence of growers on export crops is evidenced by 
the degree to which production between the World Wars became inversely 
related to price, especially for the major crops of sisal, coffee and 
cotton. (See Table 8.) In 1924, output of export crops/goods reached 
30,000 tons valued at £1.3 million. By 1930, output totalled 84,500 tons, 
plus 13,300 carats of diamonds, valued at £2.6 million; i.e. output 
nearly trebled - excluding the introduction of diamonds as an important 
export·- yet income only doubled (including diamond earnings). By 1939, 
after a period of price regeneration, export output totalled 130,500 tons, 
plus 1 .• 16 million skins and· fur-skins, plus 3,600 carats of diamonds, to 
earn £3.7 million. Over the period as a whole, output at least quadrupled 
- excluding diamond production - whereas value increased less than three-
fold. 
"The phenomenon could be put down to increasing needs for 
imported clothing, cigarettes, blankets, shoes and Kerosene 
which for some ••• had become necessities rather than luxuries. 1112 
Production for the world market and the local market depended in part 
on the level of development of the communications' network. In areas 
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Table 8. Growth of Tanganyika's Exports: 1913 - 1939. 
Ground Hides/ Furs/ Total 
Year Sisal Cotton Coffee -nuts Skins Skins Diamonds. Value 
( '000 tons )( '000) ( :ooo ) (£ ms.) ) 
nos:; carats 
1913 21 2.2 1.1 
1918 
1919 17 
1920 17 
1921 8 . 1 .1 3.8 
1922 10 1.5 4.3 12.5 1.4 1.3 
1923 13 1.5 4.0 16.5 1.9 1.7 
1924 18 2.5 5-3 18.7 2.4 2.6 
1925 18 4.5 6.0 9.1 2.4 2.9 
1926 25 4.9 6.5 15.9 1.3 3.0 
1927 33 3-9 6.6 14.1 2.4 3-3 
1928 36 4.9 10.4 10.6 2.8 3-9 
1929 46 4.9 8.9 7.8 2.1 23.3 3-7 
1930 50 3-7 11.5 17-3 1. 7 13.3 2.6 
1931 56 2.4 9-3 3.1 2.0 7.8 .1 .6 
1932 61 3.2 11.4 15.9 2.6 1.4 2.2 
1933 70 5.1 12.7 19.2 3-9 1.4 2.5· 
1934 73 5.6 14.8 8.0 3.1 1.2 2.6 
1935 83 10.0 18.6 16.4 3.1 1000 1.4 3.4 
1936 81 11.3 12.1 22.8 3.1 1600 2.7 4.5 
1937 91 11.5 13.6 22.3 3.2 1600' 3.2 5.0 
1938 101 8.9 13.7 . 3.8 3.0 1100 3.6 3-7 
1939 93 11 .• 6 16.6 4.5 3-5 1100 3.4 4.3 
Source: IBRD The Economic Development of Tanganyika, 1961. Table 3, 
p20. 
where communications were good, peasants were able to produce cash crops 
to pay their taxes and'to increase their incomes. In areas with poor 
communications, labour migration prevailed. Yet, with improved transport 
etc., some areas which traditionally supplied labour continued to do so. 
'· The migration of labour had an unequal impact. Pastoralists were 
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were not affected, whereas societies which were unable to commerc-
ilise production because of transportation costs were severely affected. 
By the mid-1950's one of every thirteen adult male Tanganyikans was a 
long-distance migrant labourer at any time. 13 Most plantation workers 
were from societies - often neighbouring countries - which previously had 
supplied labourers for portering for traders. Men migrated primarily to 
earn cash - often by young men seeking cash to pay the taxes and to inv-
est on their own cultivation plots. 14 Such migration usually entailed 
the migrant spending up to eighteen months away from home. The areas 
providing this labour "suffered from an attendant underdevelopment which 
still prevails today."15 A vicious circle of underdevelopment was set 
up. Local communities found that commercial production was unprofitable, 
so the most able workers left the area, taking with them initiative and 
innovation. As a consequence some areas suffered involution and depop-
ulation, for example, parts of Tabora and Kigoma. As this happened the 
control over the Tsetse Fly slackened, reinforcing the spiral of under-
development. Of course, there were exceptions. During the 1950's, with 
a commodity boom, some areas flourished with the introduction of new 
crops introduced by returning migrant workers. This was true for Bugufi 
(coffee), Ngoni (tobacco) and Sukuma ( cotton). In other areas peasants 
withdrew from commercial crop production: the Mwanza cotton producers. 
Thus, 
"In. the full sense, ••• no African society in Tanganyika was fully 
proletarianised by the plantation economy during the colonial 
·.period. Those clo~e to plantations were usually able to respond 
by commercialising their own agriculture. Those mor.e distant 
were drawn into migrant labour if the opportunity for earning 
money at home was absent, but once that opportunity came to exist, 
they were generally able to return to cash crop production. No 
Tanganyikan society lost its economic independence in the sense 
that the ~ikuyu did in Kenya or the Sotho in Southern Africa: 
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that is, none lost the capac~ty to transform its own agriculture 
once it was linked to a wider market and could specialise its 
production. The plantations formed a sector in the Tanganyikan 
economy which "influenced the development of many other sectors, 
but they never succeeded in dominating the economy. 1116 
In some areas overpopulation led to overproduction on limited land 
leading to decreased productivity. In Western Usumbara farmers were 
forced to shift from the cultivation of bananas to the less nourishing 
cassava, because of overcultivation. 
Significantly, Usumbara had been one of the most sophisticated 
political and economic units in Tanganyika, but because it-became by-
passed by the colonial communication network it became underdeveloped. 
This highlights an apparent paradox which is really not a paradox: 
where colonial contact was established an area often became underdeveloped 
as surplus was extracted from it. On the other hand, an area which failed 
to make contact ~ ie. was not incorporated into the wider system - may 
become underdeveloped, because its productive capacities are not devel-
oped to the full. In fact, isolation may be done to a society, thereby 
preventing the development of productive forces. In some situations these 
phenomena - incorporation and isolation - are merely two sides of the 
same coin, being structurally linked. Frequently they are not dichot-
omous. ~solation' may pull labour and resources out of an area just as 
'incorporation' pushes surpluses out. Finally, isolation has often meant 
isolating an area from other areas with which it previously had contact. 
Hence, isolation or 'no contact' may not be in practice precisely what 
they represent.semantically. 
By 1939 the agricultural structures were fixed, minor variations 
not withstanding, until Independence. 17 The export sector had developed 
greatly by volume although not by value (see Table 8); food production 
had expanded with the introduction of new crops (wheat and potatoes) and 
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new techniques; technological advances in transport and tools wereintr~ 
duced. But, more significantly, the Tanganyikan economy had fallen more 
under the control of the colonial power, involving greater government 
intervention in the agricultural sector. Essentially, Tanganyikan prod-
ucers were experiencing the internationalisation of their market relations. 
The Depression of the 1930's reduced consumption and employment. Coffee 
prices fell by 33 per cent in 1933, yet output increased by 500 per cent in 
some areas. This was due to producers attempting to stabilise their 
incomes, and to Government policy of increasing the export of coffee to 
the growing British market. Sisal output doubled, whilst in 1935 the wages 
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of the sisal plantation workers were halved to Tsh15 - 18. Sisal growers 
(the plantation owners and managers) organised to lower wages and prevent 
price cutting. The latter policy failed because most growers were con-
tracted to· London merchants from whom they borrowed capital, and who 
controlled the terms of prices etc. The merchants made a killing. Few 
sisal owners were bankrupted by the Depression because the Government gave 
support for increasing production by cutting wages. The contract system 
which tied workers to the plantations was only one of the many ways in 
which the sisal producers were advantaged: 
"The first was there means of access thi-ough their colour and 
their education to government officials who could be persuaded 
to use political methods to assfst them. Sisal planters had no 
need to riot. The second was the fact that sisal exports were 
generally only a little less than half the total value of Tangan-
yika's exports during_ the whole period."19 
Even when prices rose they were able to use their power to hold wagesdown. 
In the. face of the Depression, and in line with their ideological 
commitment to the ·.':Three C's' - the pillars of Civilisation, of 
Christianity, and of Commerce - the British attempted to introduce reforms 
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which would smooth out the worst inefficiencies in the country's agric-
ultural system. Attempts were made to introduce new improved agricul-
tural practices which would prevent overcultivation; enforce minimum 
levels of cassava production to ensure a staple food supply; establish 
marketing boards and co-operatives to provide a better input-output 
system. These policies were frequently opposed by Africans because they 
affected traditional land t·enure patterns and practices, and because 
they represented bureaucratic interference in production. 20 Where kulaks 
were able to establish co-operatives on their own initiative opposition 
was less marked. However, during the Second World War many of these pol 
-icies were fully introduced, in the interests of the 'war effort'. Yet, 
"Nowhere ••• had commercial crops done more than supplement 
subsistence agriculture. They had not replaced it and thereby 
induced greater specialisation from which, perhaps, increased 
exchange and economic growth could have resulted •••• Moreover, 
not only were commercial crops merely added to subsistence 
farming, but they do not seem to have altered the methods of 
subsistence to any notable extent, save to reduce land avail-
able to it. The profits of commercial agriculture were devoted 
to housing, education, trade, or further cash crops, but, ••• 
at the most basic level of food production Tanganyika's 
agriculture was little changed in this period. 1121 
Consequently, increasing surpluses were being produced to the advantage 
of plantation owners, some African farmers, international and national 
traders and the colonial administration. To the peasant producer 
producing cash crops to supplement his subsistence income or to pay· 
taxes, this income was a boon rather than an imperative.necessity. This 
raises an i.mportant issue in that the individual's motive for producing 
a good may not meet with the logic of aggregate production of that good. 
One farmer facing a small decrease in price paid for his produce may not 
withdraw from production because of the'fall. The trader/merchant who 
forces this fall in price on the farmer may make large profits if the 
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number of farmers under his control is large .• 
Coulson takes a far harder line on the· effects of cash cropping; as 
a direct consequence. of the spread of cash cropping some areas were 
becoming increasingly underdeveloped and involuted. Government 
became more involied in agricultural production, providing improved 
communication systems and directing reforms to make the production of 
certain crops mo·re efficient, especially of staple food crops and export 
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crops. The attendant structures were undergoing a process of crystal 
-lisation, wherein the possibility and probability of local development 
of the forces of production became increasingly distant. Structural 
change in agriculture, involving the transformation of the whole sector, 
freeing resources and surpluses for further development did not occur. 
Rather, a freezing of subsistence agriculture occurred, while some ·advan 
-ces were made in commercial agriculture based primarily on a vent-for-
surplus and the intensification of exploitation of plantation workers 
and landless peasants. 
After World War Two economic activity increased, along with greater 
developmental efforts by the colonial government. The expensive Ground-
nut Scheme of 1946 (£35.9 million) was founded on the assumption that 
African producers were unable to supply Britain's increased need for oil 
and fats. The overcapitalised mechanised scheme was a failure, which 
Coulson attributes to bad planning, an authoritarian bureaucracy and a 
failure to allow developments based on African initiatives. Other 
development schemes were attempted. Between 1945 - 1955 soil conserv-
ation - including the resettlement of the population - through legal 
compulsion was a main aim. Attempts included the Mlalo Rehabilitation 
Scheme; Uluguru Land Usage Scheme (the forced terracing of land); Mbulu 
Development Scheme (to reduce cattle herd size and to increase the 
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available land area for ranching); Sukumaland Development Scheme (the 
resettlement in Geita and Maswa of people from the overpopulated areas 
of Mwanza and Kwimba, and the forced production of cotton; terracing of 
hill-slopes and the destruction of 'surplus' cattle). Although some of 
these projects were successful in terms of their administrative aims, 
resentment from the Africans was intense, because of the bureaucratic 
interference in their lives which loaded extra work on them. 
Bowles, writing of the period 1945 - 1954, observed ah~increase in 
the production of major exports based not on new technology, but through 
an increase in cultivated acreage, often at the expense of soil erosion 
and decreased food production. 23 Attendant on the growth in income from 
the increased production of these crops was a growth in the levels of 
imports and consumption. Tanganyika imported mostly UK goods, particul-
arly obsolete machinery and cotton goods. 
Sisal became the key export crop - produced on the large estates. 
Until 1954 prices were high. In 1948 sisal earned 55 per cent of the 
country's export earnings; in 1949, 57 per cent; 1950, 50 per cent; 1951; 
60 per cent. In 1951 the value of Tanganyika's sis~l exports was equal 
to Kenya's total export earnings. Thus, "From the British point of view 
. 1 th f 1 Eu t . . Ea. t Af . u 24 s1sa was... e most success u ropean en erpr1se 1n s r1ca ••• 
By 1954 the bubble had burst for sisal. However, the prices for 
non~plantation cotton, cashew nuts and coffee all rose, providing a fresh 
stimulus to African production which lasted until 1961. ·By 1961 the 
price of coffee fell.· to half the 1954 level, and the price of cotton 
fell by 12 per cent. The merchants made most of these fluctuations. 
Producers increased production to stabilise their incomes and to meet 
their contractual obligations with the London dealers. 
During the Second World War, British colonial governments fixed the 
.. '•. 
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prices paid to producers for their crops. In particular, monopolistic 
Marketing Boards were established Cor strengthened) with the supPOsed aim 
of stabilising producer incomes. In fact, they tended to function as a 
means of taxing producers. As the prices of the particular commodities 
covered by the particular marketing board rose, only a proportion of 
this rise was passed to the producer. The remainder was used forresearch 
and development of the commodity; for development projects in areas where 
the commodity was produced; for a stabilisation fund in case the price 
fell or in the event of a poor harvest; and finally - but of growiz:tg 
importance - as a source of general development revenue. Most of the 
surpluses gained by the marketing boards were i~vested on the London Stock 
Market. The fixing of commodity prices during and immediately after the 
War, at rates well below market pr~.ces meant that the British economy was 
rebuilt on the profits of its trade in cheap colonial commodities, and 
on investments by its colonies in London. 25 
"Both •• (the Post Office Savings Bank) and the Government pension 
funds were under obligation to invest their deposits on the 
London stock market. If the Government itself wanted money it 
borrowed it back in the same London stock market, but paid a 
higher rate of interest than it got on its own deposits. The 
commercial banksfinanced the buying of crops from the peasant 
sector up to 1960. In that year they and the Post Office Savings 
Bank organised the transfer to London of over 55 million shillings 
for departing expatriates •••• 
It is clear that ··they (the colonial policies and institutions) 
must be seen together as a system for extracting surplus from Africa. 
Every institution had its role to play in this, and virtually 
nothing was done which did not advance this end."26 
In effect the UK controlled Tanganyika's economy with a minimum of 
direct political control. "The extent of control by British traders was 
the eilttent of dependence by Tanganyika on Britain's economy ••• 1127 
"The ··remarkable fact is that exports rose much faster than imports 
and much of the foreign exchange earned was not spent at all, let 
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alone on develop~ent projects. In the years from 1951 to 1961 
there was a surplus balance in ten years out of eleven, and in 
seven of those years there was a surplus balance of over £8 mill 
-ion, around 10% of the total volume of trade. The total trade 
surplus over those eleven years was approximately £77 million. 
While some of this was spent on services, the remainder presumably 
reflects Britain's interest as a centre for the investment of 
surpluses rather than Tanganyika's interest as a user of capit~l- 1128 
Further, 
"The great expansion of cash crops had made the country's prosp-
erity increasingly dependent on the industrial nations •• 1129 
Finally, Iliffe observing colonial policy toward African producers notes 
that, 
"It was an attempt to solve a number of problems which had emerged 
in the agricultural systems •• :the growing shortage of land owing 
to population growth- and cash-cropping without major technological 
change, ••• or the tendency toward involution, ••• But the policy 
attempted to solve ~hese problems without altering the basic 
forces which brought them into existence."30 
By the mid-1950's policy changes were introdu.ced in the face of pol 
-itical pressure and changes in the world prices of various Tangan-
ikan crops: 
"The basic principle of the late 1940's had been to ~-preserve the 
peasant cultivator and stabilise his farming system, insisting, for 
example, on communal land tenure. By the mid-1950's the peasant 
cultivator was losing favour. The reason for this was probably 
mainly political: the emergence 9f a class of wealthy African 
farmers in the place of· a peasantry, it was believed, would 
increase political stability in rural areas ••• The Report of the 
Royal Commission on Land and Population in East Africa, published 
in 1955 ••••• saw the problem of development as one of hastening 
the transition from subsistence to commercial agriculture •••• To 
achieve this aim, it concluded, 'economic and social policies 
must be based on the realisation that the development of East 
Africa basically depends on the extent to which the indigenous 
populations can, with the help of necessarily small numbers of 
migrant people, be integrated into the world economy'. Government 
policy should therefore support the demands of the most progressive 
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farmers, especially by encouraging the replacement of customary 
land tenure by individual freehold. 'Policy ••• should aim at ind-
ividualisation of land ownership and mobility in the transfer of 
land •• ' "31 
"What happened was that the government ••• unable to stabilise 
the old African agricultural systems in the face of economic 
change, ••• decided to throw them wide open to the forces of the 
market, •• (to be) 'integrated into the world economy' ••• Individual 
landownership and the widespread landlessness were consequences 
which would have to be accepted. 1132 
Consequently, the expansion of cash cropping for export in a period 
of relatively high world prices moderated the effects of ·inequality. 
Although not a uniform effect, marginal crops and areas were developed, 
but generally, greater commercialisation was achieved in many areas 
only by richer farmers using tractors and hired labour and ousting poor 
peasants. The rise of the 'master farmer' represented the rise of true 
capitalist farming. 
During this period African nationalism took off. African resent-
ment of Asian traders and middlemen, of an interferring government, of 
the·marketing boards, led to strident demands for Africanisation. African 
farmers formed their own co-operatives and attempted to boycott both the 
Government and Asian-controlled systems. 1n 1952 KNCU successfully org-
anised its own coffee auctions. In 1954 Mwanza cotton farmers formed 
the Tanganyikan African National Union in response to the increased role 
being taken by the Lint and Seed Marketing Board in the marketing of the 
crop. In particular they resented their prices being limited while the 
world price was high. The role of kulak farmers was crucial because they 
were more integrated into the commercial system than other peasants. It 
was this group which had initiated moves to set up their own co-operat-
ives before 1939. They resented efforts being made to pass control over 
the co-operatives into the hands of bureaucratic administ-
_,/' 
.. ·· 
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rators. This resentment was related to, and reflected in, demands for 
Africanisation. What was being sought did not represent an attempt to 
withdraw from the capitalist system. 
"It was very commonly ••• larger and more commercial farmers who led 
the co-operative movement whose development was such a feature of 
this period. 1133 
In all areas differentiation was moving apace, and in some areas 
capitalist development and underdevelopment were well on the road to 
crystallisation at the time of Independence. Throughout Tanganyika 
uneven development existed. However, despite eighty years of colonial 
rule the country was still overwhelmingly an agricultural economy domin-
ated by the subsistence sector. Capitalist enterprise in agriculture 
was limited in intensity, but served as a target for the development 
policies of the administrations. The relations between the rural capit-
alist class and the ruling administrations is a theme which runs through 
-out the debate over Tanzania's development/underdevelopment. The basis 
for this relationship was laid down during the colonial period. The 
colonial administrators' policies in the agricultural sector set the 
stage for strategies and policies initiated after Independence. It will 
be shown that a continuity exists between colonial policies and the 
policies followed during the next fifteen years. 
Industrial Activity: 
Industrial activity - which has been severely limited in scope -
has reinforced the disintegrated, underdeveloped structure of the economy. 
There had been little mass production of manufactured goods because the 
level of cash wages and incomes had been too low to create a demand which 
would make the setting up of such industries locally worthwhile, ~ 
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capitalist basis. Mass production of textiles only began in 1957, and the 
local production of manufactured agricultural implements did not start 
until after Independence. All this in spite of the discovery of ample 
deposits of iron and coal during the German period. 
The World Bank Group, reporting on Tanganyika immediately before Ind-
ependence, argued that, 
"Manufacturing development has been proceeding rapidly ~n recent 
years, (up to 1961) and may be expected to continue a high rate of 
expansion, though without becoming a major employer of laban~ ••• 
Tanganyika's immediate compa~ative advantage appears to lie in 
agricultural production. Although unemployment among Africans who 
move into the towns creates local social problems, there is no 
overall problem of lack of opportunity to work for a living ••• 
Consequently, efforts to accelerate further the growth of man-
ufacturing by means of protection or other special expedients do 
not seem appropriate, and industrial development in Tanganyika 
should continue to depend on .the growth of the· internal market, 
and thus ••• on the development of agriculture."34 
A more plausible insight into the nature of Tanganyikan industrialactiv-
i ty is offered by Coulson. 
"But what about the industrialisation which has taken place in 
Tanzania since the 1950's? In terms of growth it has been imp-
ressive, but most of it, instead at being aimed at mass markets 
as in the early stages of capitalist development, has been aimed 
at luxury markets: toilet preparations, the processed foods, the 
household goods that ••• characterise the more developed present 
stage of capitalism-in the West."35 
Coulson's argument rests on the notion that so~e mass consumer goods 
such as those listed above, and others such as beer, cigarettes, radios etc. are 
of secondary importance to the need to produce capital goods and producer goods. 
The World Bank Group: 
The Group's ~pproach to Tanzania on the eve of Independence was 
expli~it - the creation of an African bourgeoisie united with a signif-
icant foreign bourgeois element. Herein the Group appeared to have taken 
over the role of advising and directing the Tanganyikan development 
strategy from the colonial administrators. In fact, the Group's Reports 
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have all been heavily concerned with advising the Government on the 
'correct' development policies. 
The Group's concern has always been with the development of capit-
alist activity. 
"The recent growth of Tanganyika's manufacturing industry, ••• has 
depended predominantly on non-African enterprise and capital, both 
resident and foreign ••• The emergence of an African business commun 
-ity will necessarily be a gradual process ••• As the participation 
of Afr±cans in commerce and the service trades develops, this should 
provide the nucleus of a business class which can shift to small-
and medium-sized industrial activity as opportunities arise. The 
same may apply to Africans who achieve success as settled farmers. 
Also, the growth of a class of African artisans and technicians 
in·industries should form the basis from which small businessmen 
may be recruited in time."36 
Clear in this quotation is the implication that successful· capitalist dev 
-elopment is both feasible and inevitable, although on a lower scale than 
in the developed countries. Constraints and contradictions are ignored. 
Below, culled from the IBRD's Report on Tanganyika's prospects in 
1961, are some of the Group's observations and recommendations to the 
then newly-independent state. 
" ••• the proportion of total output which does not enter the market 
economy is ••• 40 per cent. In many parts of the territory, partic-
ularly in the South, subsistence activities ••. appear to outweigh 
monetary activities. In certain Northern areas, by contrast, 
monetary activity greatly predominates. Many Africans in Tanganyika 
have only minimal contacts with the monetary economy. The great 
majority.· •• are in an intermediate position, depending upon subsis-
tence production for many of their staple wants, but selling some 
goods and services for money, so that in varying degrees they are 
partly in the 'subsistence' economy and partly in the 'monetary' 
economy ••• Production of cash crops ••• is an activity taking second 
place to the production of food for the family~ •• Neverthe-less, 
preoccupation with self-sufficiency is breaking down.~ ... ".)? 
Essentially the observations made here are that at Independence, 
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subsistence w·aa still the ·major preoccupation of most Tanganyikans, 
although regional differentiation exists. (The north is the area of 
major European settlement). This appeared to be breaking down as cash 
cropping and the cash nexus spread. At this time the Group is concerned 
simply with the development of commercial agriculture, and the destruct-
ion of subsistence agriculture. The attempt being made was to create a 
fully capitalist economy. The link between the monetary sector and the 
subsistence sector was not analysed. The former was intended to replace 
the latter. Only later, in 1968, did the Group begin to see the benefits 
of fixing the monetary-subsistence sector link as a permanent structure 
of agricultural production in underdeveloped economies. In this Report 
the directives were simple. 
" ••• the pace and shape of future development in Tanganyika are 
highly dependent on public action, notably in the central task 
of improvement and transformation of African agriculture, in 
providing, improving and maintaining communications over the 
large distances of the territory ••• (But) limitation of financial 
resources remains the main restriction on the public development 
effort and ••• to a major degree, on the development of the economy 
as a whole."38 
Here, it is stressed that the weakness of the existing productive struct 
-ures can only be overcome by strong state action. This is an acknow-
ledgement of the centrality of the state in the functioning of the econ-
omy in Late Capitalism. 
Group recommendations include, 
·"the adoption of an increasing scale of two different types of 
community development approach to rural development, one inten-
sive and the o.ther extensive. u 39 
This was intended to allow for different levels of agricultural develop 
-ment in the different parts of the country. Thus, "In places it will 
be desirable to .continue the present policy of concentrating extension 
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effort on the few progressive African farmers." 40 Generally, 
"What is needed is to replace modified shifting cultivation and 
extensive pastoralism by methods making more intensive and more 
permanent use of land. The aim must be to convert African agri-
culture from its present status of being little more than a 
traditional occupation, undertaken mainly for subsistence and 
resulting in land deterioration, to ~arming as a business ·activity 
on effi·ciently-run, planned farms of economic size, justifying the 
injection of capital, achieving a much higher level of producti-
vity and appreciably raising standards of living •• Extension work •• 
converting peasants into yeomen farmers using the land on a perman-
ent basis ••• securing •• high •• yields •• while essential to secure 
immediate increases of production, cannot make a sufficiently 
rapid and widespread impact on land-use problems • 
• • • The Mission recommen.ds (along with the extension approach) •• a 
'transformation' program •• (with) radical reform of methods and 
organisation •• the settlement of new areas •• (with the introduc-
tion of) superior··methods and organisation •• be seized to the 
greatest possible extent. 1141 
These two approaches to rural development were intended as a method 
of individualising .(further) agricultural production,in order to ensure 
internal specialisation and the division of labour (differentiation). 
"Individua~ (land) tenure should lead to the release and encouragement 
of new:"'genius and to new experiments in finding the most productive use 
of land,"42 and therein favour specialisation. However, the process 
"depends on the reduction of the traditional preoccupation of the African 
cultivator with self-sufficiency in food. 1143 
The IBRD saw a bright future for European settlers and planters. 
"Estate agriculture on alienated land makes a valuable contrib-
ution to the economy •• and policies hostile to the continuance of 
estate agriculture would be short-sighted •• Public authorities 
should be prepared to p±·ovide help for established estates ••• The 
estates •• have •• value in demonstrating to Africans relatively ad-
vanced methods1of production."44 
For stsal production - grown almost entirely on estates involving a high 
degree ef hand labour, hardships were envisaged, and because 
"wages have recently increased, and the industry has a fair amount 
of labor troubles •••• it is important that efforts should be made 
to economize in labor."45 
Did the Tanganyikan administrators follow these recommendations? 
Did the Group·' s policies toward Tanzania change during the next fifteen 
years in response to the specifics of the Tanzanian situation, and to 
changes in global Bank Group strategy as outlined in the previous sections? 
Further, were the structures created before Independence transformed? 
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Chapter Three 
From Independence To Arusha 
Bienefeld has written: 
"Tanzania's policy has evolved in a progressive direction in 
response to the contradictions which followed inevitably from 
its early orthodox development strategy ••• These contradictions 
ha b 1 d . . 111 ve een reso ve ~n a progress~ve way ••• 
The orthodox development strategy - that which was set out along lines 
laid down in the 1961 IBRD Mission Report was, according to this view, 
followed until the AruS.ha Declaration.~in 1967. This does not mean that 
the change in strategy was a sudden event. It was the result of histor-
ical and class forces, and the changeover, if there was one started 
before 1967, and lasted long after. Bienefeld's optimistic interpretation 
of events since 1967 will be criticised in the following chapters. 
Basil Davidson writing of the newly-independent states of Angola, 
Guine and Mozambique, observed that they "rejected their colonial inherit-
ance in the economic field". The export of cash crops continued because 
their economic inheritance gave them no alternative. But, they made sure 
that export growth should not be made the chief regulator of their econ-
omies.2 The evidence suggests that Tanzania failed to achieve this break. 
This may partly be explained by the ideological stances of the Tanzanian 
leaders. Many were content with Independence. As nationalists they were 
often anti-imperialist, in the sense that they opposed the imperialists 
who appropriated surpluses which the nationalists believed was their 
(the nationalists') own. However, competition for control over approp-
riated surpluses did not make nationalists socialists. Of greater 
importance to Tanzanian development strategies and their failure, has 
been the balance of c:;.ass forces and the attendant structure· •of the state. 
"The colonial period ••• left Tanzania with a class structure ••• -
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foreign capital in the rural as well as urban sector, and a 
small sector of capitalist farmers and a class of agricultural 
labourers; a largely urban petty-bourgeoisie of officials, 
teachers and small traders; and a set of 'peasantries' ranging 
from highly stratified ones in areas of long standing cash crop 
production or recent pioneering settlement, but little differ-
entiation in other regions. 113 
Shivji has described Tanzania between 1961 - 1967 as a "neo-colony 
1 4 par excellence" , meaning that foreign ownership of the means of prod-
uction was predominant, with in this case, British international corp-
orations taking the lion's share.5 Production of lu~1ry goods, raw mat 
-erials and export crops saw the increased exploitation of workers and 
peasants, essentially remaining in a pre-capitalist social formation, 
by capitalists.6 
Between 1961 - 68 administrative expenditure rose by about 90 per 
cent whilst production increased by around 30 per cent, ie. the state 
apparatus experienced a disproportionate expansion. Von Freyhold's 
description of the Tanzanian state at Independence, which had been 
"constructed for the benefit of the metropole" follows from this. 
"Among its more notable apparatuses were a Treasury with the task 
of raising internal revenue and negotiating with foreign donors, 
a ?lanning Department charged with listing projects foreign donors 
and investors could be expected to support, a Department of Agric-
ulture mainly concerned with telling the peasants what and how to 
produce for the world market, a Community Development Department 
that told people to adopt more 'modern' habits, a Labour Depart-
ment staffed with a large number of officers with military exper-
ience and dedicated to joint consultation and industrial peace, a 
Department of Industries mainly concerned with attracting foreign 
investors, a Police Department whose most effective units were 
concentrated near large-scale.enterprises and already to assi~t any 
employer in trouble."7 
Because the size of the private African bourgeoisie was so small, 
the state took its place in running the country: 
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"The alien 'local capitalist class' was ••• replaced by economic 
apparatuses of the state controlled by the governing class and 
managed by a sotial stratum of people who owe their incomes and 
social position to the governing class and were prepared to 
support it."8 
The fledgling African bourgeoisie waged before, and immediately after 
Independence, a class battle against the existing bourgeoisie to take over 
the reigns of political power. In Tanzania the African bourgeoisie fought 
this battle under the banner of Africanisation and socialism. 
Two major themes are apparent from here on. First, the intensif-
ication of exploitation of the peasants and the further development of 
capitalism in some rural areas. Second, the increasing strength arid 
spheres of activity engaged in by the state. With regard to the latter, 
a major element was the bureaucratic attempt to increase agricultural 
output regardless of the nature of the attendant developments. Essent-
ially the strategy was elitist and authoritarian. Whether the policies 
helped or hindered the growth of capitalist forces was not of paramount 
importance to the bureaucrats. They sought growth with or without 
transformation. As technoc.rats without the necessary skills and tech-
niques, they failed to come to terms with the fact that development is 
a:process of transformation of economy and society. The existing struct 
-ures were a product of the historical forces, throughout which a central 
theme had been present. Colonial administration capped Tanganyikan 
economy and society. It appropriated much of the surplus produced there. 
After Independence few things changed - many of the new bosses were in 
fact the old bosses. More particularly, the World Bank Group became a 
surrogate colonial administrator, especially after 1967. 
An observation of the trends during the period 1961 --66 offers 
"an historical sketch of the trends over 1961 - 66 during which 
period inequality •••• was increasing markedly, the basis.for an 
African bourgeois elite with intermixed political and person-
al interests was being laid, and the degree of progress toward 
absolute poverty eradication was uneven and faltering."9 
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At Independence a coalition between the various elites (bureaucrats, 
intellectuals, capitalist large farmeps, businessmen) ruled the country. 
Those radicals among the leadership were isolated from the populaceby their 
alliance with other, reactionary, elites. Previously TANU and the Tang-
anyikan Federation of Labour (TFL) had been allied during the Independence 
struggle, but following Independence and the TANU Government's alliances, 
the TFL split with TANU over the issue of Africanisation. Nyerere and 
TANU argued for gradual Africanisation, especially in the public service 
seetor, whilst the TLF sought immediate African takeover. In 1962 the 
Government responded by issuing a declaration that Africanisation would 
be completed by 1980. Hence, within two years of~Independence a crack 
had appeared in the alliance between the 'progressive' leadership and 
a key section of the population. 
Other aspects of the early 'orthodox' strategy were a reliance on 
foreign aid for development projects and a belief that socialism was poss 
-ible through harnessing capitalist development under a colonial civil 
10 
service, and with British officers running the Army. By 1964 a new 
theme. had been introduced: Nyerere sought 'citizen-isation' of the Civil 
Service rather than Africanisation. This was an attempt to overcome the 
problems of shortage of skilled manpower in public employment. Almost 
immediately the Army mutinied, with trade union support, on the grounds 
~f their particular grievances - the attitude of the British officers 
toward the~, and because the colonial education policies had-effectively 
discriminated against Africans, so that 'citizen-isation' would benefit 
Asians and, Eu_ropeans more than Africans. As a result of the mutiny, 
which was speedily put down, the TFL was banned. A new Government-cant 
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-rolled union took its place - NUTA - the National Union of African 
Workers. The Government appointed some of the top officials and strikes 
were banned because they were 'anti-patriotic'. 
NUTA was corrupt and bureaucratic. Bienefeld maintains that at 
this time it was only the personal popularity of Nyerere and Kawawa which 
prevented the workers' dissent being translated into action. Rank and 
file discontent took the form of critiques of government strategy for the 
11 development programme as a whole. As dissent grew, the Government con 
-ceded reforms. 1n 1965 changes from above were attempted. Workers' 
Committees were established, but they had no involvement in the organ-
isation ~f production. The managers retained absolute control in this 
fiel4, so essentially the Committees became 'discipline panels'. Thus, 
within the industrial sector as well---as the agricultural· sector, the pre 
-Independence trends were continued. 
The amorphous coalition of ruling elites represented, and held, 
differing ideological positions. Evidence of popular discontent with 
the failure to transform society after Independence was apparent to all 
sections of the leadership. It was the radical element, led by Nyerere, 
whlch appeared to gain the upper hand as a result. This group succeeded, 
despite great opposition from other sections of the leadership, in intra 
-ducing a progressive wages policy, salary cuts for state officials, and 
a national service for development. The Arusha Declaration which follow 
-ed was essentially the product of a progressive leadership - a very 
small committed group - attempting to achieve solutions to the contra-
dictions of a 'neo-colony par. excellence': high unemployment levels; a 
tiny industrial base; a large agricultural sector concerned with product 
-ion for export; an extended tertiary sector; a local bourgeoisie integ 
-rated intotthe system of international corporate business as directors, 
managers or representatives of foreign interests in the country. These 
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features ensured that political instability was never far from the 
surface. 
The popular discontent threatened the leadership.with a loss of 
its p0pular political base, both in the rural areas and in the urban 
centres. 
Rural development had long been a major interest of Tanzanian leaders 
and planners, and of outside bodies. Nyerere, in 1961, published a pam-
phlet: Ujamaa - The Basis of African Socialism, which laid great stress 
on development through the so-called traditonal extended African family. 
In December of the same year, in his ?residential Inaugural Speech, the 
need for·a villagisation scheme was emphasised. During 1962 and 1963 
nearly one thousand settlement schemes were initiated, about half of which 
were started by the TANU Youth League. The most famous of these became 
the Ruvuma Development Association, where groups of farmers set up co-
operatives and collective farming. By 1967,· twenty villages, with twenty 
-three families each sharing the work and returns, were members of the 
Association. 
Ellman writing on the development of the Ujamaa policy, found that 
t~e Village Settlement Period (1961-1966) was an attempt to fully imple-
ment the Bank Group's guidelines on the development of agricultural 
production •. At the same time, i.e. in the initial phase, the actual est-
ablishment of village settlements was not in the hands of the administr-
12 
ators. . Problems arose because of the lack of planning in the early 
schemes. The logistics were not fully planned, so various bottlenecks 
developed w~ich helped to stifle the early enthusiasm. Better planning 
was required, and this necessitated the participation of the bureaucracy. 
It was now that the bureaucracy attempted to implement the 'World Bank 
approach', whose object was to concentrate capital investment and techn-
ical manpower on target groups of farmers settled in the most fertile 
areas. It was intended .to introduce farming systems based ~n increasing 
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-ly intensive and permanent use of land and (imported) resources -
fertilizers, tractors - under the auspices of the Rural Settlement Com-
mission. Each scheme contained 250 families, with £150,000 per scheme 
invested in the provision of roads, water, buildings, farm machinery, 
agricultural inputs, and cash for credit. The investment was to be re-
paid out of increased income resulting from increased yields. 
By the end of 1965, the total n~mber of settlement villages in the 
Settlement Scheme reached 23, covering 15,000 acres of crops and involv 
-ing 3,402 families. 13 Generally these villages contained individual 
plots, but which needed neighbourly co-operation to run well. However, 
where the crops were farmed extensively, eg. wheat or cattle, communal 
production was practiced. 
The workings of these villages were heavily supervised by extension 
officers employed by the Government. Consequently, spontaneity was 
hindered further. But, most importantly, during the three years of their 
existence, £2 million was invested but the returns were extremely poor. 
The Rmss Report of 1966 found that the forty settlement schemes - there 
had never been more than forty, but the number had varied below this 
figure - had been a waste of resources, had been over-capitalised and 
badly plan~ed, and that they had tended to make the settlers dependent 
on external resources. The schemes run by the Government were not aimed 
at socialist transformation. 
"(An) amazing warping of the village settlement programme •• 
(occurred whereby) ••• the agricultural bureaucracy was largely 
oriented to 'progressive farmer.·'·: emphasis and distrusted both 
broad front and communal efforts, and the 'implementation• pack-
age proposal of the World Bank experts was simply not checked to 
see whether it was 'as ordered'. It certainly was not. Villages 
remainea, as did greatly enhanced levels of infrastructure and 
service provision. Communal management had given way to a neo-
Gaullist or neo-McKinsey type of 'participation• in which an out-
side expert manager would to all intents and purposes run the 
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village as if it were a plantation. The broad front approach was 
necessarily dropped be9ause the cost per family of the 'revised' 
approach was dauntingly high, while the need to work hard and to be 
. 
self-reliant to prosper was virtually removed from members. The 
whole episode is an object lesson in the dangers of using foreign 
expertise to formulate a programme without giving it clear guide-
lines and providing for built-in checks by local expertise commit-
ted to and comprehending the basic political economic goals. As a 
result the successful villages ••• contributed to the break down of 
previously quasi-feudal, relatively egalitarian social and prod-
uction systems, not to the~r transformation toward more modern 
variants at higher levels of technology and of productive forces. 1114 
In some areas of high potential where land scarcity was a problem and 
where hired labour was used to work the farms owned by other farmers, 
"a rural elite of improving landlords (and 'progressive farmers') 
was emerging, allying with the rural bureaucracy, dominating rural 
institutions (notably many co-operatives) especially in respect of 
their salaried posts, and using this economic base to gain·'control 
of a high and increasing share of TANU, local government and other 
political leadership positions with a feedback effect of manipulat-
ing land allocation. 111 5 
Thus, the Village Settlement Scheme had failed to achieve an equitable 
transformation of rural society and economy because the bureaucrats 
were net concerned to implement such a policy. Instead the World Bank 
approach was adopted, w~ich despite radical-sounding phrases, was inten-
ded to increase rural differentiation to the detriment of the poorer 
peasants. The encouragement given to the richer peasants and farmers by 
the bureaucrats is a theme which runs through Tanzanian colonial -and 
post-colonial history. 
Overall, the evolving contradictions and failure of the 'orthodox' 
strategy were aggregating to the extent that Shivji was able to argue 
that 
"the upshot of these contending factors is that a neo-colonial 
formation of this type may either relapse into army takeovers or. 
may 'evolve' into a different socio-economic formation- ••••••• 
154. 
'bureaucratic capitalism•.n16 
This 'bureaucratic capitalism' entails state control of the economy in 
collusion with international capitalism. 
"All this has important effects on the process of class-formation 
and on ••• consciousness ••. On top of the administrative bureau-
cracy of the civil service-type running the state machinery, there 
arises the economic bureaucracy. The economic bureaucracy is 
involved directly in the managing and runn~ng of the production 
process. The administrative bureaucracy has roots in the ~­
omic base itself, which makes its position and interest in the 
status quo much stronger and deeper. In addition state ownership 
allows the bureaucrats to dull the consciousness of the exploited 
masses of the population thereby serving very well the interests 
of the international bourgeoisie ••• while ••• the army, police and 
the newly-educated ·elite ••• is propritiated by extra. privileges 
and facilities. 1117 
The Arusha Declaration was a political response to these contra-
dictions of falling prices for the key export crops, the failure of the 
Village Settlement Scheme to mobilise the peasants to increase production, 
the failure of foreign investment to arrive in the required quantities, 
inflation, rising discontent of the peasants and workers. The consequen-
ces of this 'change' in direction were not fully apparent even as late 
as 1970, when Shivji wrote: 
"Tanzania appears to be in a situation of flux - a situation of 
latent but definite class struggle. On the one hand, there is 
the economic and political bureaucracy (objectively backed by inter 
-national bourgeoisie, the country being still in the neo-colonial 
framework), and on the other are the workers and peasants as repre-
sented in their most vocal and conscious elements - largely small 
groups of intelligentsia, including a few .~nlightened leaders. 1118 
One change which did occur after 1967 was that the World Bank Group's 
level of intervention increased dramatically. In 1961 it had produced 
the first of its reports on the country's economic·prospects, and made 
several recommendations concerning future Government policy and strategy 
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for development. Man~ of the recommendations were contained in the 
country's First Five Year Plan (F5YP, 1964- 1969); some of the policies 
were introdUced, viz. the Village Settlement Scheme; and the Group 
provided cheap finance for the development programme. (See pages 107 -
.112). 
The apparent change in strategy and policy heralded by the Arusha 
Declaration coincided with the advent of the fresh Group approaches to 
rural development. It would appear that Arusha in principle, -represented 
a defeat for the Group strategy as practised in Tanzania since 1961. One 
of the key issues then became one of whether the supporters of the policies 
associated with the Bank Group could regain ascendancy in Tanzania. 
WhateYer the reality of the other changes after Arusha, the_increased 
activity of the Bank Group represents a denial of socialist transform-
ation and .. reconstruction of economy and society. The new World Bank Group 
strategy facilitated the emasculation of the principles outlined in 
Arusha. 
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The 1970 Wo~ld Bank Group Mission Report on the First Five Year Plan: 
The First Five Year Plan covered the period between 1964 and 1969. 
Its genesis is to be found in the earlier Mission Report of 1961. Hence, 
although straddling the Arusha Declaration it represented pre-Arusha 
thinking·. 
The 1970 Report19 was primarily concerned with the failure of the 
First Five Year Plan (F5YP) to raise GDP by the target figure of 6.7.per 
cent p.a. The Report outlined some of the most perceptible trends of 
the economy over this period. Of these, the most important was the 
differential growth rates of the various sectors. The share of GDP pro-
duced by the agricultural sector fell from 57 per cent to 50 per cent 
(1964-8), whereas the manufacturing sector's share rose from 4.1 per cent 
to 6.4 per cent. The service industries experienced a rapid growth of 
6 per cent p.a. over the period 1964-69, so that in 1968 they represented 
41.7 per cent of monetary GDP. The primary sector grew at 3.2 per cent 
p.a. between 1960-68, whereas the secondary and tertiary sectors averaged 
an annual growth rate of 9.7 per cent. (See Tables 9 and 10). 
Manufacturing, construction, commerce and transport showed high rates 
' of growth"for two reasons, according to the Mission Report. First, 
import-substitution industries were growing; and, second, transit trade 
with Zambia had increased after the Rhodesian UDI, and the introduction 
of economic sanctions. 
Agriculture, on the other hand, had suffered a decline in wage emp-
loyment from 50 per cent of all employed labour in 1964, to 33 per cent 
by 1968, largely because of the decline of the sisal industry. This de-
cline resulted in an absolute decline in total wage employment. In 1964 
wage employment in agriculture, mostly on the sisal estates, totalled 
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Table 10. Credit from Commercial Banks By Sector, 1964 - 68. 
(US $m) 
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 
Agriculture 27.3 39.0 44.5 24.5 44.3 
Industry 7.8 10.5 16.3 16.1 20.0 
Commerce 24.2 37.0 44.3 42.4 47.5 
Construction 3-5 5.8 
Transport 1.5 2.2 
Government 23.0 29.1 0.6 
Household 0.8 0.9 
Other 9-5 11.6 13.8 
Source: De~ived from Table 6.1, vol ~, 1970 Mission Report. 
,> 
of the targ~t figure of 370,000. The major feature of the period of F5YP 
was that the secondary and tertiary sectors (see Table 9 for definitions 
of the sectors) became the major employers of labour. The possibility 
of dramatic increases in non-agricultural employment was seen as unlik-
ely by the Mission, although no explanation was offered. The Mission 
concluded that the main thrust of economic development in Tanzania must 
originate in the agricultural sector, but with emphasis also on the growth 
f t . d . 20 o our1sm an serv1ces. 
The period covering the F5YP was a disappointment to Tanzanian plan 
-ners not only because GDP grew at 4.5 per cernt p.a., rather than the 
expected 6.7 per cent p.a., but also because the standard deviation of 
the former figure was 3 per cent, demonstrating Tanzania's vulnerability 
to short-term stimuli such as weather and price changes for its major 
exports. Table 11 shows that certain crops experienced high growth rates· 
(in value) over the period, whilst sisal, the major crop suffered a 
decline of 23 per cent in value on a decline of 2 per cent in quantity'. 
Overall agricultural output grew at only one per cent per annum, due 
largely to the negative effects of the decline of the sisal industry. 
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The world price of sisal had fallen in 1965 and 1966, followed by two 
years of bad weather, with the joint effect of decreasing sisal's share 
of monetary agricultural output from 37 per cent (1963) to less than 16 
per cent ( 1968). Consequently,. -diversification of crops became inevita-
ble both as a policy objective and as a pragmatic response to sisal's 
increasing unprofitability. 
Along with the diversification of agricultural output, the F5YP saw 
Table 11. Quantity and Value of Marketed Agricultural Output: 1963 - 1968 
(US ·,3m; '000 tons) 
Item 1963 1968 ~ growth·rate 1963/8 
Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value 
Sisal 214.3 61.9 193.8 21.7 2.0 - 23.0 
Cotton 45.7 21.3 50.7 24.4 2.1 2.7 
Coffee 28.2 18.8 49.2 32.6 12.1 11.7 
Cashewnuts 56.4 3-9 105.0 11.6 13.3 24.0 
Sugar 49.2 6.4 81.0 10.5 10.5 10.3 
Tea 4.9 5.0 7.8 6.7 9.8 5-9 
Tobacco 2.3 1 .1 7.1 4.2 25.0 30'.•0 
Pyrethrum 2.3 1.7 4.7 2.7 15.4 9.6 
Wheat 18.8 1.1 27.4 2.1 7.8 13.4 
Groundnuts 11.9 2.5 14.0 1.8 3-3 6.7 
Others .... 21.6 18.1 
145.4 136.4 
Source: Table 6·, vol-q, 1970 Mission Report 
many other changes in the structure of the rural economy, according to 
the Mission, namely that, 'transformationist' and 'gradualist' approaches 
to rural development were attempted. The 'transformationist' elemerit 
was instituted through the Village Settlement S.c.heme; the large raric~ing 
estates; attempts at mechanisation; and the extension of economic infra-
structure to the rural areas. On the other hand, 'gradualist' policies 
... 
-:· 
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were introduced through the provision of credit facilities, water, tran 
-sport and commercial services ·to peasant producers, and the extension 
of research and development facilities for agriculture. In essence, the 
former approach sought to radically increase production through the 
destruction of traditional methods and organisation of agriculture, and 
the introduction of advanced techniques. The latter sought merely to make 
the traditional systems more efficient. 
Without attempting to explain the reasons, the Mission noted the ab-
andonment of the transformation approach in 1966. For the rest of the 
F5YP Tanzania was said to have concentrated on the ·gradualist approach, 
especially assistance to small farmers •. Extension, marketing and produc 
-tion services were increased as were attempts to encourage diversifica 
-tion. As proof of the success of this 'new' policy, the Miss±on 
reported that the value of the marketed output of peasant producers rose 
from US $71.2 million in 1964, to US $98.6 million in 1969, whereas the 
value of estate-produced crops fell from US $74.2 million to US $35 mil 
-lio~ over the same period. 21 Further 'proof' of the adoption of this 
policy is given by Seidmann: 
"Investment (by private capitalists - CJ) in plantations and 
agricultural processing has tended to decline as aid agencies 
and African government-sponsored programmes have stimulated 
Af . t t d h f t n 22 r1can peasan s o pro uce cas crops or expor s ••• 
Agriculture has always been the most important sector of the Tanza 
-nian economy, but other sectors have experienced higher growth rates. 
Over the period of the F5Y?, the mining industry relied almost entirely 
on diamonds for its earnings, with 80 per cent of the sector's marketed 
value earned from them. During F5YP both the output and the price of 
diamonds fell. Generally, mineral output increased by one per cent p.a., 
but its share of GDP fell from 3.3 per cent to 2.9 per cent. 23 
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Manufacturing grew at an average annual rate of 11.2 per cent bet-
ween 1964 and 1969, and by 1968 this sector produced 7.4 per cent of 
monetary GDP. Employment grew from 22,212 to 35,359, with the increase 
due mainly to the processing sector expansion. Consumer goods accounted 
for most of the sector's employment and output, but oil refining, cement, 
aluminium goods, plastics, and metal processing all showed an increase. 
The Mission stated that the gross capital stock in industry stood some-
where between US $~68 million and US $196 million, 50 per cent of which 
was created between 1964 and 1969, with major investment in textile mills, 
refineries and a cement factory, the total cost of which was US $42 mil 
1 . 24 - ~on. Capital good manufacturing also showed an increase from US $40 
million ( 1963) ·to US $93 million ( 1968). 
Total investment for development during the F5YP reached US $593.6 
million, representing 86.2 per cent of the target figure. Central Gove 
-rnment Development expenditure only achieved 82 per cent of its target. 25 
Within this general picture the Mission Report noted that expenditure 
over the period was unevenly spread - the first two years witnessed a 
very low increase in development expenditure, but the rate and amount of 
expenditure increased thereafter. The Mission argued that the cause of 
this unevenness lay in the chronic shortage of skilled manpower needed 
to implement a balanaced development programme. 26 . 
It had been projected that 78 per cent of all Central Government 
expenditure for development would come from external sources. In fact, 
internal sources provided 65 per cent of total Government development 
expenditure. By 1967 it was clear that this was not the only reason 
that all expectations for the F5YP wereunrealistic •. Prices for the major 
exports all fell, especially sisal, due largely to overproduction in a 
limited market. Tanzania's deficit in foreign exchange between 1962 -
1967, was £22 million - ie. more than was invested in Government-owned 
industry between 1968-71. The only major areas of investment were 
either capital-intensive or export-oriented enclaves. 27 
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It was clear.to Tanzanians, and to the Mission that changes were 
necessary when producing the Second Five Year Plan (S5YP). The·Tanzanian 
ideas on a 'new' strategywerecontained in the Arusha Declaration, which 
was proclaimed before the F5YP had run its full course. The Declaration 
set in motion the nationalisation and public control of banking, insur-
ance, importing and wholesale trade, processing and manufacturing, and 
the production, processing and export of sisal. 
The takeover of the import-export trade by the State Trading Corp-
oration, in 1968, had an immediate effect. In 1966 the net outflow of 
profits and dividends from Tanzania totalled US $19.3 million; in 1967 
the figure was US $16.8 million; and in 1968, US $8.8 million. In giving 
these figures Seidmann argues that this decline after the STC took over 
demonstrates that the extent of 'fiddling' of rebates by foreign firms, 
averaged between 5 - 10 per cent of the total value of imports. 28 
In 1966, total investment and commitments in the National Develop-
ment Corporation (NDC) group were US $71.4 million, with US $16 million 
provided out of the NDC's own surpluses. By 1968 the respective figures 
were US $178.2 million and US $39.2 million. The increased investment 
from the NDC's own resources were due to the acquisition of private 
companies and shares in the investment of existing private companies. 
However, after 1969 and the full development of the Parastatals, invest-
ment in agricultural processing, livestock, hotels and game lodges was 
transferred from the NDC to the relevant parastatal. The NDC was left 
with its main activity covering manufacturing and mining. 
The Mission Report noted that despite the increased state inter-
vention, the Govern~ent favoured pr~vate investment i~ manufacturing and 
tourism, and looked favourably on joint public corporation/private enter-
prise ventures. 29 The Government's purchase of 51 per cent shares in· 
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several large industries did riot necessarily entail that they were 
nationalised in the full·sense of the term. Management of the firms 
was oft-en left in the hands·· of the foreign or private interests. It was 
hoped - by the Mission - that despite this concession, Government part-
icipation would ensure that investment would be 'better directed'. This 
suggests the her.etical view - for the Bank Group - that private invest-
ment is not always the best method of encouraging economic development. 
Central Government Funding 
Central Government increased its involvement in the economy, demon-
strated by its increased levels of recurrent and capital expenditure: 
respectively, US $99.3 million and US $20.4 million in 1963/4; US $181.2 
million and US $59.4 million in 1"968/9. (See Table 12). 
Table 12. c'entral Government Revenue and Expenditure. 1963/4-1968/9. 
(US $ million) 
1963/4 
Recurrent Revenue: 100.5 
OF WHICH: 
Taxes 68.7 
Interest/rent/other 10..5 
Aid Appropriation* 21.3 
Recurrent Expenditure: 99-3 
OF WHICH: 
Social Services 35.0 
Economic Services 18.5 
Administration .. 43.9 
To Dev' t Budget 1.9 
DeveloEnient Bu.dget** 20.4 
1966/7 
143.5 
101.6 
14.0 
21.9 
'143.5 
40.0 
36.0 
61.2 
6.3 
41.2 
1968/9 
181.2 
146.2 
14.3 
20.6 
181.2 
50.1 
43.3 
74.2 
13.7 
59.4 
Total 
826 
826 
*Loans from abroad accrue to the Development Budget, but aid-in-approp-
riation is treated as Recurrent Revenue. 
**Excludes EAC investment. 
Sourc~: Derived from Tables 5.1,5.2 & 5.3, vol 1, 1970 Mission Report. 
Recurrent revenue almost doubled over the period - US $100.5 million 
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in 1963/4, and US $181.2 million in 1968/9. This revenue was raised most 
-ly through taxation - income taxation, corporation tax, excise and 
import duties--- whose revenue doubled over the period. 
The major part. of recurrent expenditure went on economic services 
for agriculture, roads, education and public health. The development ex 
-penditure however, is separately classified as capital expenditure. For 
the period under examination, expenditure targets for development spend 
-ing were not reached. During the F5YP, US $185 million was spent by the 
Central Government on its development budget. Allowing for inflation, 
the Mission estimated that, in real terms, only 67 - 72 per cent of the 
target figure of US $224.1 million was reached. Particularly in the ear.ly 
years of the Plan the shortfall was great, but toward the end of the 
period lack of financial resources proved to be a constraint on develop-
ment.30 The failure to achieve expenditure targets was not general. The 
two large-spending Ministries, of Communications, Transport and Labour, 
and of Agriculture, Food and Co-operatives, spent more than their all-
oted funds, whereas, National Education, and Land, Housing and Urban Dev 
-elopment realised only 50 per cent of their targets. The Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry spent only 23.7 per cent of its target. In terms 
of relative spending, the Ministry of Communications, etc., received 36.6 
per cent of total development expenditure, which it spent mostly on roads, 
followed by urban water supplies and aerodromes. 31 The Ministry of Lands, 
etc., absorbed 16.2 per cent of all development expenditure; Education 11.3 
per cent; and agriculture 10.4 per cent. 
External Trade 
Tables 13 17 give details of Tanzania's merchandise external 
trade during the F5YP. Agricultural products clearly dominated exports, 
and, manufactured goods along with transport machinery accounted for 
Table 13. External Trade - 1964-1968. (US $ million). 
Exports 
Imports 
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968* 
214.3 196.0 259-·0 233.6 240.5 
167.1 187.0 226.0 221.0 256.9 
*1968 includes Zanzibar. 
Source: Table 3.~, vol 1, 1970 Mission Report. 
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Table 14. Imports to Tanzania by major category. (US $ millions). 
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 
Value % Value % Value % Value % Value % 
Consumer Goods 74.0 44 76.1 41 92.4 41 75.0 34 79.4 32 
Intermediate Goods 25.9 15 28.7 15 35.6 16 41.0 19 39.6 19· 
Transport Equip't. 15.7 9 18.1 10 27.6 12 29.7 13 32.5 13 
Capital Goods 47.6 28 59-9 32 63.7 28 71.0 32 93.4 37 
Miscellaneous 4.1 4 4.2 2 6.6 3 4.2 2 4.0 2 
Total 167.3 187.0- 225.9 220.9 2bi-8.9 
Source: Derived from Paragraph 10, vol 1, 1970 Mission Report. 
most of the imports. The Mission noted that import-substitution indus-
tries grew<~over the period, but that as a whole Tanzania was becoming 
more dependent on Kenya as a major supplier of her manufactured goods. 32 
Imports grew at a faster rate than exports during the F5YP, with the 
averages at 18.4 per cent p.a. for capital goods, followed by intermedi-
ate goods ( 11.2 pe_r cent p.a.) and consumer goods at 2.2 per cent p.a. 
The value of capital and transport goods doubled between 1964 and 1968. 
Merchandise exports rose in value from US $214.3 million in 1964 to 
US $228.4 million in 1968 - excluding Zanzibar. Generally, before 1964 
sisal, cotton and coffee exports provided over half of all exports, with 
sisal taking the largest single share. Yet by 1968 the situation had 
changed dramatically, with sisal exports showing a major decline, both 
absolutely and relative to other export crops. Cotton became the lead-
ing foreign exchange earner, followed by coffee, refined oil products and 
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then sisal. 
Table 1,5. Tanzania: Imports by major categories. (US$ millions). 
1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 
Food & Live Animals 15.4 17.8 22.3 21.0 19.5 
Beverages/Tobacco 6.9 5.2 4.1 4.3 2.0 
Crude Materials 1.9 ''2.0 2.0 2.2 4.1 
Animal/Vegetable/oils/ 
Fats 0.7 1.5 2.0 1.7 2.4 
Chemicals/Fertilizers 14.6 16.0 . 18.5 15.3 16.4 
Manufactured Goods 59.0 65.5 79-3 72-7 77."7 
of which: 
Textiles 26.6 28.8 40.1 22.4 
Iron & Steel Goods 8.5 8.5 8.1 19.5 
Other Metal Goods 7.8 12.5 11.2 12.0 
Machiner~/TransEort 
EquiEment 37-3. 45.4 59.1 66.6 73-7 
of which: 
Cars 3.8 3.4 4.6 3.8 
Other Transport 11.9 14.8 23.1 25.6 
Other Machinery 19.9 25.9 30.5 36.5 
Miscellaneous 21.1 22.0 23.7 17.5 30.1 
Mineral Fuel7Lubricant 10.7 11.5 15.2 19.5 23-7 
Total Imports: 167.2 188.0 225.9 220.9 249.0 
Source·:· ·Derived from Table 3.3, vol 1, 1970 Mission Report. 
Table 16. ~orts by Main Categories: 1964, 1965 & 1968. (US $ millions) 
( '000 tons) 
1964 1965 1968 Over~ll 
Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value 
Coffee 
Cotton 
Sisal 
Diamonds* 
Cashews 
Meat/Preparations 
Cloves · 
Oil seeds/Nuts/etc 
Tea 
Hides/Skins 
32.7 31.0 27.8 24.0 48.4 37.1 202.4 166 
44.5 27-7 55-3 34.2 61.9 39-3 306.3 186 
208.9 61.2 210~2 40.1 186.1 22.3 1002.2 184 
664 .• 0 19.0 828.4 19.9 682.7 18.9 4067.4 115 
55~8. 9.2 63.6 11.6 78.4 14.3 338.7 62 
5.6: 6.0 5.6 5-3 4.9 6.0 30.5 32 
8.1 8.5 8.5 6.4 11.5 8.4 59-3 44 
63.4 -·8 • .?' 47.6 8.0 34.9 6.3 238.5 37 
4.4 4.3 4.2 4.1 6.6 6.3 27.4 27 
5-5 3.6 7.0 4.2 6.8 4.3 31.1 22 
Petroleum Produce 
Tobacco (•ooq lb) 385.0 
Other 
0.1 
27.0 
5674.0 
22.9 300 
1.4 11060.0 5.6 29383.0 121 
28 • 4 • • • • • • 30. 1 ••. • • 141 
Total Value US $1437 million 
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30 per cent of the country's exports in 1968, but provided on~y 9.6Jper 
cent of its imports. 
The changing patterns reflected Tanzania's inc+eased expenditure 
on development projects. The EEe, US and Japan were able to provide the 
goods required for construction and transportation projects at lower 
cost than the UK, .: .. g;espi te the UK' s historical advantage of being colon-
ial ruler less than a decade previously. Another factor accounting for 
the decline in the UK's share of trade was the political crisis arising 
from the British Government's failure to take strong action against 
Rhodesia. The rise in the amount of trade with other Sterling Area 
countries was a sign of the growing trade with other Third World countr-
ies. 
The direction and trends of the economy over the period of the First 
Five Year..Plan discernible from the figures presented by the first volume 
of the 1970 Mission Report, makes clear Tanzania's worsening economic 
plight. Structural changes toward development had not occurred, and 
changes both in strategy and policy by the planners were needed. Even 
so, integrated policies were not followed. This was highlighted by the 
attempt to diversify agricultural production. Plans had been made to 
diversify production in 1961, but the slump in sisal prices forced immed 
-iate ad hoc measures to be taken. 
The Mission's evidence suggested that the overall movement of the 
economy had been toward gradual growth - the extension of the market ec-
onomy into areas previously only marginally integrated into commercial 
activities. 
'Muddle through' appeared to be the motto of Tanzanian planners 
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during the period of the F5YP. Yet, some changes were planned - viz. the 
Village Settlement Scheme. The Scheme reflected commonly-accepted ideas 
on :•.modernising' agriculture during the early 1960's. However, the 
Scheme's high cost and low returns, added to its unpopularity with the 
people subjected to it ensured its abandonment. 
Above all, the F5YP reflected an acceptance of the 1961 IBRD Mission 
Report on Tanzania's prospects. Its recommendations were based on the 
need for greater state intervention in the development of the economy. 
Within this framework, the scenario envisaged involved the development 
of a capitalist farmer class; the breakdown of the preoccupation of 
peasant producers with self-reliance; the adoption of a dual approach 
to ru!al development (estate/large-scale agriculture and individual pea-
sant production); a high degree of foreign capitalist investment in the 
economy. The theory behind the Plan was that the peasants would produc_e 
the surpluses, which when allied with foreign investment and know-how 
would provide the resources required for the initiation of a modernising 
developing economy. 
Despite the evidence to the contrary, the 1970 Mission Report was 
optimistic. It argued that despite Tanzania's balance of payments 
position was worsening, it was worsening in the most beneficial way. 
Namely that the structure of the economy went through a period of struc-
tural change resulting from an effort to shift away from almost total 
dependency on a single crop. Instead, efforts had been made to diver-
sify agricultural production and to seek the development of import-sub-
stitution industries. This had caused some short-term hardships and 
trade deficits, but the decline in the share of the import bill taken 
by consumer goods, and the increase in the share taken by intermediate 
and capital goods were seen as signs of future development. 
Other events had been occurring in Tanzania which challenged the 
ascendancy of Group thinking on development strategy. 
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Chapter Four 
The Arusha Declaration 
A brief outline of the debate on socialism in Tanzania 
Within the ranks of the radical writers the debate has raged over 
the suceesses and failures of the socialist experiment. The numerous 
contributors have tended to fall into two major groups, and both have 
been careful (until recently) not to argue that the struggle for devel-
opment and self-reliance has been finally resolved. One group argued· 
that although the struggle has not been a one-sided catalogue of success 
-es, certain trends are discernible; namely, that the size and power of 
the national bourgeoisie has been successfully limited; state control of 
the commanding heights of the economy has taken place; the development 
of class consciousness among the peasants and workers has moved apace, 
as exemplified by Mwongozo; a tremendous potential for a socialist devel 
-opment / transformation of society and economy had been opened up by 
the successful collectivisation and Ujamaa-isation of the peasants. They 
stress the point that any struggle for transformation is necessarily a 
dialectical process, the results of which may not be immediately appar-
ent, and that on the issue of strategy, it is sometimes necessary to 
make alliances with non-immediate class enemies in order to strengthen 
one's hand. 
The opposing grouping has always taken a less optimistic line, which 
in recent years has hardened considerably. Their position holds that 
the class struggle in Tanzania is being won by those who are in league 
with international capitalism. Any ·gains made locally are seen as in-
cidental to the determining trend, because essentially the state, its 
functionaries and its agents (the bureaucracies) are the enemy of the 
working class and peasants. Apart from particular atomised individuals 
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the state apparatus is attempting to distort and prevent a socialist 
transformation, so as to further the particular class interests of the 
'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' - which may include economic nationalism. 
This 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie' controls the Party, Government, Adminis-
tration, and trade unions, and beneath the thin veneer of socialism, has 
succeeded in entrenching itself so deeply that only a proletarian-peasant 
revolution may succeed in destroying this class's power. What the 
former group of writers identifies as being the saving graces of the 
Tanzanian experiment, the latter group sees as being clear techniques 
for the exploitation of the masses. Nationalisation has meant state 
control and not worker/peasant ownership and control of their means of 
production. Ujamaa has not resulted in self-reliance, development and 
democracy; nor voluntaristic increases in diversified productivity. 
Workers' Committees have seen no increase in industrial democracy. 
Instead, authoritarianism, commandism and repression with greater bureau 
-cratic control have all increased. Within this trend, the most import-
ant sector of the economy - agriculture - has become ever more export-
oriented, with the World Bank Group encouraging the state to pursue a 
policy which aids this development. The organisation of crop production 
has involved greater exploitation of the peasants through forced re-
settlement in villages which have been established to provide cheap and 
plentiful labour either for estate production or for individualised pro-
duction of export crops. As Williams argues: 
"State control can be enforced on corporate communities more 
effectively than isolated farmers. In Tsarist Russia, the re-
demption payments were extracted from communes; Stalin collect 
-ivised the farmers to enforce grain procurement on villages. 
In Tanzania, peasants have been resettled into villages so that 
the state can provide amenities, impose taxes, and supervise 
production more easily •••• 
Conformity with official priorities and directives and pro-
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visions of economic plans can be imposed more easily when the 
state controls access to land, irrigation and other resources 
necessary to production. Hence, the continued attractions, to 
the bureaucrats, despite repeated disasters, of settlement 
schemes where farmers are dependent on the state for their 
livelihood •• and subordinated to the supervision and control 
of officials. 111 
That this policy was implemented too harshly is evidenced by World Bank 
Group pressure on the state to take a more subtle approach. Hence, the 
reality of Tanzania's Ujamaa policy and programmes for rural socialism 
is that the structures being constructed favour those forces which are 
opposed to socialist construction. Objectively, the trends have 
always been toward exploitation and inequality, and taking the ideology 
of certain political leaders as the point of departure for an analysis 
of the Tanzanian experience was always likely to end in disillusion-
ment. 
Clearly a key question must be: Who has benefited from the policies 
followed since the Arusha Declaration?2 and the more optimistic writers 
argue that oversimplification is too easy. They wish to distinguish 
between a polic~ and the execution of that policy; i.e • .they accept the 
good and proper intentions of the policy-makers, and seek to explain the 
worst excesses in terms of either traditional hangovers, individual 
corruption, or overenthusiasm in the execution of correct policies. 
There has recently been a convergence of opinion. The world cap-
italist recession of the early 1970's caused major problems in Tanzania, 
and the policy-makers appear to have coped with the problems not by fol-
lowing socialist policies, but have turned more eagerly than before 
to policies outlined and sanctioned by the Bank Group. Many of the 
writers acknowledge that a water-shed was reached in 1974, and even the 
formerly-optimistic writers have turned to consider the 'internal' feat-
ures within a wider framework of imperialism and international class 
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struggle. 
The Arusha Declaration 
By 1967 the reality of the ~rthodox' development strategy - the 
underdevelopment of soci~ty and the dis-integration of the economy - was 
apparent to the radical elements in the Government. The Leadership was 
forced to solve key policy questions concerning a development strategy 
for the country. To achieve a successful process of development where 
ought the initial emphasis to lie - industry or agriculture? What type of 
industry was feasible- heavy or light? Were the techniques of produc-
tion to be labour-intensive or capital~intensive? If agricultural 
collectivisation was deemeq essential to the development strategy, what 
methods for collectivisation ought to be employed? And of course, a theme 
central to the ~echnical' aspects of any development strategy- what is 
'development' meant to do? This raises issues about ideology, mobilisa-
tion and organisation.3 
By 1967 some of these issues had already been resolved. The major 
priority, since Independence - at least at the level of policy guiderines 
- had been to increase agricultural smrpluses as a necessary preliminary 
to some form of industrialisation - import-substitution. Historically, 
Tanzanian agriculture had always been labour-intensive, and most of the 
mechanisation which had occurred relied overwhelmingly on imported 
machinery, Le. an integrated agricultural-cum-industrial strategy was 
non-existent. A heavy goods sector did not exist either, because the 
economy had evolved along lines laid down during the colonial period -
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a small industrial base and a large agricultural base. The problems of 
developing a capital goods sector in a country like Tanzania were there-
fore very great. The capital costs are so prohibitive as to prohibit 
such developments on a capitalist basis in the foreseeable future. 
Suggestions that small-scale heavy goods production be established·fail 
to grasp the fundamental contradiction in Tanzania's development strategy 
- Tanzania is not mistress of her own. house. Whatever the degree of 
collusion between the internationaL bourgeoisie and the national bourge-
oisie, Tanzania's freedom of action is severely ~~stricted by the struct-
ures of international capitalism. A 'catch twenty-two' is at work. If 
Tanzania was able to establish small or medium-sized capital goods sectors 
to me~t the requirements of its people, we suggest that it would firstneed 
to be on the road to socialist construction. This is not to deny that some 
heavy industry will be established. However, such industry is likely to be 
controlled,and partly owned by, and profitable for foreign interests. Who-
ever owns or controls the heavy goods sector holds a key toTanzania's future. 
The choice of technique of production was also already established. 
Labour-intensive techniques prevailed~ Lawrence maintains that this need 
not be a barrier to successful industrial development. 
"In the long run, advanced capital intensive technology will gi'ow 
in domination, even in the rural areas. Part of the longer run objec-
tives of socialist development involves a reduction rathe~ than an 
increase in manual labour, and a society where man is in control 
of machines, but where machines do the repetitive uncreative work."5 
The two remaining decisions were of the greatest importance. The 
decisions taken here effectively determined the answers to the previous 
problems. The strategies of agric~ltural production and the issue of 
ideology and organ~sation •. Here the resources were at hand- the land 
and labour. How they were mobilised and organised potentially provided 
the key to any meaningful answer to the country's problems, and to the 
future development of the economy along socialist lines. The Arusha 
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Declaration and the policies which followed were attempts to initiate 
alternative development strategies. The central issue remains .. - were 
the new approaches a structural break with the international capitalist 
system, and did they halt the domestic trend toward capitalist differen-
tiation? 
Cliffe maintains that the Arusha Declaration - a victory for the 
progressive radicals in the Government and Party heirarchy - represented 
a logical and coherent alternative to the foreign- and capitalist-domin-
ated strategy for tackling the country's underdevelopment.6 It was 
felt that the danger of further damage being done by international cor-
porations directing the economy -could only be overcome if national cant-
rol of the economy was achieved. This in turn would occur fully only 
through the creation of socialist institutions throughout all levels of 
production and decision-making. ·National economic independence, by this 
view, is possible only through socialism, ~e. participation, decentral-
isation, structural change in production and use-patterns; and the eli-
mination of exploitation. 7 Further, the Declaration was a clear state-
ment of objectives: the equality of human beings; the avoidance of exp-
loitation of man by man; the democratic organisation of society's dev-
elopment; the development of society based on the efforts of the workers 
and peasants, and not on foreign or··expropriated capital. 
So¢ialism and self-reliance were the two key related elements of 
the new development strategy. Nationalisation, to gain control of the 
'commanding heights' of the economy was initiated. The establishment of 
producer co-operatives in agriculture was accelerated. A Leadership Code 
was introduced banning Party, Government and public sector employees and· 
leaders from personal involvement in private enterprise. This latter 
measure was intended to prevent self-aggrandisement, to attack petty-
bourgeois power and state-sponsored class formation, and was further 
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enhanced by the freezing of higher official salaries and the introduc-
tion of a progressive income tax. The emphasis throughout was on equity 
and equality within Tanzania. 8 
Nsari observes in ironic fashion that, Arusha, at a stroke, trans-
forme.d Tanzania into a nation of peasants and workers. All the major means 
of production were to be owned and controlled by the peasants and workers 
through their government and co-operatives. 
become the Party of peasants and workers. 9 
The ruling Party was to 
10 Leys maintains that the 
Leadership recognised many of the implications of the existing system 
but they failed to grasp the strength of the bourgeois nature of the 
Tanzanian state, and the degree of capitalist penetration. Both these 
critics have raised an important issue: The ideological position of the 
Leadership, their strength (and how to combat it), and the class struct 
-ure of the Tanzanian state. This complex issue forms the essential 
elements of the debate around the nature of the Tanzanian political econ 
-omy. (See below Chapters Five and Six). 
Parastatals were established to control a significant part of the 
industrial sector. In their day-to-day activities they were meant to 
o.e quasi-autonomous, outside the mainstream of ministerial and depart-
mental heirarchies. They were intended as technically specialised 
bodies, concerned with the operation of developing the various economic 
t . d t" d . 11 sec ors, cover1ng pro uc 1on, commerce an serv1ces. The key para-
statal was the National Development Corporation, which was responsible 
for all. economic activities except finance, trading (responsibility of 
the State Trading Corporation), and sisal (under the auspices of the 
Tanzania Sisal Corporation). 12 The NDC comprised forty companies and 
twenty-five subsidiaries. 
A common feature of all the parastatals at the time was t~eir high 
-ly centralised and bureaucratic organisational structures. The NDC 
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was of major imp'ortance. It was given the role of being the 'motor of 
the development process' in the industrial sphere, along the lines laid 
down in the Declaration. An apparent contradiction is presented here: 
the maj·or practice of the NDC, from its earljjest days, was to enter into 
joint ventures with foreign investors. 
The new trend of part-ownership was a method used by private and 
foreign capital of avoiding the dangers of wholesale nationalisation. 
It also introduced an extra degree of certainty to foreign capital that 
repayment and interest would be safeguarded. To the state such agree-
ments ensured that foreign investment continued to flow into capital-
deficient enterprises whilst giving the state a supposedly controlling 
share in the enterprise. Frequently, management agreements between the 
state or the parastatals, and an individual firm allowed the private 
firm to retain control of the venture, with fixed interest rates and 
ample compensation for short-term losses. It is not uncommon .for the 
private firm to have control over all overseas processing and marketing 
of the product, and of supplying imported elements required in the prod-
uction process, thereby giving them much scope for making super-profits 
by arranging the import and export prices to suit their interests. 
Seidmann states that after the nationalisation of trade in 1968 foreign 
firms were obliged to sacrifice their 5 - 10 per cent take of the value 
of Tanzania's total imports gained through regulating import-export prices. 
The firms were prepared to give up this prize in return for the commit-
ment of state capital to joint projects, and with the promise that the 
labour force would 'behave itself'. The parastatals were concerned with 
achieving profits. and surpluses, and with developing their own inte~ests, 
which usually.involved increasing their own power and influence against 
other parastatals. 
The thinking behind the Declaration was based on a concern above all 
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to increase agricultural production, especially food for the local mar-
ket, and with overall output increases, in order to provide reinvest-
ible surpluses. At the same time, the ideology and organisation of agr-
icultural production were correctly identified as crucial. 
Nyerere's pamphlet 'Socialism and Rural Development' of 1967, laid 
the framework for the basis of rural and national development. He noted 
that development had occurred, but that it was· ·of a capitalist type, fav 
-ouring individual aggrandisement at the expense of the underdevelopment 
of others. Selfishness and individualistic greed had increased so that 
society comprised a few wealthy people and an overwhelming majority of 
poor people. The rise of the urban centres, with a drawing out of res-
ources, especially labour, from the rural areas encouraged further dev-
elopment of wage-labour employment and a greater division of labour, and 
differentiation, between people and between urban and rural areas. The 
provision of social services, education and Western-type entertainment 
facilities in the urban areas·acted like a magnet to many people in the 
rural areas, especially the rural unemployed. The flight of youth to 
the towns, a decline in production for subsistence, and an attendant 
increase in cash cropping demonstrated changing socio-economic structures. 
Green warns of taking the urban-rural gap too literally~ He obser 
-ves that the urban-peasant income gap in 1974 was approximately 5:1, 
but the figures are fairly meaningless, and that intra-urban and intra-
rural disparities are greater than those between the two sectors. 
"A rural family raising most of its own food, building its own 
house, and achieving a net cash income of SHS1250 -·1500 a year 
is better off than a minimum wage earner at SHS4080 cash income and 
limited (if any) income in kind if he has the same size family. 
However, in this case the range of services and goods available, 
the chance of advancing to a higher income level, and the greater 
availabil~ty of public consumption (primary education, health, pure 
water) in urban areas has an inverse effect in favour of urban 
dwellers."13 
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In the rural areas the growth of GDP did not represent progressive 
development of the productive forces for the benefit of the whole 
society, because the rich farmers had appropriated for themselves the 
benefits of increased production. Nyerere saw this, and also that class 
differentiation and crystallisation was accelerating, especially in areas 
where land was scarce. Here a farmer-employer class stood in opposition 
to a labouring class. Production of greater output was being achieved 
through increased exploitation of labour. It was feared by the prog-
ressive radicals that unless the Qimite~ amount of capitalist, small-
scale agriculture was rapidly curtailed, then any hope for the creation 
of an egalitarian qua socialist society would be destroyed. 
In Nyerere's view a dichotomy existed between socialist agricult-
ural production and the imperativ.eneed to increase production immediate 
-ly. No substitute was available for the hard work and sacrifices needed 
from labour to increase production. This of itself entailed complex 
relations between the producers (labour); between producer and consumers; 
and between the producers and the state (which directed production and 
distribution). The new agricultural strategy outlined by Nyerere attempted 
to overcome the supposed paradox between the reconstruction of agricult-
ural production and the need to increase production immediately. For 
Cliffe, 
"the change sought is a revolutionary one and will involve not 
just the adoption of farming techniques, but the reorganisation 
of land-use patterns and thus a basic alteration in the economic 
relations between individuals; the consequent social changes, to-
gether with a shift of residence where appropriate, will constitute 
a total transformation of the rural community - a multi-dimension-
al and interrelated set of processes which involve a change in 
the mode of production, in both technical forces of production 
and in the social relations of production."14 
Raikes views a transition to socialism and self-re.liance as the 
mconvergence of resource use and the needs of the mass of the people. 1115 
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This requires that the masses control the means and processes of prod-
uction; and, the development of an integrated industrial base producing 
low-level capital goods and producer goods, and development of local 
skills and technology. China and Vietnam are· cited as evidence of the 
great releases of productivity and creativity released in peasants and 
workers when they take control of their own productive processes. 
"Given non-exploitative social organisations and suitable pol-
itical assistance and education people can mobilise themselves 
for tremendous feats of productivity and creativity, but they 
cannot be mobilised 'from above' while exploitative or author-
itarian social relations continue."16 
Nyerere's concern to raise productivity immediately did not allow for a 
single socialist approach. Ujamaa was to help fuel socialist trans-
formation, but other approaches were also taken on board. Raikes saw 
the danger of this duality. Political mobilisation was required not 
administrative action. 
"The latter may well achieve the concentration of the population 
in nucleated villages, but it will certainly not provide the re-
lease of productivity required for a major investment drive."17 
Commenting on the development of the Ujamaa Village policy in 1969, 
Nyerere reiterated many of his remarks made in 1967. A fundamental change 
in rural economic and social organisation was required·involving the co-
operativisation of prod~ction, marketing and distribution, along communal 
lines- with all Government policies mobilised to achieve it. 18 However, 
to achieve the immediate production increases, Nyerere still favoured 
the introduction of modern techniques on large-scale state farms. These 
farms were to become an important feature of the Second Five Year Plan. 
They were·to be organised under the auspices of the Ministry of Agricul-
ture, Food and Crops, and were to be supplemented by farms owned by Co-
operative Unions. A major feature of these farms was that they were 
subjected to a high degr~e of administrative/bureaucratic control. A 
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partial explanation was that a large capital investment was needed for 
their establishment, and the desire by the Government, to ensure a high 
level of managerial skill and a 'highly disciplined labour force•. 19 
It was recognised that such enterprises were not likely to transform the 
countryside along socialist lines, but the aim was to ensure increased 
production of estate-grown wheat and export crops • 
. This emphasis on large-scale estate agriculture contradicts nicely 
Nyerere's statement in 1967 stressing the need for the 'traditional 
African family' living style, ie. Ujamaa villages, which were to be rid 
of the old inequalities and inadequacies. 
"We.have already seen ••• the great dangers of heavy initial cap-
italisation and the great burden of debt which it leaves for the 
farmers. ·And the truth is that in any case our nation does not 
have the large amounts of capital. We have to create our ·own, and 
we can do this if we work together using at the beginning simply 
the resources we have already - that is our labour, our land, and 
20 
our willingness to work together." 
Hence, Tanzania was still to follow two modes for developing the agric-
ultural sector. The large-scale farms required heavy capital invest-
ment, mechanisation of production and the resettlement of the local pop 
-ulation. The workers on these estates were to become simple wage labo-
urers. 
On the other hand, a gradualist approach was continued through the 
development of villages without a fundamental reorganisation of the means 
of production nor in the processes of production, insofar as fe~ true 
Ujamaa villages were established, at least between 1967 and 1969. Yet, 
a 1969 Presidential Circular stressed that Ujamaa villages were essential 
to the transformation of the rural sector •.. 
According to this Circular, the Government and Party machinery was 
to be organised to assist the establishment of the villages, and there-
after to give them priority in credit provision and servicing and exten 
-sion services. The aim was to shift from co-operative marketing to co-
operative production. Other features included the infusion of Party 
cadres to rural areas to help educate the population on the need for 
communal production. The Ministry of Regional Administration and Rural 
Development co-ordinated the push toward the creation of these villages. 
21 McHenry comparing the Chinese, Soviet, Mexican and Tanzanian 
experience of collectivisation draws attention to certain common features. 
The use of a myth concerning the 'traditional' form as justification for 
collectivisation was used by all the -countries. Nyerere isolated the 
'good' and 'bad' aspects of 'traditional African socialism' and then 
argued that -the best aspects had been incorporated into the plans for 
Ujamaa. Second, in all the examples, peasants were rllffered social ser-
vices and credit facilities if they moved into sett_led villages - i.e. 
techniques for villagisation were used to increase the numbers of peasants 
in villages, and so to increase the importance of villages in terms of 
the share of production they were responsible for, and the ease of prov-
iding marketing, supply and production services as well as social services. 
In all cases the governments sought increased production. 
The reason that Ujamaa villages were not 'transformationist' in that the 
relations of production nor the techniques of production were structural-
ly reconstituted on socialist lines, lay in the nature of their establish-
ment. The term was not well understood, thus, a whole range of activit-
ies were declared 'Ujamaa' by administrators. 22 The term 'communal prod-
uction' was not understood either. In traditional African villages 
it meant individual landholding, with mutual aid schemes. In Nyerere's 
thinking communal production meant communal landholding and communal 
organisation of work and rewards. That these features were not a central 
plank of the administrators' understanding of the policy objective implies 
that for many of these administrators - who were responsible for initi-
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ating the policy - Ujamaa meant nothing more than villagisation. 
The Second Five Year Plan (S5YP, 1969 - 74) was initiated in 1969. 
It was a strategy supposedly based on the Arusha Declaration and the 
policy statements which followed it. The policy of Socialism, Self-
Reliance and Development was to be initiated, or so it was thought. 
The Ujamaa programme was intended to form a central plank in the Plan, 
although the state farms were still encouraged. 
The 1970 Mission Report examined this Plan, and offers an insight 
into World Bank Group thinking on the 'revolutionary' aspects of Tanzan-
ia's development strategy. 
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Section IV of The 1970 Mission Report: Projections for the Second 
Five Year Plan. 
The Mission argued that the broad objectives and strategy for this 
Plan (S5YP, 1969 ~ 1974), were laid down in the Arusha Declaration. It 
sought "balanced socio-economic growth"~3 with greater investment in 
directly productive activities in order to inc~ease the country's res-
ource base, The need was identified to increase the consumption levels 
of the lowest income-earners and to narrow the growing urban-rural gap. 
in living standards. This was to be achieved by increasing investment 
in rural areas. 
The greatest emphasis was placed by the Mission Report on the 
paramount need to increase the quantity, quality and variety of agric-
ultural output. (This concern was centred on the production of export 
crops, although as food shortages became more common-place, food prod-
uction was added to the concern. Seidman provides a corrective to the 
Mission's altruism: 
"Despite the fact that World Bank spokesmen admitted the limit-
ations of export agriculture due to world market problems, how-
·ever, it continued to help specific African countries produce 
export crops in isheer desperation' even when, like coffee •• 
they are in surplus on the world market. 1124 ) 
Under S5YP the initiative for rural development was to come from the 
rural population with Goverment support in terms of finance, staff, 
infrastructure and well-planned agricultural education. 
The S5YP's target for total investment for development was approx-
imately us. $1,,130. million, with private investment projected to play a 
decreasing role, and development of rural areas as the key objective. 25 
Generally, the Mission believed the S5YP to be realistic, although it 
favoured US $1,041 million as the target investment figure. If implem-
Table 18 
Tanzania: Second Five Year Plan Project of Total Investment 
(US $ millions) 
Central Government 
Parastatals & Co-operatives 
Private 
EAC 
Total 
427-9 
322.1 
301.1 
81.2 
1132.3 
Source: Derived from Para. 137 vol 1, 1970 Mission Report. 
ented, it would have resulted in a 6.5 per cent p.a. increase in GDP 
between 1968 - 73, at 1968 prices. However, central to this calculat-
ion was the Mission's belief that coffee prices were likely to rise over 
the period. Th.e general balance of payments position was foreseen as 
moderately optimistic, based primarily on a coffee boom and an increase 
in invisible trade. Given this vista Tanzania would not suffer from 
debt-service problems, but aid always was meant to form a key element of 
Government development planning. 
It was expected that a change would take place in the make-up of 
GDP, with manufacturing, construction and public utilities showing much 
higher growth rates than agriculture, communications and transport. The 
breakdown of investment structure was expected to differ from that of 
the F5YP. 
The Central Government investment target, excluding a contribution 
of US $91 million to the parastatals, totalled US $428 million. The 
parastatals and co-operatives' target was set at US $322 million; the 
EAC US $81 million; and private investment US $300 million. Looking in 
greater detail at these figures; although the parastatals comprise 25 
26 bodies, NDC, TANESCO, NAFCO, TTC, and NHC accounted for 85 per cent 
of this sector's investment target. The full target for this sector 
was expected to be raised from Central Government budgeting (30 per cent), 
their own resources (30 per cent), and from foreign long-term loans, 
supplier credits and equity capital (40 per cent). Of the total Govern-
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ment investment of US $519 million, 57 per cent was to be raised local 
-ly. The Report noted that nearly all private investment would come 
from local sources for private enterprises because foreign private inve 
-stors would find the NDC a much safer, more profitable investment. 
The Mission estimated that the S5YP's financial targets were over-
ambitious, and set the figure at US $1,040 million, of which 31 per cent 
(US $323 milliq_n) was to be raised externally, whilst the rest would 
rely on local resources,"therefore, favouring self-reliance. 1127 
Table 19. 1970 Mission Projection of Investment f.or S5YP. 
(US $ million) 
Value % 
Ministerial Dev't Expenditure 400 38.4 
Parastatal Organisations 259 24.9 
EAC 81 7.8 
Private 301 28.9 
Total 1041 100.0 
Source: Derived from Para. 172,. vel 1, 1970 Mission Report. 
Further disparities between the Mission's projections and the S5YP 
existed over estimates of recurrent revenue and expenditure. 28 The S5YP 
budgeted for a recurrent budget surplus of US $87 million over the period, 
derived from total recurrent revenue of US $1242 million, and recurrent 
expenditure of US $1155 million. Such a surplus would have required a 
growth rate in revenue of 9.3 per cent p.a •. According to the S5YP 
revenue from taxation was to grow by 9.7 per cent pa. on the 1969/70 
figure. The Mission claimed that this figure was a gross over-estimat-
ion because all avenues for increasing recurrent revenue··through taxat-
ion had already been exhausted by 1969/70. The Mission offered US $70 
million as a more realistic target for the total recurrent budgetary 
surplus. 
The revised investment plan - ie. the Mission's figures - are re-
produced in Table 20. 
,. 
Table 20. 1970 Mission Report Estimate of Central Government Develop-
ment Expenditure & Source of Finance. (US $ millions) 
Investment Financing 
Ministerial 
Contribution to 
Parastatals 
Total 
400.0 
73-5 
473-5 
Internal Sources: 
From recurrent Budget 
Internal borrowing 
Other local 
Total 
External Sources 
Grants 
Loans 
Total 
67.9 
147.0 
45.5 
262.2 
14.0· 
197-3 
211.3 
Source: Derived from Para. 168, val 1, 1970 Mission Report. 
The table demonstrates that 45 per cent of total Cen~ral Government 
development" ·eJq>endi ture was, according to the Mission, to be raised from 
foreign aid. This contradicts the earlier claim that Tanzania's develop 
-ment was to be heavily dependent on self-reliance. The picture is clar 
-ified by the Mission's projection for the monetary value of projects 
not receiving external finance. US $262.2 million was the limit set on 
internal sources for Central Government development plans, but US $108.5 
million would be required for projects which the Mission believed would 
not be financed externally. 29 Hence, US $153-7 million of internal 
resources were to be invested in projects attracting foreign aid - a 
ratio of 42:58. This of course, made no allowance for the costs of for-
eign aid in terms of debt-service etc.* 
*The provision of foreign aid did not fit the timetable of S5YP exactly 
because aid is rarely disbursed in one lump sum. Aid committed for F5YP 
was still being disbursed during S5YP. The 1970 Mission recommended that 
the Tanzanian Government prepare a list of high-priority projects for pre 
-sentation to the East African Aid Consultative Group immediately, which 
would be examined by representatives of the aid donors under the auspices· 
of the Bank Group's Permanent Mission for East Africa. 30 
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The Mission saw the Parastatals as a means by which the Government 
maintained a substantial participation in all productive and distribut-
ive activities. In 1969, in order to make the co-ordination of the dev-
elopment programme administratively more efficient, the Parastatals were 
reorganised~- to give a clear line of authority from a parent ministry. 
The two key ministries were the Treasury, and the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industries •. The net effect of the reorganisation was to break 
up the NDC into the Tanzania Tourist Corporation,,the National Agricul-
ture~ Foodand"Co-operatives Corporation and a small NDC. 
The Mission estimated that over the period of the S5YP, the Para-
statals would receive one quarter of all investments. Including US $20.5 
million investment by the National Development Credit Agency (NDCA) and 
the National Small Industries Corporation (Government-financed for the 
benefit of the Parastatals), this sector's total estimate was expected 
to reach US $279-5 million. 31 Most of the investment was to be raised 
from internal parastatal savings - US $140.4 mill~on; Central Government 
contributions - US $73-5 million; and direct foreign investment - made 
up from loans, equity participation and supplier credits - US $45.1 
million (i.e. 16 per cent of the Parastatals total investment). 
As of June 1969, US $92.1 million worth of foreign finance was avail-
able for S5YP, 32. of which the West provided US $70.3 million, and the 
USSR and PRC, US $21.7 million~3 Hence, another US $119 miilion was 
needed (excluding the finance required for the Tanzam Railway). For the 
projected target of US $323 million in foreign resources required for 
the S5YP, Central Government was to take US $211 million; the Parastat-
als- US $45 million; the Tanzam Railway- US $28 million (approximately)* 
and direct private investment in private firms - US $14 million. 
* Most of the finance required for the Tanzam Railway (about US $400 million) 
had already been promised. 
Agriculture 
The S5YP was geared, in principle at least, to reorganise the agri 
-cul tural:·sector, thus the Mission Report's examination of the prospects 
for the Plan n_ecessarily covered the agricultural ·sector in detail. Most 
of this Report was taken up with the issue of how to ensure increased 
production of export crops by small farmers/peasants rather than by agri 
-culture organised on capitalist lines. 
As shown earlier (Part One, Chapter Two, pages 74 - 94) World Bank 
Group thinking on agricultural/rural development changed in the late 1960's. 
"The new World Bank - IDA emphasis on agriculture, in contrast to 
earlier years, is on small farmers rather than plantations. The 
latter, it is argued, tend to be 'politically vulnerable' and their 
relatively heavy fixed costs make them economically vulnerable in 
a period of softening demand and prices. 1134 
This is not to suggest that the Bank Group alone was responsible for this 
'new' perspective. The S5YP itself, was heavily committed to agricult-
ural development, but the tension lay in what type of agricultural dev-
elopment, based on what assumptions. 
According to the Mission, four types of crops were identified in 
the S5YP - export crops; import-substitution crops; high-nutritional 
value crops; staple foods .. - all of which were to be expanded. However? 
the Mission pinpointed an immediate determining constraint. 
"The most important determinant of the success of the agricultural 
program .. will be the availability of trained and experienced man-
power."35 
A possible solution to this problem was offered: 
"It is important that external donors recognise that ••• it would 
be desirable to incorporate a technical component in their aid 
programs ••• In some instances the role of the external donor 
could usefully begin right at the outset, in identifying and 
preparing projects in which they have a potential interest. 
In the absence-of such 'pre-investment' assistance, Tanzania 
will experience difficulty in submitting a steady supply of 
projects for the consideration of external donors."36 
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Herein lies a key point. Foreign·technicians were to be used to prepare 
project-studies and to carry them out. This begs the obvious question 
of the ideological and therefore, practical commitment of these technic-
ians to a socialist development programme. A dependence on foreign tech-
nicians to perform the tasks of constructing socialist development pro-
:' jects is ih:tdirect contradiction to the notion of self-reliance. Seidman 
noted that the Bank Group set up,an Agricultural Development Service 
in East Africa to supervise its projects, whose staff included eighteen 
expatriates with long experience in the colonial service, some as succ-
essful capitalist farmers. On the issue of their ideological perspect-
ive, it is not what is in the minds of the planners/supervisors which is 
crucial, but how they conceived their projects and in what total environ-
ment/perspective. ·seidman saw in the setting up of the ADS, an attempt 
to pursue the same polices as the colonial power just before Indepecdence 
- the development of "a 'stable yeomanry' among African farmers in an 
effort to maintain the status quo in East Africa. 11 .3? 
The Mi~sion p~ojected over the period the output of soft wheat, 
oilseeds and livestock to fall, but of sisal, tea and tobacco to inc-
rease. On the other hand, expectations of price changes were for those 
of cotton, tea, pyrethrum, rice and oilseeds to fall, but the prices for 
cashewnuts, coffee and tobacco to rise. The key crop was coffee because 
Brazil, the largest producer suffered from poor harvests and frost damage 
which harmed production. This meant that the price of coffee would remain 
high for several years. 
Of the eleven major crops, the Mission recommended extra effort on 
the development of tea, tobacco, cotton, cashews and coffee. No special 
efforts were to be expended on the development of wheat production, maize 
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and rice. In fact the efforts under way for the development of wheat 
production were recommended for curtailment.38 
"There appears to be too much concern for attaining self-
sufficiency in food."39 
"Attempts to achieve self-sufficiency in crops such as soft-
wheat should not be pushed too rapidly as long as they can be 
imported at reasonable prices •••• To import these items ••• 
would enable extension and other staff to be employed in act-
ivities where they would be most productive, eg cotton or 
40 
cashews." 
The Mission's explanation for this view was that wheat and rice 
were grown on state farms which are capital-intensive and plagued by 
low productivity. Importing cheap food would free resources for other 
activities. The Mission also warned that unless producer prices of 
export crops were kept high, there would be a shift to the production 
f . . d "1 d 41 o r~ce, ma~ze an o~ see s. This appeared to be the Mission's great-
est fear ~ that Tanzania would seek self-sufficiency in food at the exp-
ense of export crops. 
Export Crops: (See Tables 16 & 21) 
1. Cotton: 
Tanzania has a history of small-holder production, especially in the most 
productive regions - Lake Victoria and Tabora Region produces 97 per 
cent of harvested output. The average annual output for 1967-69 was 
0.354·million bales, but the S5YP expected output to rise to 0.6.2/0.7 
million bales by 1975. 
The Mission projected a falling price on the world market for cotton, so 
to achieve the target, it recommended a concerted cotton campaign. This 
would involve the removal of all export duties on the crop and the prov-
ision of better se.rvices (infrastructure) in cotton-growing areas, and 
greater efficiency in collection and processing. This necessarily re-
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quired the provision of inputs at subsidised rates. The Mission took 
the point of view that the cost of increasing the output of the crop be 
shared by all rate and tax payers, but that in effect, the lion's share 
of the benefits accrue to cotton producers. In sum, the Mission's app-
roach was to increase output by incentive to increase the acreage then 
already planted by cotton farmers, and to bring new farmers into cotton 
production. Cotton was projected to earn 26 per cent of the agricultur-
al sector's income over the period. 
Table 21. Crop Husbandry Summary, Total 1964- 1968. 
Principal Cash Crop Volume Marketed Output Value 
( '000 tons) (US % millions) 
Sisal 1076.0 190.7 
Cotton 315.7 145.7 
Coffee 219.8 151.5 
Cashewnu.ts 407.5 46.0 
Sugar 348.4 45.0 
Tea 31.8 28.6 
Tobacco 27.2 16.3 
Pyrethrum 21.6 15.6 
Wheat 137.4 11.4 
Groundnuts 58.5 7.8 
Source: Derived from Table 1, vol 11, 1970 Mission Report. 
Note: disparities between this table and Table 16 lie in the fact that 
some crops are stored, and because Table 21 includes Zanzibar. 
2. Pyrethrum: 
Again small-holder production represented well over 90 per cent of the 
marketed output. Outptutoverthe S5YP was not exp~cted to increase gre 
-atly because of the effects of a falling world price. Although the 
yields from estates were almost double those from small-holder farms, 
acre for acre, estate production took only a small share of the national 
output. The Mission pleaded against a shift to large-scale estate pro-
duction. It suggested the introduction of productivity schemes .be used 
as a means of increasing small-holder yields. 
"The advantage of a shift (back - CJ) from estates to family 
labour is that Tanzania can be a low-cost producer if the new 
42 technology is adopted by small farmers." 
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This theme permeated all the Mission's thinking with regard to the pro-
duction of export crops. Namely, that family labour, in this situation, 
is involved in the production of food for subsistence and the production 
of cash crops for the market, thereby lowering the costs of cash crop 
production because the responsibility for the reproduction of labour 
does not fall on the cash cropping sector. 
The Mission introduced an environmental issue by arguing that world 
demand for pyrethrum will increase as the ecological dangers of synthet-
ics such as DDT are fully realised, but that a fall in production costs 
would be necessary to give the country a competitive edge over its rival-
producers·and rival crops. 
Tea: 
This crop had been largely an estate-produced crop, and it was hoped to 
achieve an output of 29 million pounds in 1974 - an increase of 9 per 
cent p.a. The Mission and the S5YP planned on increased output encouraged 
by an IDA credit to help finance an extra 12,000 acres of small-holder 
production. (See 115). 
Sisal: 
Employment in this sector fell by 70,000 between 1962 and 1969, but its 
prospects brightened with the setting up of a FAO study group to intra-
duce quotas for the major producers. Tanzania's quota was set at 0.2 
million p.a. - 11 per cent less than the 1965 figure. Before 1967 the 
large estates were generally foreign-owned and the Government centred 
most of its attention on small-holder production, but, after national-
isation under the Tanzanian Sisal Corporation, the state had taken either 
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holdings or ownership of 60 per cent of the industry's capacity. One 
effect had been that only the best estates had received government aid·: 
The others were left to decline further. 43 
The Mission also noted that massive over-capacity existed in the 
industry and that diversification of the declining estates was a press-
ing policy objective. However, the soil and climatic conditions under 
which it is cultivated are such that few crops will substitute for it. 
In essence, the Mission admitted that it had no policy for sisal 
production between 1969 - 1974. 
Coffee: 
Between 1966 - 68, coffee had become the second largest export-earner. 
Although small-holders were r.esponsible for 75 per cent of total output, 
one of the majo~ reasons for increased output, according to the Mission, 
was the introduction of modern production techniques, particularly spray-
ing and the use of fertilizers. This was especially so on estates where 
yields per acre were treble those of small-holders. 
Tanzania is a member of the International Coffee Agreement, which 
set an export quota of 41,000 tons p.a. on Tanzania between 1969/70-
1972/3. Generally, production was expected to exceed the quota, there-
fore Tanzania.was encouraged to find markets outside the quota-area. 
The Mission accepted the S5YP target figure of 67,000 tons by 1974, 
of which. 65,000 tons would be exported. To ensure maximum benefit it was 
recommended that all marginal production be abandoned - but no distinct-
ion was made between estate and small-holder production. 
, Tobacco: 
This crop was favoured for expansion by the Mission because of the avail-
ability of cheap labour to cultivate it. Tanzania was reckoned to be an 
ideal producer, and the IDA provided a· credit of US $9 million in 1970/1 
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for the expansion of production. 
Import-Substitution Crops: 
Wheat 
Ninety per cent of Tanzania's wheat production originated from large 
commercial farms in Kilimanjaro and Arusha; and, half the country's tot-
al consumption was imported (1962- 1968). In the S5YP the Government 
continued its attempts to develop wheat production, on state farms, thr-
ough small-holder production and through ujamaa production. The Govern-
ment hoped to achieve self-sufficiency by 1974. State farms were projec 
-ted for development or expansion at: Sumbawanga- 50,000 acres (1970); 
Ilembo (1970/1); Syutila (1972/3/4); Ilini- 5,000 acres (1974); Mara-
1000 acres (1970/1); Milundikwa- 2,700 acres (1969); Rwamkoma- 400 
acres (1969/70). Also, at the Basotu Wheat Scheme in Arusha, NAFCO was 
to manage an area of 5,000 acres, projected to expand to 30,000 acres 
by 1974. 
When this Mission Report was prepared, wheat was relatively cheap 
on the world market, and the Mission felt that it would better serve 
Tanzania's interests to import 'cheap' wheat than to use local resources 
to produce the crop more 'expensively'. Accepting that the development 
of food crops was politically important to the Government, the Mission 
recommended the limited development of small-holder production rather 
than estate production. The World Bank Group's disapproval of Tanzania's 
desire to develop wheat as a major crop was highlighted by its unwill-
ingness to loan for the development of the crop. Almost every other 
crop has, during the past 15 years, received Bank Group support. 44 
Rice: 
One of the aims of the S5YP was to achieve self-sufficiency and perhaps 
surplus in this crop, on 13,000 acres of state farms. The Mission ace-
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epted this proposal, but again argued that import prices were, and 
would remain, low enough to make the need to achieve self-sufficiency 
marginal. 
Such optimism contradicted the Mission's own Table: 
Table 22. Paddy Production and Imports, 1962 - 1968. ( '000 tons) 
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 
Production 80.9 99.0 109.2 92.9 129.2 108.5 n.a. 
Imports n.a. 2.4 1.6 Y-5 14.9 2.5 16.6 
Value of Imports n.a. 0.4 0.2 0.6 2.2 0.5 2.8 
(US $ million) 
Source: Derived from Table 14, vol11, 1970 Mission Report. 
Herein, the quantity and cost of imported rice had risen, while domestic 
production fluctuated. 
High-Nutrition Foods: 
Dairying, beef cattle, sheep, goats, pigs, poultry and fish were all ear 
-marked for development over the period. Bilateral and multilateral aid 
donors had always been willing to aid the development of this sector, with 
projects ranging from aid to small-holder pastoralists to aid to large-
scale ranching estates. 
No mention was made of the reasons why foreign donors have been willing 
participants in this sector, nor whether production was export-oriented, 
or was geared to internal consumption. 
Staple Foods: 
These were covered by the S5YP's targets for sorghum, millet, maize etc. 
and contrary to the Mission's arguments, were an integral part of the 
S5YP's development strategy. Generall~ the production of staple foods 
was expected to be left in the hands of individual small-holder producers. 45 
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The Mission's assessment of the agricultural sector's projections in 
the S5YP, produced a figure of US $84.6 million net increment to GDP, 
as opposed·to the Plan's own figure of US $86 million. The Mission 
also forecast that by 1973, export crops would have doubled, showing 
an increase from 1968's figure of 81.6 per cent of all exports, to 86.5 
per cent of all exports. 
THE UJAMAA PROGRAMME: 
The Mission's analysis of the policy of the Ujamaa Village Program-
me as laid down in the S5YP, was instructive of their stance on the 
nature of development. No attempt was made to describe or define Ujamaa 
other than to call them small communities involved in farming and relying 
on local initiative. 
"A major question is whether the Ujamaa program will result in a 
diversion of human and capital resources from on-going activities 
- eg, cotton, tea and livestock extension programs - to a new but 
unproven venture." 46 
Again the fear was present that Ujamaa would pose a threat to the full 
development of export crops. The apprehension was balanced by a degree 
of optimism- 'Ujamaa' production was thought to be well suited to the 
areas opened up for flue-cured tobacco, cotton and tea production, and 
such production (undefined by the Mission Report) could also prove use-
ful for the production of handtools and ox-carts! 47 
Also, 
"Ujamaa villages are not designed solely to expand commodity 
output, although there could be many advantages in organising 
the production of commodities on a ujamaa basis, as has been 
done successfully in the case of tobacco." 48 
"However, it would be advisable to regard the program as an 
experiment during the present Plan •• " 49 
"Much can be learned about the nature of social and economic 
change in rural areasfroma careful monitoring of the Ujamaa 
Program."50 
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It was surely significant that the major and potentially most rev 
-olutionary alteration in Tanzania's political economy merited less than 
a single page of the Mission's report. Various explanations can be given. 
Perhaps the Mission was ignorant of the potential impact of the Programme; 
perhaps the Mission was aware that the Ujamaa Programme was not revol-
utionary and was likely to have a negligible impact on raising the out-
put of export crops. More likely, it was the Mission's - which is the 
Bank Group's - ambiguity concerning the Ujamaa Programme which explains 
its lack of analysis. It would appear that the Mission reflected the 
general uncertainty shown within the Bank Group over its primary concern 
- the product or the relations of production? That is, the Group sought 
increased productivity; does it therefore not care which productive re-
lations are employed to achieve increased productivity? The two aspects 
are inseparable, yet the Bank Group's concern with the technology of 
increased productivity tended to relegate the social relations aspects 
to a secondary position, at this time, (1970). Yet, this is too simplis 
-tic because the Mission did recommend the adoption of small-holder pro 
-duction precisely because the relations of production were such as to 
limit the costs of production. Hence, the ambiguity. 
The Industrial Sector: 
Industrialisation during the S5YP was intended to absorb US $182 
million, with the NDC projected as the Government's main instrument for 
furthering industrial development, with an investment target of US $109 
million. Many of its projects were drawn up in collaboration with for-
eign interests. Yet, the Mission reported that the declining scope for 
private investment brought about by the Arusha Declaration except in the 
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areas of housing, transport and construction, and in peasant agricul-
ture, minhibits industrial development 11 • 51 
The main thrust of the development of manufacturing during the 
period was .to increase the quantity and quality of local-produced small 
consumer goods, and some intermediate goods, eg. processing plants. 
Growth had already been established in this field by 1969, so future 
growth was not expected to be great. The Mission estimated that a real-
istic investment figure would be US $140 million. 52 
"In fact, most of the industries which are considered feasible 
have already been identified, and many are being established."53 
The development of manufacturing industries was hoped to cover import 
-substitution, processing and,.to provide an exportable surplus. Clearly, 
the questions to be asked here are, first, what are the products that 
these industries produce? These are mostly luxury or semi-luxuries, such 
as beer, cosmetics and other high-priced consumer goods, often based on 
imported constituent element, geared to a small high-income urban popul-
ations. Second, a Mission suggestion that exportable surpluses will be 
sold overseas was dubious, given the cost-effectiveness of the industrial 
-ised countries' exports in this area; and, that other countries in East 
Africa will also be developing their own import-substitution industries. 
The Service Sector: 
This sector, incorporating transport and communicatio~s, was singled out 
as the sector most likely to have achieved its growth targets by 1974. 
This assessment was based on the further development of the Zambian 
through-traffic link; and on tourism. Ambitious road and airport schemes 
were earmarked for full development during the S5YP, to meet the expected 
growth in transit trade, tourism, and the need for greater provision of 
feeder roads for agricultural development to ensure greater ease of trans 
-portation of export crops. 
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One of the major explanations for the rapid development of the 
road system lay in the Western aid donors self-felt need to make up for 
their failure to build the Tanzam Railway. Instead they are building a 
parallel road to supplement the railroad. 
The Private Sector: 
After the Arusha Declaration, the relative importance of 'purely' private 
enterprise had declined,_ but its participation in projects with the NDC 
increased. The S5YP·targetedcUS $300 million (26 per cent of total in-
vestment) as the private sector's investment, 88 per cent of which would 
be concentrated in housing (US $84 million), road transport (US $105 
million), and construction (US $73-5 million). 
Table 23. S5YP Estimate of Private Sector Investment 
(US $ million) 
Housing 
Other Building 
Transport 
Construction Equipment 
Other Machinery 
Total 
84.0 
38.5 
105.0 
35.0 
38.5 
301.0 
Source: Derived from Para 164, vol 1, 1970 Mission Report 
"The Government believes that, with the .exception of those enter-
prises listed in the Arusha Declaration, private enterprise 
.continues to have an important role, and several examples of 
collaboration with the parastatal organisations - notably NDC 
- exist. In most cases, the initiative has come from foreign 
in:terests. The main fields in which local private enterprises 
are active are housing, transport and tourism."54 
Tourism: 
The basis ·for the development of tourism was founded on an assumption 
that the number of tourists would rise from 40,000 in 1968 to"at least 
100,000 in 1974. 
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The isolation of tourism as an area of major importance for private 
enterprise was accepted and encouraged by the Mission. Under the S5YP 
at least US $27.million was to be invested in the development of accom~ 
odation and wildlife areas.55 This was apart from the costs of a new 
airport at Aru~ha and other infrastructure required to sustain it. 
Seidman, argued that in all one-third of all NDC funds for ~industrial 
investment' were to be concentrated in the tourist sector.56 The 
parastatal responsible for tourism, the Tanzania Tourist Corporation, 
favoured partnership with private enterprise, through which management 
was left in private hands. 
Volume II of the 1970 Mission Report was concerned with 'Agriculture 
I 
and Rural Development'. Onea the key issues of the F5YP was the 
structure of the rural economy and the attempt to diversify crop prod-
uction. In summary, two approaches were taken regarding rural developm-· 
ent - transformationist and gradualist - with the former being shelved 
in 1966 because it, was found to be too capital-intensive, and produced poor 
returns·. Ujamaa villagisation which only began in 1968/9 appeared not 
to be seen by -the.Mi'ss:ion as,,transformationist. Instead it was seen to 
represent an attempt to counter the urban bias present when services and 
benefits were dispensed. It was envisaged that Ujamaas would encourage 
greater investment in rural areas. In fact, according to the Mission, 
the villages wer·e 1c be .centres purely for social and technical services 
based on self-help. ana .co-operation, without reference to the ideological 
basis of the policy~7 i.e. no change in the relations of production was 
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envisaged. 
The Mission reported that 90 per cent of the country's population 
was dependent on the land for a livelihood. A surplus of land existed, 
of great potential, if cultivated properly.~8 Peasant farming predom-
inated - especially hand-hoeing - and although 'tractorization' was 
attempted, it was abandoned as too expensive. Besides crop production, 
livestock was important, with approximately 11 million cattle in 1969 -
mostly Southern Zebus - farmed extensively on the abundant grasslands. 
Further, we are told that the country was self-sufficient in food, except 
for wheat and dairy produce.59 
Finally, the Mission noted the growth of rural unemployment and the 
lack of any corresponding growth in urban employment, and concluded that 
rural self-employment was a necessary policy-objective. 
In essence, this section of the 1970 Mission Report reflected the 
World Bank Group's attempts to counter and circumvent the radical aspects 
of the new Tanzanian strategy outlined in the Arusha Declaration. In 
particular, attempts were made to circumvent any structural changes in 
the relations of production of peasants. Ujamaa, identified by the 
Mission as a 'useful experiment' was presented as a possible method for 
facilitating the production of cash crops (tea and tobacco), with foreign 
aid providing some of the resources (and supervision) for introducing 
advanced farming techniques and technology. Neither socialist trans-
formation nor even self-sufficiency were envisaged by the World Bank as 
central themes. The failure·of the Village Settlement Scheme during the 
F5YP ensured a degree of flexibility on the World Bank's side concerning 
new forms of labour organisation to facilitate cash crop production. It 
was only the possibility of using Ujamaa to increase such production with 
-out changing the relations of production, which interested the World Bank 
Group. 
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Chapter Five 
The Reality of Arusha 
1 Coulson has chronologued the main events of the Ujamaa Programme 
between 1967 and 1974 as follows: 
Jan 1967: Arusha Declaration - an emphasis on self-reliance and social-
ism at local and national level. 
Sep 1967: 'Socialism and Rural Development'- Ujamaa was announced as the 
official policy for rural development. 
1968: Some so-called Ujamaa villages were established -·often through 
the coercive pressure put on peasants by local politicians and 
bureaucrats seeking career promotion. 
1968: 'Freedom and Development'- Nyerere's paper acknowl~dged that 
mistakes had been' made: short-cuts had been attempted; too much 
had been promised and expected; the correct ideological commit-
m~nt had been lacking. The use of force to achieve villagisation 
was strongly condemned. Future villages were to be smalle.r in 
order to achieve more real democracy. 
1969: 'Presidential Circular No. 1' -All Government policies, act-
ivities and efforts were to be geared to encouraging greater 
communalisation. All Government departments were ordered to 
site their development projects in Ujamaa villages. This was to 
be a central plank of the Second Five Year Plan. 
A Regional Development Fund, financed partly by the IDA, was 
set up to provide creq.it facilities for small projects in Ujamaa 
villages. The combined effect of these initiatives induced peas-
ants to settle in so-called communal villages. In this way 
bureaucrats became initiators and controllers of the drive to 
rural change. The cost of this policy became prohibitive because 
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the provision of credit and other facilities was not matched by 
increased productivity. 
1969: Operation Rufiji - The whole population of this area was 
forcibly resettled on higher ground because of local overcult-
ivation, infertility and the threat of flooding. 
The Ruvuma Development Association was banned because of its 
criticisms of the Party and Government. 
1970: Planning Teams were sent to improve village production per-
formance. The operat!i.pn failed because these experts were- often -
unfamiliar with local conditions. 
Operation Dodoma - A plan was launched to resettle the popula-
tion of this region near water supplies. 
1971: 30,000 Gogo families were moved into 190 villages in the Dodoma 
Region. Two of the new settlements contained more than 500 
families each. The Government ploughed 21,000 acres by tractor 
but cultivation and harvesting were organised. on an individual 
basis. 
By the end of 1971, 629 'Ujamaa' villages were operational. 
In the Ismani Region a Regional Commissioner responsible for in-
itiating local Ujamaa villages was assassinated by a. rich farmer. 
1972: Operation Kigoma and Operation Chunya were started. The Dec-
entralisation was introduced. 
Communal production was still extremely limited. Bureaucratic 
directives were issued ordering an increase in productivity - by 
any means available. This was taken as encouragement for indiv-
idual cultivation. 
1973: Decreasing emphasis was being laid on Ujamaa v~llages, and 
more on 'development' villages. The latter were centres of soc-
ial services and agricultural facilities comprisin~ 500 families 
each. Production was not organised communally. A directive was 
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issued: 'To Live In Villages Is An Order'. 
A severe drought forced the importation of maize. 
1974: Villagisation through coercion proceeded rapidly. Production 
was dislocated. The importation of food continued. All village 
members were compelled to cultivate a plot of staple food for 
subsistence, besides the p~oduction of cash crops for export. 
The dual policy of Ujamaa villages and state farms was put into 
effect during the S5YP. However, it would be wrong to assume an even 
impact of the policy throughout the country. The peasantry is not a hom 
-ogeneous category. Different strata within the peasantry have different 
interests. Hence, 
"A •• preci·se and sensitive class analysis, which searches out the 
different groups and strata as well as the differing situations 
of local peasantries would seem to be required for policy purposes 
- first, to identify the likely responses to change and specifically 
to the actual policy of Ujamaa Vijijini, and secondly to isolate 
different economic systems which could form the basis of ujamaa 
production and thus work out the diverse programmes tailored.to 
the diverse rural situations that Nyerere envisages. 112 
The development of the Ujamaa Programme was viewed, in the light of 
this, as a progression of small steps rather than a single great leap 
forward. Initially, a diverse farming system was envisaged: the follow-
ing of many alternative paths according to the particular area's stage· 
of development, the degree of social stratification, the availability of 
land, the level of economic opportunity. The first stage often meant the 
establishment of co-operative marketing, and co-operative purchase of 
agricultural inputs. The Leadership rejected a policy of creating 
'islands of socialism'. Instead an approach was chosen which saw that 
governmental and political institutions were geared to push for collect-
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ivisation of agriculture throughout the country - except on the state 
farms. 
Figures on the progress of the policy, in terms of· the number of 
villages established, presented by Ellman show that in February 1967 
there were 48 Ujamaa villages containing 0.05 per cent of the Mainland's 
population. By December 1969 the respective figures were 650 and 2.5 
per cent. In June 1971, 2,668 villages had been established, with 
840,000 people (6.3 per cent of the Mainland's population. Immediately 
a definitional problem arises because the Ministry of Rural Development's 
definition of Ujamaa villages includes villages at all levels and stages 
of development toward Ujamaa. Ellman observes that an independent report 
in 1968 estimated the number of true Ujamaa villages to be as low as 20. 3 
A significant feature in 1971 was that most of the villages were establ-
ished in areas where land surplus existed. In Mtwara, 44 per cent of the 
population were settled in Ministry-defined Ujamaa villages, whereas in 
the rich, land-scarce areas of Kilimanjaro only 0.3 per cent were settled 
in such villages. 4 
The villagisation process is split into three stages by Ellman. In 
the first stage, when the village has been recently established and is 
not immediately viable (self-sufficient), long-term investment is required 
- for the provision of roads, water supplies and other infrastructural 
facilities - especially in newly-settled areas. After 1970 the funds for 
such villages were provided in the form of a grant from the executive 
Ministries and from the Regional Development Fund. Short-term invest-
ment on seed, tractors, fertilizers and other agricultural inputs was 
supplied through local co-operative societies and unions from the Tanzan-
ian Rural Development Bank. Finance from the latter source took the 
form of loans which were to be repaid out of crop production earnings. 
Second ·stage villages are those approaching or already achieving 
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economic viability. The village must constitute a working unit wherein 
the use of a village register entitles the village to qualify as an Agri 
-cultural Association, and thereby gives it access to credit from the 
TRDB. Infrastructural investment and services are provided through 
Central Government schemes. 
The third stage villages are fully-fledged co-operative societies. 
These are expected to attract commercial credit from the National Bank 
of Commerce, the relevant Marketing Boards, TRDB,etc. 
Ellman found that any ·evaluation of cost-benefit of investment- was 
extremely difficult. Flue-cured tobacco is grown only in the village 
co-operatives.-and stage one villages. Production of this crop rose from 
3,576 tonnes in 1966, to 8,926 tonnes in 1970, but there is no evidence 
that this increase.was due to the policy of villagisation. 
One of the basic failures of the earlier Village Settlement Scheme 
was that farmers spent far more time and effort working on their own 
land than on communal holdings. This was also true of the early stages 
of Ujamaa Village development. Yet the number of villages increased. 
The explanation lies in a mixture of incentives and coercion forced on 
the peasants. The early villages contained less than 50 families, which 
despite the flexibility this gave to organising production, was too small 
in administrative terms to make the provision of government services 
efficient. Thus, since 1968/9 many of the villages established were to 
contain at least 200-300 families. In theory, a sub-division of 50-100 
families comprised the production unit, joining with other production 
units in service, marketing and large-scale productive activities. In 
the second and third stage villages, a mixed-crop agricultural system 
prevailed, where cotton, tobacco and other cash crops were grown commun-
ally, whilst food was grown individually (ie. by each family). Herein 
the peasants become hired cash earners and at the same time remain sub-
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sistence producers. 
A criticism much in evidence in the literature evaluating the co-
operative and Ujamaa programmes concerned the provision of credit to the 
villages. The National Development Credit Agency was created on the 
advice of the Bank Group, and received most of its post-1966 financing 
from the IDA. Until it was superceded by the Tanzanian Rural Develop-
ment Bank (TRDB) in 1971 it was the major provider of credit to producers. 
The formula for determining the level of credit facility did··not depend 
on the land-ownership patterns. No effort was made to discriminate in 
favour of Ujamaa villages. Instead, the availability of credit was dep-
endent on a per centage figure of the previous year's average value of 
crop deliveries from the individual farmers. In effect, this policy 
favoured the richer farmers/producers. In 1970, of all the NDC credits, 
70 per cent were concentrated in the nine richest regions, while the six 
poorest received only 11 per cent. Further, 90 per cent of all crop dev 
-elopment loans in this year were issued for the production of export 
crops. This links the World Bank Group lending policies in Tanzania to 
the actual policies of the local administration. The Bank Group provided 
most of·~the funds and these funds were used to develop export crop pro-
duction, predominantly in the richer areas of the country. Hence, the 
Bank Group's concern with the production of export crops has had the 
effect of exacerbating regional and individual inequalities. 
"The NDCA can therefore be criticised for failing to confront the 
problem of increasing differentiation both within regions and be-
tween regions, as well as for encouraging continued reliance on 
primary export crops at the expense of local foodstuff expansion."5 
The ·credit system was administered through the co-operative network 
which was almost entirely geared toward marketing and service provision 
activities. Although the NDCA gave credits through ~he co-operatives, 
the credits were not made to the cocoperatives but to individual farmers. 
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Consequently, an analysis of the social composition of the co-operatives 
is essential~ as Loxley argues, because, 
" •• far from acting as a check on capitalism, the co-operative mov-
ement has in fact been an important instrument of exploitation of 
the rural masses." 6 
The link between the co-operative societies was founded on the notion 
that the c·o-operatives would guarantee any loans made to its members. 
Hence, the determining feature was the practice of 'building on the best' 
to the detriment of the poorer areas. Because many of the early Ujamaa 
villages were not registered members of co-operative societies they did 
not qualify for NDCA credits. Thus, the NDCA, in practice, was concerned 
with the development of a kulak farmer class. 
Seushi and Loxley argue that· the Regional Development Fund was the 
only source of finance for Ujamaa villages betw~en 1967-71 not controlled 
from Dar.7 Over this period, 55 per cent of RDF loans went for directly 
productive activities,, the remainder going <im~·irifra.structural investment. 
However, not all RDF loans went on Ujamaa investment. Between 1967 - 69, 
only Tsh. on.~ million out of Tsh. 50 million went directly to Ujamaa villages. 
With the establishment of TRDB and the provision of its facilities 
to Ujamaa villages, the situation changed only slightly for the better. 
In fiscal year 1972, 90 per cent of the number of TRDB approved loans 
went on tobacco product~on, 8 and was concentrated in the Tabora Region 
(receiving 75 per cent of the total credits). Of TRDB's total crop dev-
elopment credits in this year, by value, 42 per eent went on tobacco, 
and 23 per cent on tea. 
"It appears, therefore, that TRDB credits to Ujamaa have served to 
reinforce the historical concentration of credit both i'n terms of 
regional spread •• and in terms of export crops."9 
The Ujamaa villages have been categorised into five types by Raikes. 10 
The .self-initiated villages of the kind found in the Ruvuma~~·Dev.elopment 
Association were fully co-operative with. full communalisation of prod-
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uction - ie the relations of production were based on equality and co-
operation - and were mostly self-reliant. However, bureaucratic elem-
ents in the Government administration sought to take over such experiments 
to ensure administratively-defi?ed efficiency in planning and organ-
isation. 
'Ujamaa through signposting' is the term given to an administrat-
ive ploy of referring to all villages with a minimum number of communal 
production features as Ujamaa villages. It is this device which enables 
Ellman to set the number of Ujamaa villages so high. These villages 
often have made no efforts to transform the mode of production and the 
ploy served the interests of local rich producers insofar as they 
gained access to, or at·least the opportunity of access to, Government 
welfare facilities~ Local administrators and politicians gained career 
status both nationally and locally if they were able to point to succes 
-ses in the numbers of Ujamaa villages in their locality. 
The third type are those which were formed through material induce-
ment. Again these are not revolutionary in ideology nor practice. 
Frequently such an approach inhibits the development of an ideology 
encouraging .self-reliance. In fact, dependency on those who control the 
provision of social and agricultural services often.increases in this 
situation, as reflected in the failure of mobilisation efforts. 
Coercion has almost always been used against the weakest groups 
who may have resisted villagisation. Raikes argues coherently, that after 
1970 coercion increased dramatically. The population settled in planned 
villages represents neat and tidy administrative units, facilitating 
economies of scale .and more convenient law and order policing. Essentially, 
coercion is riddled with notions of elitism, and those resisting are 
frequently defined as 'backward'. The pastoralists have suffered most 
from coercive policies by administrators, which is attributable to their 
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special and particular underdevelopment during the colonial period, 
when colonial policy severely restricted the possibilities for pastoral 
development. Administrative practices toward the pastoralists were based 
on the assumption of their inherent backwardness. 
The final type of Ujamaa village classified by Raikes is that which 
was formed by kulak farmers. These villages resembled joint-stock co-
mpanies, ie they represented capitalist enterprise. Kulaks have com-
bined with peasants to gain access to cheap social and financial facil-
ities, cheap machinery and new land. This occurred particularly in the 
richer areas, such as Kilimanjaro, where land nationalised from the 
European settlers was given over to these 'Ujamaa' villages. 
Consequently, Nyerere's vague initial policy statements on Ujamaa 
were matched in the vagueness and ambiguity of the implementation of 
that strategy. The early calls for flexibility in implementing the str-
ategy had, by 1970/1, been distorted through the same formula to cover 
all village-types under the umbrella of 'Ujamaa'. 
The confusion, ambiguity and distortion of the central planks of 
the Ujamaa Programme is attributable to a series of factors, which all 
revolve around the issue of who controls the Tanzanian economy. 
It was demonstrated earlier that capitalist differentiation was 
occurring as a product of historical forces. During the colonial· period 
Tanzania had been integrated into the world capitalist economy by the 
structuring of its economy along the lines of an agricultural export 
crop economy. This had involved the destruction of pre-capitalist str-
uctures, or at least their restructuring to new structureswhic~ although 
not represe~ting ~ crystallised capitalist mode of production, no longer 
represented the previous mode either. Capitalist structures have taken 
the role of overseeing the development of primitive accumulation. The 
World Bank Group plays its part in this process by providing funds for 
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the production of these export crops. It has been shown that the use 
of these funds accelerates regionaland group differentiation. This 
does not imply a conspiratorial consciousness on behalf of the Bank 
Group. Such developments aze.immanent in the very structure of World 
Bank Group thinking and activity. 
Peasant differentiation is a process which necessarily has a deter-
mining i~fluence on the dynamics of structural change, or non-change in 
Tanzania. The structural transformation of economy and society along 
socialist lines, in a predominantly peasant country requires the mobil-
isation of most, if not all, peasants. Hence, the Ujamaa Programme, and 
the co-operative union system which plays an important part i.n its succ-
ess or failure, are subject to the effects of peasant differentiation. 
"Throughout sub-Saharan Africa •• in response to the creation of 
markets, particularly for export crops, an entrepreneurial 
incipient capitalist class of farmers has developed, increasingly 
differentiated from other farmers. Where governments have tried 
to control them through, for example, co-operatives and marketing 
boards, they have been found to manipulate these institutions to 
their own ends. 1111 
In the particular location of her study, Ismani -'the maize granary 
of Tanzania' - Feldman shows that since 1945, and the development of 
maize cultivation, some African entrepreneurs from other areas have 
moved into this area to develop commercial agriculture and small-scale 
businesses. Some of these migrants became early mechapisers,managing 
land areas of between 100 - 2000· acres~ However, most of the newcomers 
came without capital, so that in 1957 and 1969, 60 per cent of the 
farmers - who were mainly hoe-farmers - cultivated less than '1(} acres 
12 
each. 
In the early years after 1945, immigration was intense,. but the abund-
ance of land sufficed for the demand. Initially, the newcomers were 
allotted land through applications to the village headman, but with the 
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newcomer influx continuing, land did over time become scarce. Land 
transactions shifted from allotment by the village head, to private 
sale or rent, i.e. accumulation of land was established. By 1969, large 
farms coexisted with landless peasants who worked on these farms. 
The process of commercialisation of the relations of producti~n -
class relations - had not crystallised in this area by the early 1970. 
Traditional patterns of authority and stratification played a part in 
such crystallisation as has occurred, but not to the degree that the 
systems of production are unable to overcome traditional constraints. 
Hence, individual accumulation has been possible, and structures have 
been developed which enable the perpetuation of this process: 
"This pos_sibili ty is enhanced given the existing structure of the 
education system in Tanzania. Moreover, the bigger farmers domin-
ate the most crucial rural institution linking the rural area to 
the central. government - the co-operative society. Co-operative. 
policies have been pursued which are favourable to them, but more 
importantly, the co-operative societies give them a voice through 
which they can interpret government policies to the rest of the 
peopl.e. 
Ismani has also provided the test case for the peaceful est~ 
ablishment of rural socialism. The response of the local poli-
tical leaders, in keeping with their class interests, to the 
prospect, and ultimately the implementation of·collectivisation 
indicates some: of the contradictions within pre-Ujamaa Tanzanian 
society betw~en its democratic institutions and the realities of 
its social structure. In the event, the attempt to collectivise 
the entire population of Ismani, landlord and peasants,jla~ge­
and small-scale farmers, was unsupported by the •• local leader-
ship, and though finally carried through, culminated in the ass-
assination of the Iringa Regional Commissioner •• (in) 1970. 1113 
Van Velzen, who was concerned with the relationship between the state 
bureaucrats, the rich capitalist farmers and the peasants, identifies 
two key aspects- 'penetration' and 'penetrators'. Penetration is the 
process whereby the periphery - the regions - is led to accept the 
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authority and guidelines laid down by the metropole - the Government/ 
civil service. His main observation on penetration is that, 
"past penetration has greatly improved the position of the more 
wealthy farmers •••• The system of economic differentiation which 
has crystallised in the rural areas has in its turn affected the 
outcome of new penetrative efforts. 1114 
Thus, penetration is not a one-off event, but a process of building on 
previous relations. 
Th.e penetrators, defined as Staff - Party and Government officials, 
such as Extension Officers and District Officers - function to propagate 
the ideals of self-help and egalitarianism. However, Van Velzen found 
that their mere presence represented inequality and elitism. Above all, 
Staff were 'outsiders' dependent not on local communal activities, but 
on Central Government, thereby relying not on the peasants for their auth 
-ority, but on the Government. Most damning of all criticisms is that 
Van Velzen found in his study, close and mutually beneficial relations 
between the Staff and kulaks. The cultural divide between Staff and 
kulaks was narrow enough to permit daily social meetings to be held in 
each other's houses, and for presents to be exchanged. The closeness of 
this relationship was reflected in the efforts made by Staff to ensure 
that kulaks were elected to committee posts. 
"There appears to be a more objective and quantitative indicator 
available to gauge the extent of staff-kulak co-operation: the 
representation of kulaks in official functions ••• 
Over-representation of kulaks in these functions is important 
to the total power profile of rural society ••• 
During the period of our fieldwork 39 official functions were 
made available •••• 26 of these were occupied by ••• the rich~st 20 
per cent of the population ••• 
••• We may conclude for Itumba that wealthy peasants get a bigger 
share of official functions ••• 111 5 
Although .local political institutions were controlled by wealthy farmers, 
Feldman observes: 
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"Even where economic supremacy is not converted into either social 
or political control, the institutionalised system of private 
property and the market enable the capitalist entrepreneur to 
assert an autonomy in the economic sphere inconceivable within 
another mode of production. Thus through access to factor markets, 
the entrepreneur can continue to maintain and increase the scale of 
his operations with very little involvement in local community 
affairs. 1116 
Many wealthy farmers did, however, become involved in the operations of 
the local political organisations. 
The organisational structures of TANU in rural areas were intended 
to prevent the aggrandisement of wealthy farmers. TANU's functions are 
two-fold - to encourage mass popular participation, and to act as a check 
on the administration of government. Achieving the former requires a 
communication network. The Ten-House Cells were created with this end 
in mind. These are, theoretically, the basic organisational units for 
the Party and the Government. 
Area Level 
National 
Regional 
District 
Branch 
Cell 
Organisation of TANU17 
Organisation 
National Conference 
Regional II 
Annual District 
Conference 
Annual Branch 
Conference 
Ten Houses 
Executive Bodies 
National Executive Council -
Cabinet. 
Regional E.C. 
District E.C. 
Branch E.C. 
All Conferences give directions to their Executive Councils, and the 
National Conference is responsible to the N.E.C. 
The Branch Secretary is a paid Party official who works through about 
300 Cell leaders, each overseeing about 20 adults. The Cell leaders are 
Party members elected from their Cells to perform the unpaid function of 
directing information and policies from the heirarchy to their Cells, and 
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to feed back the Cell's responses to the policy-makers. Another pot-
entially crucial role played by the Cell leader is that of Village 
Development Committee member·, which gives the leader the ability to 
decide on and initiate local self-help development projects. Further, 
the VDC gives the Cell leader power to allocate plots of land for 
building and cultivating, and to control various licenses. 
This organisational structure offers the opportunity for popular 
participation, democracy, accountability and a measure of central polit-
ical control over the development strategy. Ideally, it also allows for 
local democratic control over the productive processes. On the other 
hand, and the evidence suggests that this does happen, the structure 
provides the framework for a series of abuses, ranging from commandism 
and authoritarianism from above, to parochialism and opportunism locally, 
18 
and more.critically, manipulation by local elite groups. O'Barr , 
examining the technical abilities of the Cell leaders, found that besides 
being poor initiators of change, they were unwilling or unable to explain 
government policy adequately, so that mass participation was far from 
maximal. The Cell leaders' adjudicative successes appeared, in this 
study, to owe more to traditional authority patterns than to raised con-
sciousness i~teracting dialectically with changing structural relations 
of production. 
Likewise, a study by Kitching19 found the role of the Cell leader· 
to be unstructured, so that the status, effectiveness and content of the 
position·.dependerl on the particular 'personality' of the office-holder. 
(He also found that the VDC acted more as a dispute settlement agency 
than a development agency). The Cell leader may encompass a wide range 
of functions - perhaps Party activist, Government agent, tax collector, 
police functionary, development councillor, dispute settler. Hence, if 
a particular group of peasants has control over this position or over the 
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office-holder then the structure could prove very useful to their 
interests. 
"The cell leaders in Kihengeni, to some extent, constitute an 
economic elite in the community, though to a much lesser extent 
than those who have held office in the co-operative society, or 
2o 
at higher levels of TANU." 
Few of the Cell leaders stood for posts as TANU Branch officials, when 
they became vacant, whereas co-operative society officials and other co-
mittee officials frequently did stand, successfully. The social base 
from which the co-operative officials were drawn highlights the strati-
fied nature of Tanzania's rural structures. In Ismani, the co-operat-
ives were established during the 1950's, so that African farmers replaced 
Asian traders in the transporting and marketing of maize. Initially, 
membership of the society was set at TSH100, thereby excluding all but 
the richest farmers. During the 1960's less affluent farmers joined, but 
the experience and influence of the richer, more established farmers 
ensured their continued control over·the institution. The co-operatives 
remained essentially commercial bodies, although the ideological ration-
ale given for the extension of the system was founded on principles of 
mutual aid, self-help and the reduction of inequality through sharing 
resources and rewards. All crops were marketed through three co-oper-
atives, but the very richest farmers by-passed the system because they 
were able to contract better deals for themselves than they could as 
society members. This suggests that the co-operative system was of the 
greatest benefit to kulak farmers rather than full-scale capitalist 
farmers. 
A major feature of the co-operative system was the provision of 
credit to members. 
"It is clear from one society's records that credit was either 
allocated according to the scale of farming, or even in suspic-
iously large amounts to members of the committees and their 
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relatives. Thus, despite the egalitarian ideals of co-operat-
ives, inpractice they simply reinforced the divisions which 
already existed between the farmers. 1121 
Further, 
"it was still "the same kind of people - those who were active and 
successful as commercial farmers - who put themselves forward as 
leaders. There was no incompatibility between the class baseL of 
the co-operatives' leadership, and the policies which they were 
encouraged to pursue as part of a commercial institution. 1122 
Critically, Feldman_makes the claim that the co-operative societies· 
were a training ground. for TANU leadership. The co-operative leadership 
provided ·a source of elected TANU representatives to divisional, dtstrict 
and regional committees. There appears to be a direct relation between 
the propertied base of the co-operative leadership and entry into the 
higher echelons of the Party; and, a mutually beneficial relationship 
between the richer farmers and the Government officials responsible for 
overseeing local develop.ment strategy. Consequently, mystification and 
not clarity resulted from the activities of, in particular, the richer 
farmers being in control of the co-operative movement. Mystification of 
the operational requirements of the co-operatives - the keeping of offi-
cial records and other administrative duties - through corruption and 
inefficiency, ensures low levels of participation by ordinary members. 
The means of political ·mobilisation are in··. the hands of the richer farm-
ers. The co-operatives received and passed on more political messages 
than did the Ten"-House Cell leaders.because of the close links between 
the co-operative leaders and those already up the TAN~ career ladder. 
The ideological stance - and their actual interests as kulaks -
brings the TANU officials' suitability for the posts into question. 
"The message of Ujamaa put forward by ••• local political leaders •• 
(involved the provision of social utilities) •• if only people 
would live together in villages.~ndcultivate together - a vague 
proposal which could and did mean a few hours' collective work per 
week on meagre plots ••• Capitalism was condemned, often most 
forcibly by TANU leaders who were the largest landowners, but 
capitalism did not in practical terms extend to landlords or 
employers. 1123 
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Henc~, the Ujamaa Pr"O·gramme and :itssupplementary policies appear mot to 
have posed a great threat to those who held the reigns of local power and 
authority. Now, the 1970 Mission Report's scant regard for the Ujamaa 
Programme falls into better perspective. 
The evidence suggests that by 1970 the essence of the programme had 
evaporated. Coulson's chronology noted that the Presidential Circular 
No. 1, 1969, ordering a mobilisation of all agencies toward the full imp-
lementation of the programme, resulted in authoritarianism and 'induce-
ment' rather than self-reliance and a transformation of the rural poli-
tical economy. Feldman and Raikes have shown that this can, in large 
part, be attributed to administrators and bureaucrats seeking 'adminis-
trative efficiency'. A point often missed is that the hature of World 
Bank Group. loans and credits requires that the existing bureaucratic 
structures be maintained. The credit systems were set up after Bank Group 
prompting, with Group funds and in a manner laid down·by the Group. 
What has been offered above is an attempt to demonstrate that class 
relations were critical to the success or failure of the Ujamaa Programme, 
and that the Bank Group, although distanced from local events, ·influ.enced 
events through the provision of credit. Whether the Ujamaa Programme· 
was initiated and maintained from above, or was distorted from within 
local areas, the effects were the same: a failure to mobilise the pop-
ulation toward socialist reconstruction. By 1974, Green - who argues 
that great strides have been made toward socialist construction qua 
'income distribution and absolute poverty eradication', admitted that: 
"A •• problem exists within the old line of co-operatives, and espec-
ia~ly their manufacturing and plantation activities. Clearly, 
these are capitalist in nature, because the hired labourers are 
. I 
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not eligible to be co-operative members while the surpluses go 
either to lower charges to members or to expand the producti v.e 
units owned by the co-operative on behalf of its members. This 
contradiction may prove particularly serious in the case of rec-
ently acquired coffee estates in Kilimanjaro region, which tended 
to have co-operative society owners and mana-g:ers who are local, 
and unskilled and semi-skilled labour from other parts of Tanzania."24 
In the agricultural sector recent changes have meant· that, for example, 
"upper income settlement scheme projects for tea and tobacco" have been 
"rather imperfectly 'converted' to ujamaa villages ••• ". 25 In fact, "the 
present tea and tobacco smallholder schemes and the tea and tobacco 
specialised 'ujamaa' villages are clearly forces for increasing rural in-
equality as they are now structured". 26 (See section below on 1974 World 
Bank Group· Mission Report). Where there have been few changes things 
are as bad: 
"Much of this sector (co-operatives) is still in the hands of 
the 1961-66 emergent elite and run with little more particip-
ation than then, and is also often rather better at creating 
salaried posts than lowering costs and raising farmer payout •• "27 
The co-operatives were not geared toward creating Ujamaa villages, and 
those Ujamaa villages which were created faced great bureaucratic intrus 
-ion. 
"The poorer districts in the poorer regions show the highest respon 
-se to the concepts of living and working together in units large 
enough to receive ••• basic public services, of adopting modifica-
tions in production and marketing patterns ••• and of conducting an 
increasing proportion of production and distribution on a communal 
basis. 
By 1973-4 at least Tsh300 million a year of recurrent ••• and 
capital funds were being deployed in support of ujamaa villages. 
On the access to public services front progress seems to be fairly 
rapid. On the production development front problems arise ••• (S)ince 
1972, there has been emphasis on utilising the potential of larger 
joint labour forces ••• larger farm units ••• and easier communication 
channels •• However, the illusion that the basic need is either 
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finance or finance plus exhortation ••• dies hard."28 
The failure of the Ujamaa Programme to begin the transformation of 
the rural politica& economy reflects two interrelated themes. Primarily, 
the Government's concern with maintaining the levels of foreign exchange 
earnings meant that the country remained geared to the production of 
export crops. Secondly, this concern entailed an increase in adminis-
trative and bureaucratic involvement in the agricultural sector; and, as 
shown, this enabled bureaucrats/administrators and·kulaks to abuse their 
power and authority. 
A minority view has been taken by Nsari, who suggests that the Ujamaa 
Programme represented a strategy for the containment of the richer peas-
ants by the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. In this view, the bureaucratic 
bourgeoisie and kulak class were in conflict over the distribution of 
surpluses and power. The containment of the kulaks dovetailed with other 
strategies such as, nationalising much of the industrial sector, and 
increasing the scope of state activity in the economy- in collusion with~ 
international capitalism - in order to strengthen and consolidate the 
power of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, which constitutes a class in itself, 
seeking to control state power. 29 How the richer peasants were to be 
contained is not spelt ou~ and the evidence provided by Raikes, Van ~: 
Velzert and Feldman suggests that although the Programme was opposed, in 
certain areas, by richer farmers, often the structures constructed served 
their interests ~.they adapted the extra facilities to serve their own 
interests, eg. the provision of inputs, etc .. ; economies of scale; ··avail-
ability of labour for hire·. Perhaps the Programme was seen by the bureau-
cratic bourgeoisie to be a means of subjugating the kulak farmers, but 
its implementation did not match this intention. 
Where Ujamaa villages were established - often in the poorer areas 
administrative interference was great. Self-reliance makes outside ad-
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ministration superfluous. Inhibitingself-reliance, and retaining 
administrative influence and control can be achieved through a variety of 
techniques, including the imposition of external planning on village members, 
and control over the·provision and use of ci·edi ts and grants~ ""The latte;r- te.ch-
ique was used in areas where export crops were grown, i.e. outside control was 
used to maintain the structures of export crop production. Tobacco, cot-
ton and tea projects were initiated in the early 1970's on the advice of 
the World Bank Group. The pattern of these projects generally 
required the development of islands of ' modern ' farming, based on 
imported farm inputs, under the intensive supervision of the whole 
productive process, by administrators. Consequently, rural Tanzania 
experienced a varied and contradictory development strategy which failed 
to live up to the principles laid down by Nyerere, and failed to produce 
the surpluses required for the transformation of the e"conomy. Tabari 
provides figures for the years 1970-72, which show that Tanzania's bala-
nce of payments' surplus of Tsh78 million in 1970, deteriorated-to a loss 
of Tsh717 miliion in 1972.30 Part of the cause of this dramatic reversal 
was Tanzania's willingness to rely on foreign resources for the develop-
ment programme. In this situation a spiral of increasing dependency was 
set up --borrowing increased to pay off past loans and to maintain 
recurrent costs of past development projects. This put pressure on pol-
iticians to maintain the·existing production patterns - in this case the 
production of export crops - because the existing patterns did produce 
immediate yields. Thus,, tlae noose tightened on the peasant producers. 
After 1970, in the face of the contradiction between the worsening 
economic plight, the need to maintain export crop production, and the 
stated desire for socialist transformation, a fresh approach was taken. 
This was articulated in Nyerere's 1973 directive -'To Live In Villages 
Is An Order'. It demanded a more aggressive approach to agricultural 
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collectivisation. Whole areas were to be enrolled in villages through 
a series of major campaigns. Coercion became the key element in these 
campaigns which required that all peasants would live in 'development' 
villages by 1976. Raikes was able to argue from these developments that 
even as late as 1976: 
"In Tanzania there is yet no plan for the overall transformation of 
the economy, and many of the ujamaa villages are entirely··.integrated 
into the previous dependency patterns through the production of 
export crops."31 
In 1974,the ·combined effects of the increase in oil prices- the oil 
import bill rose 900 per cent in two years~2 - protectionism in the ad-
vanced- :industrialised nations; a poor harvest following local droughts 
and dislocation of production resulting from the forced villagisation 
programme negating the effects of a commodity price boom, all forced the 
Government's hand. Ujamaa villages had been dropped as the major prior-
ity, with the backing of the World Bank Group which saw them as a poss-
ible threat to the expansion of production in the export crop sphere. 
Instead, the post-1973 villages - no longer Ujamaa villages, only groups 
of 'villagised' peasants - were established during a period of mounting 
anti-peasant propaganda (Se.e Tabari); yet, the commandism and repression 
of the peasants by the administrators, in an attempt to maintain or 
increase production, itself harmed production. Nsari maintains that a 
reign of terror was initiated against the peasants, ~e. against that 
group.which had until then been the mass base of the regime. Even 
measures taken which have benefited the peasants have been viewed with 
suspicion: 
"Over 1973/4 rather more attention was devoted to increasing both 
domestic ahd export product agricultural prices paid to growers to 
sustain rural purchasing power, but the dominant motivation was 
clearly t? provide production incentives •• 1133 
So,. the. development villages were intended above all to increase pro-
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duction, not to transform the relations of production, and as such were 
supported by the Bank Group. The influence of the Bank Group is often 
exaggerated by critics according to Raikes. 
"Those who accuse the World Bank of distorting the emphasis of 
Ujamaa •• perhaps misplace their own emphasis •• Since Ujamaa ha~ 
merely a vague emphasis on production for the domestic market, 
without supporting action to develop that market, its own emph-
asis has r.emained largely towards export crops. World Bank credit 
. has. simply reinforced this. t~end. n34 
This view is generally correct. The Bank Group has provided the. credit 
which has greatly reinforced the trend. If the Bank Group had so desir-
ed it could have determined the use of its credits in other ways. In 
fact, the Bank Group has the final say on what its funds are to .be~.:used 
. . 
for, and will not allow their use for activities it does not support. 
It has the punitive power to withdraw credit facilities. The Mission 
Reports show a change in the Group's thinking toward Ujamaa. The early 
attitude of seeing them as a useful experiment changed to one of host-
ility •. Bearing in mind the rural sector's dependency on Group credits, 
the hostility is at least influential on local planners thinking. 
This is not to say that the Group's staff crudely manipulate Tanzanian plan-
ers. In its public statements the Group 'observes' rather than 'directs': 
on communal production it notes the bad effects on incentives and 
productivity, · 
"particularly in the relatively more commercialised export crop 
producing regions. Therefore the policy of collectivisation 
(In Group terminology collectivisation means communal production -
CJ) has been abandoned at leiast for the time being. However, the 
concept of 'villagisation' still remains attractive, because of the 
economies of ~cale in the provision of government services and the 
opportunities for organising a range of co-operative act~vities 
that it offers •• Between 1967 and June 1973, •• over 5,000 villages 
and over 2 million people (15 per cent of Tanzania's population) 
were organised in villages •. The extent to which the population had 
to be'moved physically varied considerably among these villages 
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The Government aim to settle the entire rural population into 
villages by 1975. Over 55 per cent of the total villages set-
tled by mid-1973 were in the four least developed ••• of Tanzania's 
18 regions."35 
However, veiled threats do appear: 
"Low rates of growth, combined with the commitment of government 
resources for future recurrent expenditures that is implicit in 
a welfare oriented pattern of development, has raised concern 
about the realization of Tanzania's objective of self-reliance •• 
(T)his dependence on foreign aid has also contributed to inade-
quate emphasis on the establishment of priorities on productive 
activities."36 
The meaning of these remarks can be interpreted· as a warning to the Tan-
zanian administrators to establish financial viability and to produce 
more export crops, or risk the withdrawal of Bank Group support. (For 
a stronger condemnation of the Ujamaa Programme by the Group see the 
section of this chapter below outlining the contents of the 1974 Mission 
Report). 
The view put .forward by Raikes is based on an evaluation of the int-
erests of the Tanzanian bureaucratic bourgeoisie. 
"The ujamaa policy was changed to conform more closely with the · 
preconceptions and interests of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie who 
controlled its implementation. Their judgement cannot be consider 
-ed neutral concerning the question of socialist transformation of 
the economy. Just as they tend to distrust the intentions and 
capabilities of peasants so they distrust the major political 
changes which would have to occur before and during a socialist 
transformation."37 
The truth of this statement does not detract from the emphasis placed 
by critics on the influence of the Bank Group. The view that the failure 
of the socialist experiment in Tanzania has been due not to contradictions 
within the peasantry, but to contradictions between Tanzania's.economy 
and the international economy into which it has become increasingly in-
corporated, is forcibly stated by Shivji. 
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"The farmers of Iringa and Kilimanjaro do not control Tanzania's 
economy as a whole. If they are important at all it is because 
they may be aligned with the economic bureaucracy which in turn 
is allied with the international bourgeoisie. We may 'plan 
victories over rural capitalism' and/or take militant political 
decisions: but these would ultimately mean nothing if our economy 
remains the appendage of imperialism."38 
Thus, an important aspect of Shivji's claim is that a strong link exists 
between rich farmers, the economic bureaucracy and the international 
bourgeoisie. 
In a postscript to his article,- 'Ujamaa and Rural Socialism', Raikes 
observes in relation to this link that: 
Thus, 
"It is perfectly clear that Tanzania is a class society and that 
the ruling bureaucratic bourgeoisie entrenches itself increasing 
-ly with every year."39 
"the three districts which have so far been little affected by 
compulsory villagisation (Kilimanjaro, Bukoba and Rungwe) are 
also those from which well over half of the higher bureaucracy 
comes." 
4o-
However, 
"insufficient attention has thus far been paid to the analysis of 
the specifics of a bureaucratic ruling class in Tanzania and its 
differences in aims and modes of operation from those of a capit-
alist bourgeoisie operating in a market economy with the assist-
41 
ance of a subordinate bureaucracy." 
The issue of the social origins of the state bureaucracy, and its 
ties with the international bourgeoisie is a recurrent theme in the lit 
-erature on Tanzania's political economy. Leys has commented on this 
theme in a critique of Alavi's theory of the overdeveloped post-colonial 
state. The debate essentially revolves around the origins of state 
power. 
In colonial societies the state apparatus inherited after flag ind-
ependence, had its base originating from the metropole, and was opposed 
' 
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to the development of the power of national classes. Thus, the state 
apparatus was overdeveloped in relation to society insofar as it main-
tained relative independence from national classes. This state typic-
ally takes a major share of the nation's economic surplus and uses it 
for development programmes, etc. The gap between the educated elite and 
the masses is great enough to convince the bureaucrats that there is a 
need for themselves to manage the economy, and thereby to manage most 
a~pects of social and political organisation. The nature of overdevel-
opment here resides not in the need, necessarily, to subjugate local 
classes, but to subordinate precapitalist relations and forces of pro-
duction to meet the demands made by imperialism based on the cycle of 
underdevelopment - export crop production had been developed and cryat-
allised; development efforts had relied on foreign funds at great cant-
inuing cost. Classically, growth and not development had been sought. 
Clearly the strength of domestic classes will be crucial to the deg 
-ree of overdevelopment. A strong bourgeoisie, for example, working in 
tandem with the state bureaucracy may achieve national economic growth, 
and the development of capitalist industrialisation. A weak bourgeoisie 
may mean that the bureaucracy has to rely heavily on the metropolitan 
bourgeoisie for support. The permutations are numerous. An acceptance 
of the centrality of the state bureaucracy's role leads to the need to 
determine its class base. Is the bureaucracy a new class (or class in 
the making), using state power to control the productive resources in 
l . "th th · t t" l b · · f · t · ? 42 Or ~s ~t ~ason w~ e ~n erna ~ona ourgeo~s~e, or pr~va e ga~n. • • 
possible to see in the Tanzanian bureaucracy only a plastic, contradict-
ory formation, still not fully in control? 
"It is a mistake to think that the class origins, class ties, or 
class ambitions of the individuals who compose the apparatus of 
the state need to be the same as those of the dominant_ class, or 
that of state power reflects their own class interests except in 
a se~ondary way,. 1143 
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If class, and not the state, is taken as the point of departure, 
then the class nature of the bureaucracy provides the key to the role 
and strength of the state. Further, the class interests of those cont-
rolling state power and the class membership/position· of state function 
-aries are not synonomous. Any evaluation of the post-Arusha policies 
must bear in mind the issue of which class controls the state. 
The evidence presented in this section on the rural development 
programmes between 1967 - 1974, suggests that socialist transformation 
has not overall occurred. The policies of the Government were ad hoc 
in response to the pressing problem of balance of payments deficits. 
Increasing production levels was the guiding principle, not socialist 
construction. · The methods used to achieve the practice of this principle 
were based on administrative neatness. The bureaucrats were the prime 
movers, no~ the masses. There was collusion between the bureaucrats and· 
the richer farmers; there was a convergence in thinking and practice be 
-tween the planners and the World Bank Group. 
There were other events and trends which have not been outlined here. 
The practices of the Parastatals are closely interwoven with events in 
the agricultural sphere; the Decentralisation of 1972 also affected all 
areas of the political economy. An examination of these. features reveals 
more insights into the failure of the Tanzanian experiment. 
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The Parastatals: 1967 to 1974. 
The Ujamaa Programme failed - or at least was not able to trans-
form the rural economy along socialist lines. This failure was due to 
a complex of factors, outstanding of which were the structures of local 
class formations, and the administrative/bureaucraticconcern to persist 
with export crop production (aided( by the World Bank Group)• The next 
task is to examine the parastatals, from the perspective of how they 
affected the implementation of the Ujamaa Programme; who controls their 
operations; and in whose interests they are operated. 
The parastatals were set up to control the major part of the indust-
rial sector, including the processing of agricultural produce. Yet, as 
late as 1975, two commentators observed that although the parastatals 
controlled key sectorsc:·of the economy, they were not very important 
in'.terms of numbers of workers employed, nor by va],ue added to GDP. 
Table 24. Tanzania (Mainland) 1972: Value added by Parastatal Sector. 
(TSHs m) %of total monetary GDP. 
Agriculture 79 4.3 
Mining 91 76-5 
Manufacturing 320 29.0 
Electricity/Water 81 79.8' 
Construction 20 4.0 
Commerce 143 11.4 
Transport 109 12.3 
Finance/Real Estate/Services 212 57.0 
Total 903 12.7 
Source:. Loxley & Saul: 'Multinationals, Workers and Parastatals in Tanz7' 
ania.' Review qf Political African Economy, No 2, p 58. 
In June 1972, the parastatal sector added, in monetary terms, less than 
13 per cent to monetary GDP, because, argue Loxley and Saul, agriculture 
and commerce were still largely inprivate hands. In this year, the para 
-statals employed 80,000 workers, taking 25 per cent of the nation's 
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wage bill for 20 per cent of total non-casual employment. Table 24 
makes clear the widely varied influence of the parastatals, eg. between 
agriculture and the provision of electricity and water. 
The authors imply that the parastatals' investment activities are of 
great importance. Generally, parastatal investment concentrated on fixed 
capital formation - especially transport and the establishment of the 
parastatals' own working systems - so that, at the time of writing they 
were responsible for between 45 per cent and 50 per cent of the total na-
tional fixed capital formation. In most instances they have invested 
more than their own savings would allow. Muchaftheirfinance has come 
from foreign suppliers of credit, technical assistance, and normal com-
mercial loans. Of 19(4/5 parastatal investment of TSH1,000 million, 
TSH450 million came from direct foreign investment; 15 per cent from local 
developmEni:t"'' banks - which derive their capital mostly from abroad; 24 
per cent from reinvested surpluses; 16 per cent from Central ·Government 
transfers from the Development Budget, of which 6 per cent was to be re-
paid as 'dividend payment'·, so that the Government's net investment 
actually represented only 10 per cent of total investment; thus, the 
parastatals were responsible for providing only 30 per cent of their 
investment requirements. 
Despite the sweeping nationalisation measures, wherein the parastat 
-als were to control the ·!commanding heights' of the economy, technical, 
mechanical and ideological problems were immanent. The Tanzanian plan-
ning system was unable to cope with the size and scope of the nationalised 
sector. The parastatals were unable to plan adequately because of the 
shortage of technical manpower, yet resented Central Government inter-
ference in their activities. This shortfall in skilled high-level man-
power was highlighted in all t.he Bank Group Mission Reports and. by Green 
in his paper evaluating developments over the period 1961-1974. 44 
A consequence of the bureaucrats' inability to plan adequately meant 
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that the Second Five Year Plan featured unappraised, unco-ordinated 
lists of projects presented by the parastatals, ·'i.e. a strong coherent 
strategy for socialist transformation failed to materialise in this 
sector also. In fact, out of the confusion it is clear to see that such 
a strategy existed in the minds and efforts of very few bureaucrats and 
administrators. The parastatals have used management systems and per-
sonnel imported from western capitalist countries. Coulson's damning 
article on the Fertilizer Factory in Tanga pointed aut that the NDCrelied 
heavily on the West German firm which provided much of the finance and 
most of the machinery for the project - i.t will also receive guaranteed 
high profit levels - for advice on its construction, management a~d run-
ning requirement~. 45 Further, Saul and Loxley revealed that the various 
constituent elements of the NDC - before the 1972 Decentralisation - pro-
duced their own annual plans and strategy, which were then integrated into 
one overall NDC plan. No attempt to. ·implement national plans was ever 
seriously mad,e, nor were these 'element' plans guided by national str.at-
egy. A breakdown in communication concerning overall strategy existed 
between the national leadership, the NDC and its constituent elements. 
"The Central Government budget, being still based on the c610nial 
administrative type of budgeting, is not drawn up in a manner 
conducive to identifying the beneficiaries of government expend-
itures.1146 
The malaise extended from the lowest levels to the highest. 
An important technical/ideological reason for this situation is 
found in the yardstick used for guiding investment and evaluating success 
of the parastatals. All were concerned with generating surpluses. 
Unfortunat~ly, most used commercial profitability as the yardstick. 
This inevitably led to uneven development and the heightening of inequal-
ity. Thus, although the public sector may be large its.modus operandi 
may be capitalist. 
"The crucial distinction ••• is what guides the accumulation of 
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capital. If it is pursuit of private property (and studies ••• 
have indicated so especially in Tanzania) - private here in the 
sense of the particularistic interest of each enterprise - then 
the economy is a private enterprise system."47 
With the advent of nationalisation, a break with world c~pitalism 
was not made. 'Full and fair' compensation was, in the end, paid to all 
foreign capitalists with holdings in Tanzania. Part of the reasoning 
behind this ·was the assumption that foreign capital was required for the 
development strategy. Nyerere's arguments in the Arusha Declaration 
concerning this issue were rhetorical and misleading. It was always the 
·case that Nyerere intended. to accept foreign finance. His was a naive 
assumptio~ that Tanzanian planners and politicians could control the 
activities of foreign capital, and use it for the desired socialist tran 
-sformation. In 1967, the Tanzanian leadership was not prepared to make 
the break with its colonial past. In fact, the arguments behind the 
Arusha Declaration refering to self-reliance, were less a statement of 
intent than a conclusion following from the failure to attract foreign 
finance in the post-Independence period. Perhaps also, the Leadership 
feared retributive actions from the Western powers if full compensation 
t "d 48 was no pal. • This refusal to break with international capitalism was 
compounded by the parastatals' increasing dependence on foreign capital 
loans, and the growth of part-ownership/joint venture projects. 
"Development strat"egies relying on foreign private investment will 
at best produce 'growth without development' ••• This implies fitful 
••• growth in GDP accompanied by: stable or widening income differ 
-entials, and often the absolute impoverishment of substantial 
sectors of the population; a substantial and probably increasing· 
outflow of surpluses; production with low local value-added content 
and a related rapid in~rease in import requirements; distortions 
in internal factor prices and the inhibition or destruction of 
domestic productive activities .and initiative; the imposition of 
severe constraints on domestic policy due to the demands of 'fiscal 
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responsibility' and the great sensitivity of foreign capital to the 
'investment climate'; the formation of an administrative/managerial 
group whose cultural and economic ties are externally oriented and 
based on repression and counter-insurgency. To escape this path-
ologi,~al conditionit is ultimately necessary to make a break with 
foreign capital from private sources and to focus development on 
the mobilisation of local resources ••• " 49 
With regard to the Fertilizer Factory - a joint venture between the NDC 
and a West German international corporation - Coulson observed: 
"It is hard to find anything good to say about the project. It uses 
imported raw materials, imported technology and imported expatriates 
to lose money·. It takes Tanzania ••• into a managed market where 
prices will always be high. Its location is designed for ease of 
importing, and not to make use of any Tanzanian raw materials, or 
to "foster any further development of a Tanzanian chemical industry. 
It is typical of an import-substitution project whose main effect 
will be to ship surplus out of Tanzania. It illustrates what so 
easily happens when Tanzania compromises with capitalism. 1150 
The link with ~apitalism involves key productive sectors, so that 
"such industries as petroleum refinery, cement, radios, ••• which 
Hirschman·considers to be beyond local capacity, are owned and 
operated.by foreign firms. 
(T)he adoption of these techniques (ie. foreign firmsinvest in 
those branches which are entirely outside the technological and 
capital capabilities of local industries) invariably means that 
labour income is not as high as it would be under different 
techniques of production, a factor that constrains the growth of 
the domestic market."51 
Another aspect of these links has been the secrecy in which they have 
been shrouded. 
"Unfortunately, the names of NDC's foreign partners, and especially 
the terms of partnership and management contracts with them, are 
so well-guarded, that it is difficult to trace their international 
l "nk .. 52 l. s. 
Of those Shivji has been able to uncover, the activities of the Brooke 
Bond - Liebig Group are typical. 
"It may make sense and is economically rational for the Brooke Bond 
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- Liebig Group, which operates on a global level, to have a plant 
- Tanganyika Packers - exploit Tanzania's livestock (raw material! 
process it into meat and export it for its markets in the Bahamas, 
Europe, Jamaica, Borneo, etc. But it makes no sense and is econ-
omically irrational for the Tanzanian economy to have Tanganyika 
Packers, if (as it now is) only 5 per cent of its products are 
consumed locally ••• ( T)he high prices fixed for ihe canned products 
•• may be completely in accord with the Brooke Bond - Liebig's 
. . 
international market but may.not at all be justified for the 
Tanzanian home market."53* 
Foreign corporations sell projects wholesale to the parastatals, in 
the form of finance plus machinery plus technical ·assistance •. Clearly, 
such a5sistance will not be ideologically neutral. 
"Defenders of the mncs' role point out that they provide scarce 
capital; provide equally scarce technology and know-how which 
provide commodities at lower prices for more people; in some 
cases provide access to export markets; and contribute through 
the ta~es paid and the employment created to local developrrient."54 
This argument is relevan.t only to capitalist development •55 
"It is vital to remel'!lber that equity investment (i.e. shareholding} 
is the worst' possible form of 'assistance'· for profitable ventures 
since the claims on earnings (eg. dividend payments to shareholders) 
which it generates are essent:j_ally unlimited both in terms of their 
size and duration. Heavy. reliance on foreign equity thus 
generates increasing claims on resources which must be offset by 
increasing foreign exchange inflows."56 
The extent of this bloodsucking relationship is underestimat.ed as 
shown by Seidman.57 Accounting techniques enable the MNC's to shift 
profits from one part of the company to another by overpricing the import-
ation of machinery etc. from one part of the corporation to another; by 
*The World Bank Group has provided finance for the development of the 
export sector of this plant. See above pages 115 - 117.and below page 236. 
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underpricing sales from one firm to another (within the corporation) to 
give the impression of low profits, and thereby avoid taxation. 
The direct activities of MNC's in Tan~ania will inevitably have a 
bearing on socialist construction. Kay's argument that imported advanced 
technology leading to capital-intensive industrialisation is logical for 
Third World capitalists, begs the question - how is such a strategy 
logical for Tanzanian socialists?58 
A_point in case is provided by two textile factories. The Chinese-
financedFriendshipTextiles plant, and the French-funded Mwanza Textile 
plant. The People's Republic of China (PRC) built the former with an 
interest-free loan of US %7 million. It targeted to employ 3,000 
workers to produce 1,000 topnes of yarn, which would be woven into cloth 
in other factories. 24 million square yards of fabric were to be prod~ 
uced annually. Management is under Tanzanian control, with Chinese tech-
nical ·experts providing the double function of staff-training and mach-
ine repair. After four years the factory fell into local hands. On 
the other hand, Mwanza Textiles Ltd. cost US %11.2 million, of which 
US %8.4 million was loaned by two French banks at a seven per cent rate 
~ 
of interest. Both factories were geared to produce the same output, but 
the Mwanza plant employed only 1,000 workers, plus 40 expatriates cant-
rolling management. Information on the two factories is not readily 
available, but because the French factory is more ·capital~intensive, it 
is possible to argue that it is dependent on_more advanced, and therefore 
usually imported, machinery and foreign technical management. The 
Chinese have a history of full training for local staff, and encourage 
the use of local technology as much as possible.59 
Logically the employment impact of the two factories is different. 
The Friendship plant was concerned to create an employment:output ratio 
which maximises employment without overmanning. Mwanza was clearly 
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concerned with maximising output, regardless to the negative effects 
on employment. A major reason for the difference in approach lies in 
the source of finance. A seven per cent pa. interest rate, compared to 
a zero rate, directs that if the planners required each project to be 
profitable, or at least to cover their own costs, then the Mwanza plant 
needed to produce greater surplus value per worker, and in aggregate, than 
the Friendship plant. Technically advanced machinery ensures greater 
productivity per worker, thus the use of such machinery with.low employ-
ment levels, is logical so long as the frame of reference is bourgeois 
economic profit maximisation. As Loxley and Saul describe it, "the 
practic·e~ of managerial capi ~alist o.rthodoxy. "60 The practice of this 
orthodoxy· ensures that value is not retained nationally, but is exported. 
Similarly, as with Tanganyika Packers Ltd., the Bank Group has 
provided funds for the Mwanza Textiles plant, and in so doing highlights 
its position on the type of devel·opment it is seeking in Tanzania in this 
sphere. It seeks greater productivity, but is not concerned with init-
iating a socialist programme to achieve such results. What is striking 
here is the continued increasing level of Bank Group involvement. 
Tabari cited The Sunday News (23 December 1971) which commented on an IDA 
credit of TSH170 million for a seven year project for cotton and maize 
production in the Geita district, and observed that the project provided 
an "open gate to even greater IDA assistance to bigger cotton projects 
61 
elsewherre." 
Lawrence, in the light of such events, argues for greater selectivity 
toward foreign aid donors and joint venture projects. 
"For Tanzania to try to transfer the aid burden to the socialist 
countries does require an ideological shift from the non-alignment 
aid strategy of maintaining a balance between East, West and 
~.neutral' • So far there appears to be no desire to switch donors 
on Principle or to reduce drastically the reliance on aid, espe_c-
ially from the large: western donors. This itself reflects the 
argument, within the framework of Tanzanian political debate 
and practice, as to the real meaning of socialism. 1162 
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The criticism of the parastatals is taken further by Loxley and Saul 
in their examination of the relationship betweep the bureaucrats run-
ning them, and the foreign management technicians, on whom they appear 
to depend. Whenever management systems have been established or altered, 
western capitalist consultancy firms have been employed to provide the 
background reports and recommendations. McKinsey, an American inter-
national consultancy firm, were contracted to reorganise NDC, STC, East 
African Harbours Co~poration; and of even greater significance, produced 
the basis for the-1972 Decentralisation.63 Other management and technic-
al advice ventures have resulted in disasters on a par with the Fertilizer 
Factory •. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), in co-
operation with the National Milling Corporation, has built a massive 
bakery in Dar, which cost more than ten small regional plants with the 
same agg~egate output capacity. This overcapitalised project, which 
favoured Canadian contractors, will result in high unemployment in this 
industry. 
Two otnerprojects, the Kilimanjaro Hotel, and one involving the Mecca 
Construction Compa-ny, when the agreements were made public, demonstrated 
that management agreements are often part of a large parcel of the joint 
venture, involving capital and equipment at exhorbitant cost. The deals 
are mostly kept secret, but in the case of these two, it is apparent 
that the training of Tanzanians was regarded as a low-priority by the 
foreign partners. Hence, a danger exists of perpet~al dependence on 
foreign staff besides the dependence on foreign machinery and capital. 
This is not to suggest that the foreign experts are necessarily more 
efficient. The STC, after being reorganised by the McKinsey firm along 
the lines of computerisation, proved to be even less efficient than bef-
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ore, so the new plans were dropped. 
Other criticisms of the parastatals' involvement with foreign cap-
italist enterprises voiced by Tanzanian radicals, include the freedom 
of access to top secret materials given to foreign consultants, etc., 
which many local bureaucrats are debarred from seeing; the very expensive 
consultancy missions often are only short-stay exercises. It is also 
felt that Tanzania is used as a training ground for young staff just 
out of business school, and that too much importance is attached to 
their evaluations .and recommendations. 
In response to criticisms of inefficiency and over-centralisation 
of the Government administration and the parastatals, McKinsey was 
called in to produce a plan for their reorganisation and decentralisa-
tion of decision making. The two parastatals to be most affected were 
the NDC and the State Trading Corporation. The NDC was broken down into 
smaller, more specialised NDC's. 64 The STC broke down into Regional 
Trading Companies, serviced by nine specialised import-export agencies, 
all of which are "planned, monitored and controlled from above by a new 
Board of Internal Trade". 65 
The 1972 Decentralisation was introduced with the supposed intent-
ion of ensuring more equitable distribution resources. Since 1972, 
Regional Development Expenditure has risen from 9.2 per cent of Govern-
ment development expenditure, to 14 per cent (estimated) in 1975/6. On 
the one hand, these figures are underestimated because recurrent expen-
diture is faken up by between one-third and one-half, of wages and 
salaries, but, this figure must be treated with some sc.epticism because 
wages and salaries paid to staff implementing development projects are 
. . 66 
counted as recurrent expenditure. On the other hand, the regional 
expenditure .~igure is over~estimated because parastatal investment is 
not controlled by the regions, although they are heavily involved in the 
239. 
regions. In fact, parastatal investment has overtaken ministerial 
investment and is at least as unevenly distributed as is the latter. 
Coulson concludes that development expenditure is still firmly in the 
hands of centralised authorities. 
Despite Decentralisation the present structures and policies of 
public investment (via the parastatals) are themselves not geared tow-
ard socialist ·development. In fact, this one of Coulson's main conten-
tions - that the growth of the service sector has benefited the better 
off, and perpetuates the existing structural inequalities within Tanzan 
-ia. Over-expansion of this sector has dried up the possibility of 
expanding other productive sectors. His solution, like the Bank Group's, 
-is to increase the strength of the productive sectors. His strategy 
would fully regionalise, decentralise and equalise the budget, thereby 
·providing at least the bases for full local development. The Bank Group 
on the other hand, is concerned to decentralise the parastatals, but 
simulataneously to strengthenfue Ministry of Agriculture. In this way 
the overriding concern with producing export crops would be controlled 
by a single super-ministry, and the parastatals would cease to be a 
centralised controlling influence. The Ministry of Agriculture would 
absorb the power of the parastatals, so that the parastatals could become 
mere regional crop marketing boards. 
This move reflects the Bank Group's concern with creating centres of 
influence in areas which it considers important. The Ministry of Agric-
ulture will become the key ministry, heavily influenced by, and co-oper-
ating with the Bank Group. 
. 67 The 1974 World Bank Group Mission Report. 
This Mission Report provided a basis for discussion for the Third 
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Five Year Plan (TFYP), between IDA and Tanzania, in the light of the 
failures of the first two Plans. 
"The Report has been developed in close collaboration with Tanzanian 
officials in the Prime Minister's Office, the Ministry of Develop-
68 
ment Planning and Regional Development." 
Perhaps the best comment on the 'achievements' of the S5YP was made 
by this Mission: 
"Real agricultural incomes and production have remained virtually 
stagnant over the past five years and this in turn has limited the 
resource base for the expansi·on of other sectors of the economy, 
while the need to import large quantities of food grains and the 
oil crisis has caused a serious deterioration of the balance of 
payments si~uation."69 
By the end of 1973, 89 per cent of the population of 14.2 million was 
dependent on agriculture for survival. Yet, only 5.1 per cent of the 
land area was used for crop cultivation. Small-holder cultivation took 
up 4.4.per cent - 38,000 sq. kms. - and large-scale cultivation, 0.7 
per cent - 5,850 sq. kms. Another 50.1 per cent was taken up by rough 
pasture and grazing land, and 42.6 per cent was wooded or forested. 
Export crops were grown on 31 per cent of the area given over to crop 
production, and the rest was used for basic food crops. 
Apart from the large private estates and the parastatal farms, most 
farms were small-holdings - 97 per cent of all holdings were of less than 
5 hectares. 70 Average income, per capita, had risen on these farms from 
US $43 in 1969, of which US $24.50 was cash, to US $54 by late 1973, with 
the cash component US $28, ie. the relative cash component had fallen, 
suggesting a relative \oJ'i.thdrawa·l into subsistence production, although 
the actual incomes had both risen, demonstrating increased productivity 
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in both sectors. 
These figures do not reflect the disparities in farm size and 
income adequately. The 'carrying capacity' of _each region was studied 
by the Bureau of Resource Allocation and Land Use Planning, and it 
found that 14 regions were overpopulated, and 30 underpopulated. 71 
Consequently, the Mission recommended for its future projects that re-
settlement of population become a key aspect. Although Tanzania was ex-
periencing a high population growth rate in some areas and attendant 
pressure o~ land, the Mission found that over all,_potential is good. 
In 1974, there was one-third of one hectare per capita of rural popula-
tion, and to maintain this ratio, the rural population of 21 million -
in 1992- will need an increase of 64 per cent in cultivated land. 72 
Some areas of good potential will be able to support far higher pop-
ulation densities. "Resettlement therefore has to be an important part 
of any long-term agricultural program. 1173 
Large-scale farming, that is, farming on state and large private .estates 
accounted for - 25 per cent of all coffee production: 90 percent of all 
tea production; 50 per cent of-all sisal and sugar production; most of 
the wheat production; and some maize and dairy production. (See Tables 
25 and 26). ..The Mission reported that export earnings from these estates 
ran at about US $80 million annually.74 
Total employment on private estates amounted to 90,000, and·services 
were provided mostly through non-Government bodies such as, The Tangany-
kan Farmers Association; Southern Highlands Tobacco Growers' Association; 
the Tea Gr.owers' Association; and the Coffee Growers' Association. 
The Mission argue~ that Tanzania's primary concern must be to raise 
output, therefor.e, it stressed the need to assure the remaining large-
scale private estate owners that they would have a .. secure future in Tan-
zania. This implies that private large-scale farming will remain an 
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important feature of Tanzania's agricultural scene. 
"With pressures to make more land available for smallholder 
farming in over-populated areas, Government now actively 
discourages private large-scale farming and it recently nation-
alized 50 coffee estates ••• There is, however, an urgent need to 
safeguard production and to ensure that the remaining large-scale 
farmers have sufficient incentives to make required investments. 
As the role of private large-scale farming has declined, so the 
importance of parastatal production has tended to increase with 
particular emphasis on sisa1.,_.sugar and beef ••• "75 
Table 25. Agricultural Productiop (1972): Small-holder Production. 
Wheat 
Maize 
Millet 
Sorghum 
Paddy Rice 
Beans 
Cassa:va 
Irish Potato 
Sweet II 
Groundnuts 
Sesame 
Banana 
Sisal 
Coffee 
Tea 
Tobacco (Flue) 
Tobacco (Fire)-
Cotton 
Sugar Cane 
Pyrethrum 
Cashewnuts 
Beef* 
* '000 head. 
Volume· (iQQO metric tons) Value of small-holder 
Total 
98 
881 
128 
191 
171 
177 
793 
113 
n.a. 
29 
8 
1205 
157" 
52 
13 
11 
80 
1064 
0.2 
138 
1105 
Small-holder production (US $m) 
% 
"25 
75 
. 100. 
100 
. 95 
95 
.100 
100 
98 
98 
98 
95 
2 
52 
10 
60 
100 
98 
1 
100 
98 
93 
Total 
2.2 
24.5 
9.2 
10.4 
12.9 
15~5 
. 24.5 
5-3 
n.a. 
n,a • 
. . o.4 
27-7 
0.8 
5-7 
1 .1 
35.1 
n.a. 
2.1 
16.4 
48.3 
336 
Source: Derived from Tables 27, ·26 and 2, 1974 Mission Report. 
Table 26. Agricultural Production (1972): Value of Exports/Imports, & 
Annual Growth Rate of Marketed Production (1965/8- 1969/72). 
1972 value (US $m) 
Exports Imports 
Wheat 3.0 
Maize 9.3 
Millet 1.8 
Sorghum 
Paddy Rice 
Beans r Cassava 
Irish Potato 
Sweet " .,. 
Groundnuts 
Sesame 
Banana 
Sisal 
Coffee 
Tea 
Tobacco (Flue) 
Tobacco (Fire) 
Cotton 
Sugar _-·can.e 
Pyrethrum 
Cashewnuts 
Beef. 
* 2.5 
0.6 
'20.1 
50.0 
8.8 
9.2 
52.2 
10.4 
3.0 
21.7 
5-9 
Annual Growth Rate 
Marketed Output (%) 
6.8 
5-7 
20.0 
5-5 
19.3 
2.8 
8.4 
32.0 
0 
?.4 
4.5 
0.3 
3.2 
2.1 
10.0 
20.5 
11.8 
2.1 
5-5 
6.5 
?.6 
n.a. 
Net value.agricultural exports= US $134.4 million.** 
*Pulses 
** After value of agricultural imports is subtracted. 
Source: as Table 25 
The urban population fared better with their average income fourfold 
that of the rural masses. The growth in rura~ income was due more to 
rising commodity prices than to increased production. However, the 
general trend hides important variations. Given that the growth rate of 
GDP decreased from 6.3 per cent p.a. to 4.4 per cent p.a., (1968-73), well 
short of the target figure of 6.5 per cent p.a. during the S5YP, one would 
have expected the growth rate of agricultural output to have decreased 
also. 
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"While recent years have seen a marked growth in the production 
of tea and tobacco - mainly from large farms - and impressive 
gains have been made with regard to cashewnuts, progress in the 
expansion of cotton and pyrethrum has been disappointing, the pro-
duction of oil crops has diminished and ••• the growth of sisal and 
coffee production has been ••• restricted. As to food production, •• 
progress has been made ( ••• from a ••• sma~l base) in wheat, rice, 
cassava and potato production, but the expansion of maize, sorghum, 
millet, banana and pulse production, all staple food crops, barely 
kept pace with population growth ••• 1965-1973. The offtake from the 
national herd has been ••• stagnant for the last four years ••• and ••• 
milk production has actually decreased. 1176 
Between 1968 and 1974, agricultural output (marketed) rose by 2.4 per 
cent p.a., while population increase reached 2.7 per cent p.a. The 
Report claimed that the annual average increase in agricultural output 
between 1963-1968 haa been 3.9 per cent. (This figure should be treated 
with scepticism because the 1970 Mission Report revealed th~t marketed 
agricultural output increased by only one per cent p.a. by volume, and 
declined by 6.2 per cent by value over the period. See Table 11, p 159. 
The figure given by the 1974 Report therefore probably refers to total 
agricultural production - marketed plus subsistence. This is almost 
impossible to ascertain with even a minimal degree of certainty.) The 
1974 Report maintained that the greater growth rate of population over 
agricultural output led directly to an increased food import bill. 77 
1974 was a particularly bad year because of rising world food prices and 
a poor local harvest. The food bill for this year was expected to total 
US $150 million, made up largely of food··grains. The average food import 
bill during the 1960's had been US $20 million, and before this Tanzania 
had been s~lf-sufficient in food.78 
The Mission Report examined the Government's previous and future dev-
elopment objectives. It identified past and future objectives as being 
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centred on rural development with small-holder production as the corner-
stone of the policy. The strategy of social equality and development ' 
had been fofulowed - Ujamaa - but, 
"Empirical evidence indicates that the implementation of this 
policy has •• had a disruptive effect on production."79 
The Tanzanian Government therefore changed its policy: 
"Recently Government has moved away from this objective and is 
now concentrating its efforts on the establishment of villages 
with individual holdings, where feasible, arranged in blocks."80 
And, "Collective farming is no longer a policy objective, •• (but) this 
is not widely known, and the prospect of collectivisation thus 
remains a disincentive as does the general uncertainty of vill-
. t" ,,81 J.za J.on. 
That the abandonment of collective farming was not widely known may be 
a significant point. It is not clear whether the lack of ~nowledge was 
due to poor communications or to the Government being unprepared to ack-
knowledge that the prinCiples of Arusha had been abandoned. 
The. Report noted. that the villagisation programme was achieved only 
through the Gqvernment offering increased social services, thereby all-
ocating a high proportion of Government and administrative capability to 
social and other. infrastructure, and investment to ~ow-yield' projects. 
"There are thus clear indications that unless the overall develop-
ment strategy is adjusted to correct these problems, improvem:en"ts 
in rural incomes and standards of living are likely to be slow. 1182 
The message could not have"· been more expl±ci t - increase incentives, 
through the elimination of disincentives such as the thre~t of villag~ 
isation; increase investment in high yield areas by.decreasing invest-
ment in social and infrastructural services. The trend identifiable in 
the 1970 Report has· crystallised, except that by 1974 the economic situ-
ation had worsened to such an extent that the Bank Group's view carried 
even greater weight because the Group controlled one of the key purse 
strings. US $30 million was loaned under a special agreement by the 
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IBRD, to enable Tanzania to purchase food imports; and, by the end of 
the year the Bank Group held at least a quarter of the country's external 
debt. (See pages 102 - 106.) 
The Mission estimated that 50 per cent of total agricultural output 
was marketed locally or exported. As domestic demand for food repres-
ented only 28 per cent of crop production, agricultural cash incomes 
were largely determined by the export prospects of the major cash crops. 
The leading eight ~raps - cotton, coffee, sisal, cashew, tea, flue-cured 
tobacco, beef and groundnuts - accounted for 60 per cent of total monetary 
production. In 1973, total agricultural exports were worth US $244 mil-
lion, ie. 81 per cent of total exports. However, although the overall 
value of the major export crops had increased by 3.6 per cent p.a. since 
- 83 1966, production actually decreased. 
Future prospects on the world market were not given by the Report, 
but two products, cotton and beef, were expected to experience a boom 
in demand. Generally however, 
"the world market· situation for Tanzania's export commodities is 
in aggregate expected to deteriorate between 1972 and 198011 • 84 
However, this trend will be partly countered by inflation raising the 
prices of these commodities. 
An outline was given of the opportunities for the development of 
rural areas. Sm~ll-holder farmers were singled out as the most important 
actors. Besides producing export crops, the small-holder was encouraged 
to produce food crops for domestic consumption. It proposed the adoption 
of simple, already known, innovations and techniques which would double 
the yield of maize, irrigated rice, sorghum beans, and, cotton and pyr-
ethrum. Lesser, but still substantial increases in the yield of wheat 
and rainfed rice, as well as coffee, tea, tobacco and other cash crops 
was envisaged. 
Hence, this Mission Report was more sensitive to the issue of self-
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sufficiency in food production. The Group's concern here reflected the 
Government's apprehension over the impending famine of 1974. On human-
itarian grounds both wished to avoid the famine. ~olitically, a starv-
ing population destabilises a government's populist mass base. Ideolo-
gically, the Group's reputation was at risk because it had been Group 
policy to persuade the Tanzanians to drop their plans for self-sufficie-
ncy. Still, the Mission did not switch to a policy of self-sufficiency 
at all costs, but as a means of furthering the interests of the small-
holder producers. 85 
"Providing that the existing constraints can be overcome and the 
necessary resourc~s made available, it is ••• not unrealistic to 
assume that Tanzania could both expand cultivated area to match 
population growth and, by 1992, double yields overall."86 
This statement reveals the Mission's ambiguity because it referred not 
only to food production, but to all agricultural production.· It shows 
that the Bank Group had introduced a new strategy. 
To achieve the desired target agricultural output will need to 
increase by 6 per cent p.a., with a resultant doubling of agricultural 
incomes. But, according to the Mission Report, the agricultural sector 
was smothered by constraints on the free development of small-holder 
farmers. Farmers' incentives were inadequate, especially for beef and 
oil. The Mission recommended that a free market system be allowed to 
develop with regard to pricing in this field, to ensure 'efficient' 
resource allocation. 87 Further constraints were: experienced in the sup-
ply and marketing system, and the poorness of the extension services. 
Particularly, the co-operatives were responsible for, and .suffered from: 
"Wi~espread mismanagement, over-stretched responsibilities, freq-
uent government interference ••• and the establ~shment of many non-
viable societies, (which) have resulted in high costs, bad services, 
delayed payments to farmers and a high proport.ion of society 
. "1 . 1188 J.nso vencJ.es. 
The offered solution was to leave the successful societies to fend for 
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themselves, and to hand over responsibility for the organisation of the 
failed societies to the Regional authorities. One other strong recomm-
endation was that fertilizers be subsidised at 75 per cent, to ensure 
a cheap and regular supply, to 'progressive' farmers. 
The Mission estimated for the S5YP, that total public sector invest-
ment in agriculture - including processing, storage facilities and mark 
-e.ting investment - was set at about 23 per cent of the total sector 
investment. In fact, actual expenditure up to June 1972 was running at 
about 13 per cent for agriculture - including parastatal investment. A 
major increase occurred thereafter to level total agricultural investment 
over the period of the S5YP at 20 per cent of total development expend-
i ture .• 
Table 27. Functional Distribution of Development Expenditure (1969-74) 
As Projected for the S5YP. 
US.$m % 
Agriculture* 48.3 13 
Education 42.0 11 
Health 14:.0 4 
Water &· Power 48.0 13 
Communications 129.4 34 
Other 91.0 25 
Total 372.? 100 
*Excludes parastatal investment.·If parastatal investment is included 
percentage would be 23%. 
Source: Table 18, vol 1~ 1974 Mission Report. 
Investment in water, power and education were well above target. 
The Miss.ion attributed this to the Decentralisation of the Government 
in 1972. The bias in favour of social investment by the regional auth-
orities was fairly predi~table, given their closeness to local influence. 
However, another explanation may have some bearing on the subject. 
Social investment projects are usually expensive and rely on foreign tech 
-nology and/or foreign technicians and materials. It would be interest 
-ing to discover whether the Regional authorities were subjecteq to sales 
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campaigns by representatives of foreign firms - especially construct-
ion firms - to provide infrastructural development programmes. The Bank 
Group recognised this 'danger• when arguing that the Decentralisation 
led to regionally-based multi-sectoral projects, which sometimes supported 
areas of high and low productivity, and tended to overemphasise social 
investment, thereby not pressing the •priority of production•. 
The Mission recommended ·. the most rapid exploitation of agricu-
1 tural opportunities on a multi-regional basis, conentrating on high yield 
areas. The establishment of growth centres under the auspices of a 
resurrected Ministry of Agriculture was to ensure that investment:in 
agriculture was increa.sed even at the expense of other sectors. Projects 
with immediate production ·impact were to be given top priority, followed 
by those favouring increased intensive farming, and then those favour-
ing social and other infrastructure. 89 
11Since in many farm:tng areas, significant agricultural progress can 
be made within the existing rural structure and levels of social 
services •• the establishment of Ujamaa villages (involving consid-
erable investment in education, health and water facilities) could 
therefore take a lower priority for the time being. 1190 
By March 1974, 20 per cent of the rural population was in Mission-
defined 1 Ujamaa• villages, ranging in size from 30 - 1800 people in each, 
. with the average at 500 (100 families). Significantly, there were few 
villages where communal farming had been established, and the Regions 
with the six highest percentages of GDP represented less than 10 per cent of 
the Ujamaa. population, whereas the poorest five Regions represented 70 per 
cent of the Ujamaa population. The Mission reckoned that Ujamaa villages 
tended to be in areas where no cultivation was practiced before. This 
meant that problems of collectivisation of private land were largely 
avoided. The collective method of farming probably totalled less than 
one per cent of total cultivated land.91 
That the exist~ng Ujamaa villages were neither self-reliant, nor 
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communally farmed was acknowledged by the Mission.92 Its own recommen-
dations for the structure of the villages were that they be made larger 
to ensure economies of scale for production and marketing, but only.in 
sparsely. pspulated areas, i.e. the poor areas. In areas where rural 
incomes were higher than average the existing structures were to be 
left intact, .and Government interference diminished, allowing the free 
market system to. work. However, the local and central administrations 
could play a useful role in setting up efficient marketing systems·for 
the prsducers, and through the provision of subsidies for inputs. This 
function was to be performed by the Tanzanian Rural Development Bank. 
The Mission .. has demolished the basis for Tanzania's socialist devel-
opment strategy. The Ujamaa villages have no:t".been proven successful as a 
method for producing export crops~.social investment has been too exp-
ensive; Decentralisation has not resulted in the expected Regional dev-
elopments; resettlefr!en~ of the population into areas of'great~·potential' 
was recommended, but only if the population was srganised. on a small-
holder basis, with the most productive receiving the most investment 
and the greatest rewards. The Bank qroup had come back to its 1961 
Missisn Report's objectives. 
The Mission's strategy for development - the establishment of high 
growth areas - was reflected in the two types of projects it recommended. 
"The report recoml"!lends that Tanzania should now concentrate its 
efforts on the most rapid exploitation possible of agricultural 
opportunities and on a multi-regional basis and starting with areas 
of high production potential. These centers would have the ••• 
advantage of illustrating the scope and methods of agricultural 
development ••• "9~ 
"The report ••• suggests a sequential approach whereby investments 
with·ari immediate production impact are given the highest priority, 
to be follsw~d by·the development of more intensive farming systems 
and only finally by an accelerated provision of social and "other 
infrastructure not essentially required for the production object-
251. 
ives. 1194 
"To implement this strategy two new (for Tanzania) types of project 
are proposed, the first of which would concentrate on maximizing 
quick yield increases from cultivated areas and the second, while 
aiming at further yield increases would also focus on expanding 
cultivated areas. The first would be the National Maize Project 
••• rocus(ing) on maize alone ••• 
The second project, the National Agricultural Development Project 
(NADP) is a longer term and more thorough effort to transform trad 
-itional farming practices. It would aim to develop more intensive 
farming systems through ••• new techniques ••• (and) settlement •• "95 
The Presidential Order on Villagisation (1973) was a preliminary move 
toward the implementation of these projects. 
The world's stocks of maize were very low by the end of 1974, so the 
price rose. At the same time Tanzania suffered from poor harvests lead 
-ing to domestic shortages. "During 1974, Tanzania will import not less . 
than 315,000 tons of maize, 60,000 tons of wheat and 22,000 tons of wheat 
flour."96 The cost would be at least US $150 million. 
Further, Tanzania's foreign exchange position had been deteriorating 
during the p~evious five years, so the importation of these grains forced 
a rethink of Bank Group/Tanzanian policy on self-sufficiency in food 
production. The new approach - typical of the Green Revolution - in the 
National Maize Project - favoured more intensive farming, using more 
inputs (usually imported) of pesticides, fertilizers and imported.high 
yield crop varieties. The reliance ·on imported inputs diminishes the 
degree of self-sufficiency being sought. The required self-sufficiency 
could be achieved in two ways - an increase by 50 per cent of the area 
under cultivation, or more intensive cultivation. Because 'maize land' 
is similar to 'tobacco land', the former approach was precluded. T~e 
Bank Group is not prepared to sacrifice tobacco production for maize 
production. In fact, it recommended increasing the area under tobacco 
cultivation.97 Besides more intensive cultivation, the Mission sought 
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to liberalise pricing policies by allowing the price to rise to import 
parity. By the end of 1974 the price had risen by 40 per cent. 
The increase in the domestic price of maize was allied to a high 
degree of supervision by the Ministry of Agriculture. The Ministry, in 
this project, was intended to provide investment in storage, marketing, 
extension and technical support for the producers, and to provide subs-
idised inputs. In this manner self-sufficiency was to be reached by 1980, 
involving an increased output from 0.88 million metric tons (1972) to 1.3 
million tons (1980). Perhaps a quote from the Mission Report will put 
the importance of this project to the Bank Group in better perspective. 
"Although both maize and cotton face favorable world market prosp-
ects, cotton production will generally give a better·return to 
iand and labour. 1198 . 
Hence, for the Bank Group at least, self-sufficiency in food was not 
paramount. 
The second type of project, the National Agricultural Development 
Project, represented a long-term effort to thoroughly transform tradi-
tional farming practices. New techniques were to be adopted ensuring 
better husbandry and more intensive farming, with resettlement of the 
population where deemed necessary.99 The method adopted was to progres 
-sively introduce·a number of sub-projects, each of 10,000 farm families.'· 
Over 20 years, ten sub~projects will be introduced annualiy. 
Under the NADP all crop production will be expanded. World Bank 
Group support for the development of cotton, tea, tobacco and cashew 
production wil~ continue, although by the Mission's own admission, 
production advances were behind schedule in 1974. 100rn fact, future 
investment by foreign donors will depend on the success of the Kigoma 
Project - a multisectoral integrated project financed by principally 
the World Bank Group - because this project was established specifically 
as a testing ground for the much larger NADP programme. 101 
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Table 28. Proposed (Agricultural Development Programme (1975-80) 
Crop Development: 
Agricultural support programme 
National Maize Project 
NADP 
Regional Projects 
Co-operative Training 
Tobacco Pr_bject 
Tea Project" 
Cot~on Project 
Cashew ·Project 
Other Pro'j ects 
Livestock Development: 
Beef Production 
Dairy _Project 
Other 'Projects 
Subtotal 
Subtotal 
Total crop· & livestock development ·in real terms* 
Other Development: 
Sugar Production 
Fruit & Vegetable Production & Marketing 
Other Parastatal Production 
Small-scale Irrigation 
Forestry 
Fisheries 
Private & Co~?perative Investment 
Subtotal (real terms) 
Grand total (real terms) 
Note: All projects supported by Bank Group financing. 
* Assumes 10 per c.ent inflation rate 
. US $ m. 
15.8 
10.5 
21.0 
7.0 
12.0 
7.0 
18.5 
49.0 
28.0 
169.0 
26 .. 0 
14.0 
28.0 
68.0 
182.0 
70.0 
7.0 
14.0 
7.0 
14.0 
7.0 
21.0 
140.0 
322.0*": 
••· Total represents 20 - ~B per cent of total resources available for the 
Third Five Year Plan. 
Source: Table 21, V;ol1. 1974 Mission .Report • 
.. 
The Mission recommended the continuation of the Kigoma project, but 
with greater emphasis on the development of cash crops, especially tob-
acco, cashewnuts and sugar. Livestock production expansion was also 
suggested through the development of small-scale livestock development 
projects, as well as the continuation of the 1972/3 credit to develop 
livestock on parastatal and 'Ujamaa' farms, along with the eradication 
of Tsetse fly, ·and the construction of an integrated crop-livestock dev-
elopment pr·oject within the framework of the NADP. At the same time, a 
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second regional project was recommended to cover the Tabora Region. 
This IDA-financed project to encourage la~ge-scale dairy production 
on parastatal farms was recommended not as an import-substitution venture, 
102 but as a revenue-earner - to give a "'good base for development". 
Total investment required for these developments was in the region 
of us $182 million - about 11 - 14 per cent of total .resources available 
for development.in the Third Five Year Plan (T5YP). However, to achieve 
this figure the Mission warned that unless social and infrastructural 
investment was decreased then 'productive agriculture' such as these 
projects would suffer. The NADP and the NMP were clearly central planks 
in the Bank Group/Tanzania strategy. 
"These two projects ••• seek to inject a nation-wide production 
impact into the small-holder sector ••• 11103 
It was envisaged that the benefits of these policies would become clear 
by 1980, when the real increase of net value of small-holder production 
would be running at 5 per cent p.a •. By 1992 real incomes are expected 
to double. 
"While initially •• beneficiaries would be mainly the more progressive 
••• farmers in higher potential areas, the long term strategy is de-
signed.to reach out to all types of small-holders ••• providing a 
stronger economic base to assist the least privileged members of 
.104 its rural areas." 
The agricultural contribution to foreign exchange earnings would be US 
$400 million by 1980, against US $134.5 million in ~972. 
The_message is again clear; Tanzania is to remain an export crop pro 
-ducer, through (generally) small-holder production. If self-suffieiency 
in food production can be achieved without threatening to disrupt the 
production of export crops, then it is to be e~couraged. The whole econ 
-amy is to •. be restructured to ensure more efficient methods of producing 
cash crops. This restructuring will be achiev.ed bY resettling the pop-
ulation into new areas of crop development. Individual incentives for· 
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small-holder farmers will be used - special subsidies on inputs for cash 
crops, and raising produc~r-prices. Social investment will decline to 
pay for these incentives. Domestic food prices will need to find their 
own level on the free market. The co-operative societies will have to 
run at a profit, or at least cover their costs. Successful farmers will 
receive the 'full reward' for their-efforts. 
A major effect of such a policy will be the crystallisation of a rich 
farmer class. on the one hand - whose innate tendencies will ensure that 
any attempt to introduce socialist policies at a later date will be 
fiercely resisted - and; the organisation of poor peasants in large-scale 
communities producing.export crops. 
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The Mission Reports examined here have been used by the author for 
a dual purpose. First, they demonstrate an evolution in World Bank Group 
policy and strategy in Tanzania, and taken in conjunction with the mat-
erial in Part One on the World Bank Group, show changes in World Bank 
strategy on a global level. Second, the statistics provided have high-
lighted many important trends in Tanzania's economic development between 
1961 - 1974. 
The empirical evidence is a significant part of the material pres-
ented here, thus verification of the empirical findings would be useful. 
Andrew Coulson provides an opportunity for verifying the Missions' emp-
irical material in an important paper on the Decentralisation. 105 
His concern was wider than an analysis of F5YP and S5YP, but he has 
offered a clear picture of the direction of Tanzania's development. 
Central t~ his argument is the expansion of state intervention in the 
economy. Government spending multiplied fivefold over the period 1964-
1975, ie. a risen share of GDP from 17 per cent to 38 per cent. 
Table 29. Tanzania Government Expenditure as a proportion of GDP at 
Factor Cost. (US $m)* 
1964/5 65/6 66/7 67/8 68/9 69/70 70/1 71/2 72/3 73/4 74/5" 
GDP 789 854 928 974 1025 1097 1131 
aRecur't Expend. 91". 99 137 149 
bDev' t Expend. 42 48 88 109 
%of GDP: 
a + b 17 17 24 26 
*Coulson's figures were all in TSH. 
**1974 only 
166 214 
113 132 
27 32 
The figures for 1973/4 and 1974/5 are e·:stimates. 
Development expenditure was corrected by Coulson 
Source: Table 2, Coulson 
228 
176 
34 
1328 1518 1772 192~* 
249 315 :398 487 
153 156 271 247 
30 31 38 38 
The figures given by Coulson do not fully coincide with the Mission's 
figures because the latter do not include EAC investment and are not cal-
culated at factor cost. See Table 12, page 163. It is clear, however, 
that one-third of Government expenditure was directed toward develo"p-
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ment, although this represented nearly 13 per cent of GDP in 1974/5. 
This reflected the rise of the service sector as a significant element 
of Government expenditure. 
Table 30. Tanzanian GDP: Income by Sector, 1964 and 1974. (US $M) 
1964 % 1974 % 
Agriculture 391 50 775 40 
Industry 100 1.3 343 18 
Trade/Transport/ 
Communications 210 27 582 30 
Public Administration 81 .10 225 12 
Total 782 100 1925 100 
Source: Page 7, Coulson.· His figures are in TSH. 
Table 31. Volume Indexes 
1964 1970 1974 
Agriculture 100 108 114 
Industry 100 123 153 
Trade/Transport/ 
Communications 100 126 149 
Public Administration 100 125 188 
Total GDP . 100 117 138" 
Source: Coulson, page 8. 
Again, the figures do not tally exactly with the M~ssions' figures - See 
--Table 9, page 157 - but both the 1970 and 1974 Mission Reports stressed 
the decline shown here in the proportion of GDP earned by agriculture. 
In 1965, the public sector accounted for 28 per cent of all capital 
investment (US $37-5 million), but by 1974 this had risen to 64 per cent 
(US $285.2· million), clearly demonstrating the growing importance of the 
Government as an employer and investor. This could be wholly beneficial, 
representing increased state control of the economy and the pursuance 
of the much-heralded socialist experiment. However, in this particular 
case, whilst the Bank Group and Coulson acknowledged the value of imp-
rovements in the country's infrastructure brought about by government 
control of investment policy, they warn .. cif the dangers of 'excessive' 
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levels of social expenditure in sectors which are not directly product-
ive. From both sources the message is clear: investment in production 
must take priority over infrastructural investment. 
Table 32. Development Expenditure - Government and Parastatals. 
1964 -. 1975 (US $m). 
Directly Productive.Sectors 
Agriculture 
Mining 
ME!-nufacturing 
Subtotal 
Services 
Construction 
Water/Power 
Tr~de/C~rnmerce 
Transport/Comm's* 
Gov't Services 
Subtotal 
Grand total 
*Excludes the Tanzam Railway. 
Source: Page 9, Coulson. 
Value 
211.4 
24.2 
286.6 
522.2 
24.5 
240.7 
124.0 
536.2 
378.6 
1304~0 
1826.0 
% 
11.5 
1.3 
15.6 
28.4 
2.0 
13.1 
6.7 
29.1 
20.6 
71.6 
100.0 
~ables 32 and 33 give details·of development expenditure over the 
period 1964/5 - 2974/5. Even within the sphere of development expend-
iture, total capital investment was concentrated in the sector covering 
buildings, works and construction equipment (65 per cent), and less than 
one-third of capital investment w~nt into directly productive machinery 
and equipment. Within the narrower field of Government and parastatal 
investment, agriculture received 11.5 per cent, industry ~nd mining 16.9 
per cent and services 71.6 per cent. 
From Table 33, trends can be identified which the Mission Reports 
ignored or were ignorant of. The Missions were especially silent abont 
industrialisation. In the years of the F5YP the development of heavy man 
-ufacturing proceeded at much the same pace as light manufacturing; but, 
during the S5YP, the light manufacturing sector raced away, especially 
between 1972 - 1975. This may reflect the development of an import-
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Table 33. Public Sector Development Expenditure - by purpose, 
1964/5 - 1968/9. (US $m) 
1964/5 65/6 66/7 67/8 68/9 Total 
Agriculture: 2.7 4.2 7.1 8.0 12.3 34.3 
of which -
Export crops 0.4 0.4 2.2 1.8 2,0 6.9 
Mining etc. 1 .1 0.8 .0.8 0.8 0.8 4.5 
Manufacturing:_ 4.1 5.6 18.1 28.5 19.9 76-3 
of which 
Light 2.0 2.2 7.8 12.3 9.8 34.1 
Heavy 2.1 3.4 10.2 16.4 10.1 42.2 
Construction 1.7 2.0 1.7 2.4 2.7 10.5 
Power/Water 8.0 7.6· 9.1 10.5 12.3 46.5 
Commerce ,!., 1.5 1,7 2.1 3.8 5-5 14.6 
Transport/Comm! 9.0 11.5 28.8 30.5 39-3 119.1 
Service·s 14.4 14.8 19.6 23.9 21.0 93.8 
· Total· 42.4 48.2 87.5 108.5 113.?- 4oo.3 
33 a. 1969/70--: 73/4 and 19?4/5 
** ** 1969/70 "70/1 71/2 72/3 73/4 Total 1974/5 
Agriculture: 11.8 14.1 18.6 27.6 51.5 123.6 53-5 
of which -
Export crops 2.2 2.0 2.5 12.0 19.9 38.6 14.4 
Mining etc. 2.1 3-9 4.6 4.3 2.9 17.9 1.8 
Manufacturing: 24.5 35-7 28.8 13.4 50.3 152-7 57-5 
of which -
Light 8.4 10.1 11.2 13.0 45.1 87.8 49.8 
Heavy 16.1 25.6 1_7.6 0.4 5.2 64.9 7-7 
Construction 3-5 4.8 4.6· 1.8 6.7 21.4 6.7 
Power/Water 1.2.2 18.5 15.1 33-7 59.2 138.7 44.5 
Comme~ce. 6.0 8.8 11.9 15.7 35.6 78.0 31.5 
Transport/Comm~37-7 72-5 76.3 70.3 86.8 343.6 74.1 
Services 34.6 42.6 41.3 44.8 64.8 228.1 . 56.7 
Total 132.3 203.9 204.3 211.7 357.4 1109.6 337-7 
* Excludes Tanzam Railway 
** Estimates 
Note: Excludes EAQ investment~ 
Source: After Coulson, Table 6 
substi"t'ution based sector, but without a detailed breakdown of what 
·f·· 
constitutes 'light' and 'heavy' industry, it is very difficult to ·ascer-
tain whether this development was a cause for optimism with regard to the 
development of a balanced industrial sector. If light industry is 
concerned primarily with the production of semi-luxuries and processing 
expensive imports for domestic consumption purposes, then clearly a 
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balanced .self-sustaining industrial sector will not develop. 
It is perhaps informative that Coulson's definition of heavy ind-
ustry covers the production of - rubber and tyres; fertilizers; oil 
refining; chemical processing; cement; basic metal industries; machine 
engineering and repairs; ship-building and repairs; and motor vehicle 
assembly - because these industries are almost entirely dependent on 
imported raw materials, semi-finished goods and spares. Effectively 
they are merely assembly_industries involving relatively few local 
resources other than labour. Such a dependence on imported materials 
cannot favour an integrated strategy of self-reliance. This appears to 
be the other side of the coin. Tanzania's economy is geared to export 
crop production and the importation of manufactured or semi-manufactured 
goods. 
Other trends have already been isolated and analysed by the Mission 
Reports. It is.noteworthy, however, that whilst development expenditure 
106 by the public sector rose by 275 per cent, expenditure on export 
crops increased sevenfold, yet expenditure on agriculture in general 
increased only threefold. The other trends identified in Tables 32 and 
33 which were of major importance to Coulson and the Bank Group, concern 
the growth ,of service sector expenditure. Although the absolute increase 
in expenditure was great - US $280 million-US $820 million - the relative 
increase was only threefold. The Bank Group in particular wished to see 
a reduction in service sector expenditure. Over the period as a whole, 
the service sector consumed 71.6 per cent of total Government and para-
statal investment expenditure on development. Althoagh it is difficult 
to measure the production impact of service provision, most of the lit-
erature on Tanzania's development acknowledges that a shift of emphasis 
from investment in services to investment in productive activities is 
essential. The issu·e is, which productive activities and for whose 
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benefit. 
I Coulson s attack on the nature of public expenditure investment is, 
in essence, an argument for the redirection of investment priorities. 
Socialist reconstruction requires such a shift, to enliven new productive 
activities, for the benefit of the whole society, not for the narrow 
self-interest of local elites and the international bourgeoisie. 
Coulson's historical explanation for the 'disproportionate' expen-
diture on services and infrastructure is that this was the result of a 
political process which originated in the colonial period., when the 
colonial ruling class was provided with 'first-class.1 expensive services 
and infrastructure. Lobbying the Government was an essential element of 
the process-to capture resources for services, and this has become est-
ablished as the norm. The provision of infrastructure/services by local 
-ised seLf-help/co-operative efforts have been minimal. Coulson argues 
that services/infrastructure are identified as external inputs to be ba_;r-
gained for. 
There are two consequences of this process; namely, that the resources 
provided for infrastructure/services are disproportionately larger camp-
ared with the allocation of resources for productive activities. Secon-
dly, the distribution of resources for infrastructure is uneven, with 
the Regions with greatest political muscle getting more than the weaker 
areas. Dar-~s-:-Salaarn and Morogoro have benefited most from investment 
in this sector, and they are the twc major regional centres •. Morogoro· 
has benefited greatly from foreign aid projects - the Tanzam Railway, 
the Kidatu HEP project, aid for urbanisation services, roads and comm-
unications. The joint effects of domestic political pressure and ·the 
provision of foreign aid tended toward the development of the service 
sector, and in the distribution of these services, the reinforcement of 
regional inequality. 
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With the increase in Government expenditure an attendant price 
spiral was experienced over the period, with local prices rising by 60 
per cent. The price increases would have been greater but for the 
increased levels of foreign aid coming in to help finance deficits. 
Besides deficit budgeting - planned inflation - taxation became an ever 
more important source of income, with income from this source trebling 
between 1966/7-1973/4, and growing in tandem with the growth in Govern 
-ment spending~ This contradicts the 1970 Mission Report's assertion 
that ·fresh (ie higher) levels of tax were exhausted by 1969. 
Foreign aid played an ever-increasing role in Tanzania's economy. 
Coulson suggests that foreign funds flowing in for Central Government 
spending increased fourteenfold, from US $12 million in late 1967, to US 
$167 million for fiscal 1974/5, (see Table 34) to represent over one-
fifth of·· total Government income for that year. 
Table 34. Sources of Tanzania Central Government Income. (US $m) 
1966/7 67/8 68/9 69/70 70/1 71;2 72/3 73/4*74/5** 
GDP* 928 974 1025 1097 1131 1328 1518 1772 1925*** 
Taxes 104 119 
Foreign aid: 17.5 11 .• 7 
Grants 1.5 0.4 
Loans 16 11.3 
Security_ Sales 11 22 
Other 46 44 
Total 178 197 
As % of .GDP ·19 20 
For.eign aid as 
%of Gov ''t Income10 6 
*Provisional. 
Figures rounded 
**Estimates. 
140 
17 
17 
1.9 
55 
230 
22 
7 
*** 
Source: After Coulson, Table 3. 
165 191 200 270 365 435 
17 38 54 73 91 167 
5 9 26 57 
17 38 49 64 65. 110 
: 
32 35 ·;;i; 36 38 48 ' 76 
85 81 83 66 117 124 
299 345 373 446 626 801 
27 29 28 29 35 42 
6 11 14 16 15 21 
For 1974 only. 
Coulson·warns that important development ministries have become very 
... 
dependent on foreign aid, much of which is channe+led into the parastat-
als (and the Crop Authorities). From Table 35 it is clear that this 
depend~nce was projected to increase. 
Table 35. 1975/6 Development Estimates 
Local Foreign Ratio 
(US $m) 
Total Ministries 121.5 190.3 1:1.6 
Minus Armed Forces 68 190.3 ~:2.8 
Agriculture 11.3 64.8 1:5.8 
Agricul tur•e ,Natural Resources, 
Works,Education,Health, Industry, 47.5 178.6 1:3.8 
Electricity 
PM's Office, Urban Dev't, .. 16.4 8.5 Transport, Communications 1:0.5 
Regions 30.9 9-9 1:0.2 
Total 162.4 200.2 1:1.2 
Source: From Table 11 and Page 13, Coulson. 
The Ministry of Agriculture expected to obtain. 85 per cent of its 
development expenditure from abroad in 1975/6. The seven major spending 
ministries budgeted for 69 per cent of their estimated joint develop-
ment expenditure to be financed externally. This· 'contrasts strongly 
with the Regions where only 23.7 per cent of development spending would 
come from foreign aid. Likewise the Prime Minister's Office, and Minist 
-ries of Land, and of Communications and Transport expected one-third of 
their development spending to come from abroad. 
Two explanations can be offered for this range of dependence - al-
though even 23.7 per cent represents a very high degree of dependence. 
First, foreign donors are prepared to finance agricultural, mineral re-
source development and education projects, but have been since the mid-
1960's, less committed to 'non-productive' investments. It was realised 
that a greater return on their investment could be obtained from agr-
icu1tural/mineral resource,projects, especially those under the ausp-
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ices of the minist>ries and parastatals. With·regard to the World Bank 
Group, by the end of the Development Decade, the Group had provided the 
basiq for a transport and communications system throughout the EAC area 
with the help of bilateral western donors, the UNO,· and'incid.eiJ,tally, 
the People's Republic~ China. The concern with export crops was 
furthered by. these developments. The movement of the crops was facil-
itated by these projects, and because only minor expansions would be 
required in the future,. inoney was less forthcoming to this sector. 
Second, and related to the first, the provision of large-scale services 
and infrastructure with the help of foreign donors raised local expect-
ations and add~d to popular demands for higher levels of services. The 
Government was left holding the baby which foreign donors had helped to 
conceive. The Government felt itself forced to take over responsibility 
for this sector as the foreign aid donors withdrew. 
Coulson's concern over the increased role played by forei'gn capi-
tal is matched by Green's warning of Tanzania's particular problems 
resulting from previous policies. 
11
.Last - but perhaps worst - that failure to resolve the external 
balance crisis would deliver Tanzanian political economic strat-
egy as a hostage to whoever could provide finance to buy food 
im~orts, a situation not likely to be conducive to maintaining 
a radical socialist poverty eradication and income redistribution 
po~icy if - say - the IMF, the EEC, or the USA were the dominant 
financier, and only slightly less unlikely if the IBRD bureaucracy 
••• were centrally involved."107 
Green's assumption is that the Bank Group is not already centrally invol-
ved in policy decisions. As an ex-Treasury official his knowledge is 
obviously great. But, the lack of formal inclusion of Bank Group staff 
in policy creation is not the same thing as lack of · infl-
uence by the Bank Group. 
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Chapter Six 
The Struggle and the Defeat. 
Whatever the degree of manipulation of the Tanzanian economy by 
such institutions of international capitalism as the World Bank Group, 
a struggle has been taking place in Tanzania, between the progressive 
forces - seeking sociali~t transformation - and bureaucratic forces 
and capitalist forces - seeking self-aggrandisement. The struggle has 
been most clearly visible in the dynamic relationship between the Gov-
ernment and the proletariat proper in the urban areas. It is, however, 
visible in other areas also. 
Iliffe demonstrates the existence of militant working class consci-
ousness among Dar dockworkers as early as the 1930's, which culminated 
in the General Strike of 1947. 1 Support for the Independence struggle 
also came from the urban working class. After Independence· certain 
features have crystallised, which have had the effect of increasing the 
oppression of the working class. 
It has already been shown that the Government had become a major 
employer, taking an increasingly interventionist role in the function-
ing of the economy. Of necessity the state has incorporated the Trade 
Union leadership into the centre of political activity. In this way, 
trade union activity has become identified as 'political', and therein, 
any ·'economic' demands by the Unions have generally been treated as anti-
patriotic, qr at least, irresponsible·, because they may upset the existing 
development strategy. Government over the years has attempted to 
replace the input function .of the Trade Unions - articulati9n of the 
workers' demands - by an output function - regulation and control of 
workers' demands and activities. When this co-option is successful the 
Unions hold back wage demands and are eff.ect:i-vely "defused as an agency 
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of opposition. 
In Tanzania the co-option has not been totally successful. Bienefeld 
identifies the Arusha Declaration as being 'immediately rhetorical' so 
far as the urban workers were conc.erned. Popular support was aroused by 
the Declaration, but was dissipated by the lack of progress toward re-
structuring the processes and relations of production. NUTA remained as 
inefficient as_before, and stayed closely tied to the ruling power. How-
ever, struggles were taking place within NUTA. Low-level officials 
were being subjected to increasing pressure from the shop-floor for 
wage increases and -improved conditions. The workers' wage levels, in the 
face of rampant inflation, added to decreased promotion opportunities, 
were sinking swiftly. Local-level officials were compelled to pass·on 
the messages of discontent. The response from the h~gher echelons of the 
Union hierarchy was limited. But, Nyerere's response was to is~ue, in 
1970, a Presidential Circular which sought to raise the status of the 
worker from -an 'object' in the production process, to the 'subject' of 
development; ie. development and t~e benefits from produc~ion were basic 
-ally for the betterment 9f the living standards of the workers. A 
second feature concerned the Workers' Committees. These had remained 
under the control of management, so attempts were made to train certain 
workers to be councillors on these,committees. It was hoped that through 
training in the techniques of negotiation they would be able to prevent 
management from continually outmanoeuvring them. 'Significantly, it was 
the responsibility of management to provide this training. There was in 
all this a notion of educating the workers to accept management-defined 
'responsibilities'. In 1971 the General Manager of NDC argued that 
workers needed to be educated to use their participation with discretion. 
This meant that no real attempts to integrate workers into the decision 
making processes was made. The Committees merely rubber-stamped managers' 
decisions. 
The 1970 response was totally inadequate, not least because the 
Circular did not apply in the private sector. Workers were disillusioned 
with NUTA and the Government. 
"In a·· majority (of Workers I Councils) no very marked results 
could be observed because neither workers nor managers took a 
sustained interest in making the Council an integral part of 
firm planning, policy making., and review. " 2 
The workers were aware of the elitism and conspicuous consumption 
by manager~ and civil servants. They witnessed the dissatisfaction of 
the latter group in the face of attempts by the progressive elements in 
the Government to limit their self-aggrandisement. 
" •• signfficant discontent by upper middle and lower top cadre 
public servants continues to exist and to manifest itself partly 
in ra·t~er passive approaches to duties, partly in private grumb-
ling,- and partly in·pseudo-radical attacks on the income distri-
bution policy as not going far enough because the 'big potatoes' of 
the Eienior leadership are better off than these individuals. "3 
The existence of a progressive element within the Party and Govern-
ment is beyond dispute. Potentially revolutionary initiatives, such as 
the Arusha Declaration and the·, Ujamaa Programme, although failing in 
practice, demonstrate that in the higher echelons of the leadership pro-
gressive elements are present which have been able to force the non-
progressive elements to backdown on some issues. However, the non-
progressive elements have always been able to inhibit or block the pro-
gressive measures from reaching fulfilment. This has generally been 
achieved by passive resistance and failure to wholeheartedly identify 
with the ideological foundations of the initiatives. 
The progressive leadership of TANU produced in 1971 the Mwongozo 
statement. These 'Guidelines' correctly recognised that the development 
strategy was sti~l misguided, and that a more intensive struggle against 
the forces of· elitism and capitalism were imperative. TANU sought Party 
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hegemony over all mass.activities, especially over the supervision and 
control of the parastatals, and over the uses of surpluses. In this way, 
constant pressure ~ould be put on civil servants and parastatals' bur-
eaucrats to. ··follow socialist policies. Unfortunately., the Party itself 
is not strong enough to achieve this hegemony. The evidence present~d 
by Feldman and Van Velzen in particular, suggests that in many rural ar-
eas TANU officials are often linked, either ideologically and/or bio-
graphically, to the kulak farmers; or are unable to prevent kulak dev-
el~pment. Thus, the P.arty itself is torn by internal conflict. 
Despite the contradictory forces at work in TANU, the Guidelines were 
taken up enthusiastically by industrial workers. In nine months, 45,000 
man-days were lost through spontaneous strikes against 'oppressive' man-
agement. Clearly, Mwongozo provided the ideological weaponry with which 
the workers could denounce the arrogance and elitism of all sections of 
the ruling power. Mihyo argues that the strikes were not particularly 
directed against individual personalities, but were a protest against low 
pay, poor conditions and a long history of discrimination and humiliation 
against Tan~anian workers. Mwongozo was used as a shield by the workers. 
Their protests were made in its name. NUTA was not spared their attacks. 
"Workers will regard unions as parastatal bodies as they do in 
Tanzania, and may well express their dissatisfaction through 
wildcat strikes, absenteeism and lower productivity."4 
Nyerere and other progressive leaders were ambivalent in their res-
ponse to·~the workers' militancy. In some cases they supported workers 
who moved to overthrow capitalism; in others they allowed the workers' 
struggles to be suppressed~ The Asian-owned Rubber Industries Ltd. was 
taken over by workers with Government support. The fact that the plant 
was Asian-owned was a key aspect of Government support. 
Producer co-operatives were initiated by workers in some areas in 
1973. This represented a major leap forward in consciousness and milit 
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-ancy. The movement began with sisal estate workers protesting against 
absentee owners and absentee management. It spread to Dar, where the 
workers' raised consciousness shifted the attack toward all· managers 
and agents per se. With the heightening of the struggle, the role play 
-ed by imperialism forced itself into the workers' consciousness. The 
manager of Robbialic·Paints, during a struggle with the workers, 
"considered himself exclusively responsible to the Nairobi office 
rather than to any principles laid down by the Tanzanian govern-
ment. Similar anomalies within the joint-venture world of the 
pa~astatal sector have also begun to surface."5 
Mihyo offers a list of the major disputes following Mwongozo, and he 
too stresses their political content. All struggles of 'mere economism' 
are never simply economic. Any struggle for better conditions and better 
is also a political struggle. This was made clear by the Gov~rnment's 
response to worker militancy during 1973 when the economic crisis was 
worsening. The Government's desire for increased productivity in the 
post-Arusha period, hardened during the early 1970's, into compulsion. 
Workers were condemned-for extremism and attempts were made to force the 
workers to use the official negotiating machinery for dispute settlement. 
Yet the NUTA machinery was inefficient and unpopular. The Mount Carmel 
Rubber Factory strike and the workers' takeover contains all the elements 
of the Government's ambivalence. 
1n 1971, the Factory Inspectorate found the factory to be dirty and 
unhealthy. The employer maintained that the fault lay with the lazy, · 
dirty, incompetent_workers. In fact, the workers were on a go-slow in 
protest against intentional under-staffing by the employer to ensure 
high profits. A Workers' Committee had been established early in the 
year by NUTA officials seeking new members. The Committee was given 
only consultative functions, with the employer's powers enhanced. In 
this instance NUTA became a dispute settler, attempting to restrain the 
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workers, and providing a bureaucratic channel for complaints. 
In February 1972, a strike was called because of the· lack of impro-
vement in the factory. The NUTA secretary forced the wi thdrawl of the 
threat by taking the dispute to the Permanent Labour Tribunal. By 1973 
the dispute was still not settled, yet the strike was illegal because 
the PLT was investigating the case. The workers' respons·e was to seize 
the factory in March 1973 - with Government support. The workers then 
took the step of taking over all aspects of production,and refused to 
work with or th~6ugh NUTA and the employer. The Secretary of the Minis-
try of Communications and Industries agreed to an NDC takeover of the 
plant. The managing director of the plant appealed to the Ministry of 
Labour - the Minister was also General Secretary of NUTA. The Minister 
acted against the workers. Sixty-nine workers were dismissed on the 
grounds of the disruptive behaviour and indiscipline. They were photo-
graphed by police and expelled from the region. Clearly, the reprisal 
was a reaction to the workers' rejection of NUTA's authority. 
This case had a happy_ending. Popular opinion condemned the Gover-
nment for the whole affair. Divisions appeared within NUTA over the 
wisdom of the dismissals. .In November 1973, six months after the 
sackings, all sixty-nine were pardoned and employed elsewhere. 
Although the Government retracted in this instance, the overall 
impression is clear. 
"It is difficult to say that there is 'control' of managers by the 
workers in their act of participation. Perhaps for a long time to 
come worker's' councils will continue to be, as the Nat.ional Devel-
opment Corporation says, 'one of the major incentives - above all 
other techniques in controlling the workers! .• 116 
Commandism and repression grew in the face of the economic crisis. The 
Villagisation Programme - Development Villages - was established in 1973, 
by force. Forced cultivation of minimum areas of food crops was intra-
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duced, with the provision of services dependent upon it. Identity-cards 
were required of the adult population. - thereby .-restricting free move-
ment. In September 1974, a slum area in Dar was burned down by Govern~ 
ment order, to force the population to leave the area. 
Leys, commenting on the Government's repponse to the effects of 
Mwongozo and the deepening economic crisis, states: 
"These ideas mark the limits not of one mail's ideology, but of the 
broadly 'populist' form of consciousness of the wing of the orig-
inal nationalist leadership most sensitive to its mass base."7 
... 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusions. 
The World Bank Group operates in the interests of international 
capitalism. Its genesis and development was concerned to expand world 
trade - the capitalist world market - and its finances and expertise 
have been dedicated to this end. That it has not liberated fully-
fledged capitalist forces and relationsr:;of production in Tanzania fits 
in well with the interests of international capitalism. Yet, at the 
same time the Group is concerned with local 'development'. Its funct-
ionaries need not be ~icked capitalists', because the Bank Group ideolo-
gy and practice is concerned with raising productivity and output -
particularly of cash crops. (But when crises do occur, as in 1974, it 
is prepared to encourage food production). In Group thinking the prod-
uction of greater surpluses is almost an end in itself; after all, the 
Bank Group loans have to be repaid. 
The distribution of this surplus is also a major concern. Already 
unequal exchange ensures that the income Tanzanians earn for their prod 
-uce is less than it otherwise would be. What is left the Bank Group 
believes ought to go to the producers according to productivity. Thus, 
the largest producers of the most profitable crops would receive the 
greatest share. This in turn, inevi~ably leads to differentiation, 
favouring for the few, higher levels of primitive accumulation, greater 
consumption, and perhaps investment in productive activities, ie. the 
beginnings pf capitalist accumulation. 
The· World Bank Group has experimented in Tanzania with various forms·' 
of collectivised production, but found Ujamaa villages generally unsuited 
to its requirements. Rather its later approach has shifted toward peas-
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ant small-holder production on large farms/villages. In so doing econ-
o_mies of scale are possible, without the destabilising effect of 
dramatically increased unemployment. The strategy represents an attempt 
to create co-ordinated 'factory' production through a reorganised 
village structure. Other standard capitalist farming techniques are 
also favoured - ranching and estate agriculture - but the Group 
appears to be concerned mainly with small-holder production of cash crops, 
i.e. with primitive accumulation within a capitalist market. 
Development. is about the progressive production, allocation and re-
investment of surpluses into productive sectors, for the benefit of the 
whole society.· The significance of the Bank Group•s:views on the dis-
tribution of surpluses cannot be minimised. The World Bank wishes to 
see reinvestment in the production of more export crops in Tanzania. 
The methods it'wishes to employ to gain these surpluses suggests strongly 
the probable direction of Tanzanian development. If attempts are 
being made to develop the forces of production - in industry and agri-
culture - then increased productivity is crucial, as is the organisa-
tional structure of that production. 
At present the surpluses from export crop productio~ are insuff-
icient to cover the costs of imports. Critically, Tanzania, a predominantly 
'.• 
agricultural;country even in 1975 - about 80 per cent of the population 
is directly dependent on the land for a livelihood - has concentrated 
on the production of non-food export crops, and has recently been forced 
to import grain and other cereals. Part of the surpluses derived from 
export crop production are used to pay for the food imports which could 
be produced domestically, This is of s~ecial significance because Tanz-
ania has a history of self-sufficiency in food production - mainly 
through subsistence. The development of the export crop. sector sin"ce 
Independence has been at the expense of food production. 
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This shift to great~r export-crop production involved changes in the 
organisation - social and technical - of agricultural production. The 
export sector has been capitalised - infrastructure (roads, rail, trans-
port, services, etc.) and input facilties (fertilizers, research and dev-
elopment facilities, technical experts, new high yield varities of crops, 
credit, etc.). In ~ecent years an attempt has been made to increase 
production in ¥arious ways. Production on individual small-holder plots 
was attempted; large-scale estates were initiated; the Group even flirted 
with Ujamaa villages. The recent implementation of the National Maize 
Project and the National Agricultural Development Programme suggests 
that the Group has decided which way it wishes to pursue its activities 
in Tanzania. 
The transformation and gradualist schemes and approaches to·rural 
development are different methods to achieve the same end - increased 
production~ Small-holder production on individual plots, and small-
holder production on individual plots within large estates are different 
methods of production, although these experiments are aimed at producing 
increased surpluses. To this end Bank Group capital - and local capital 
(re-invested surpluses and local resources) - are being channelled into 
these experiments. Increased production means increased capital for 
the state. Herein lies an area of conflict between the Bank Group and 
the Tanzanian Government. The Group seeks the distribution of.these 
surpluses to the producers - especially the richer ones - and the Govern 
-ment seeks state control over them. However, both agree that for devel 
-opment to occur - for the Government this involves a linked industrial-
isation process based on self-reliance - the peasants will provide the 
surpluses. The ev~dence suggests that more and more resources are re-
quired for capitalising the export-crop sector, for paying the service 
on debts outstanding, paying for the bureaucracy, paying for food and 
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and other imports, and for the provision of services and semi-luxury 
import-substitution industries. 
The masses provide the surpluses but they appear to get little out 
of it. Even during the peri-od of declining levels of agricultural prod-
uction income taxation increased. That is, peasants provide some capital 
for increasing their own productivity, not through a conscious decision on 
their part, but through state planning, and they are charged high inter-
est rates ~ which Von Freyhold argues intensifies their dependence on 
more credit.:and organised inputs - for the privilege of using it. 
Tanzania's agricultural development reflects the restructuring of 
rural social organisation in order to increase the production of export 
crops. A squeeze is occurring to wring out greater surpluses. In Tan-
zania the structure ·of product.ion bears no direct relation to the 
structure of consumption. What is produced locally is not consumed 
locally; what is consumed locally is not always produced locally. 
In pre-colonial times, subsistence production provided surplus 
enough for primitive accumulation to take place and in particular cir-
cumstanGes, capitalist accumulation. Since that time, Government poli-
cies h~ve been directed -toward developing structures which encourage 
increasedproduction. The basis for capitalist agriculture is being 
established although individual entrepreneurial activity is limited by 
the imposition of bureaucratic strategies and development plans. In-
dividualcapitalist activity still occurs, but plans to increase the pro-
duction of export crops require not that individual entrepreneurs be 
encouraged, but the-restructuring of work organisation and social life. 
In the new grand agricultur~l projects - the NMP and the NADP - indiv-
idual producers are becoming atomised workers within a much larger enter-
prise. This may be usefully described as factory farming, except that 
spatial relationships are different in a factory. However, the essence 
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is that new organisational frameworks are being imposed on the producers 
- particularly the poorest peasants. The most significant difference 
between the proletariat proper and the producers in these projects is 
that the producers are obliged to produce their own subsistence, indep-
endently from their work as export crop producers. 
The issue centres on the problem of the articulation of modes of 
production. Will the squeeze outlined above result in the transform-
ation of the means of production? Conversely, is it·possible to change 
the forces of production through altering the relations of producti0n? 
Tanzanian peasant producers have, in general become progressively more 
unfree. They have'been integrated and locked into the international 
economy. Does this mean that the international bourgeoisie can alter 
the relations of production without changing the forces of production, 
or the forces of production without changing the relations of production? 
It is not absolutely clear whether~1the new projects are an attempt to 
transform the forces of production, or merely a restructuring of the 
relations of production - to enable economies of production to come 
into play - making the existing forces of. production more efficient. 
This thorny theoretical problem rests on determining whether the relat-
ions of production are a 'production factor' in the production process. 
If they are, then it is arguable that capitalist transformation is crys-
tallising in Tanzania. This is not the capitalism of the eighteenth or 
nineteenth century British agriculture, but is controlled largely by 
the state. It serves the interests of the state bureaucrats; and as an 
adjustment by the Bank Group to the Ujamaa experiment, represents the 
interes~s of international capitalism. In Tanzania the trend is toward 
state capitalism, in collusion with international capitalism. 
Mamdani offers a partial solution to the conceptual problems in the 
notion of precolonial modes of production being 
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"partially destroyed, restructured and then incorporated into the 
world capitalist system as subordinate to the capitalist mode 
internationally. The tendency here ••• was dual: towards beth the 
dissolution and conservation of the pre-capitalist mode. Their 
movement was henceforth not autonomous but derived from their 
dependent relation to what was the dominant mode in the inter-
1 
national capitalist system." 
Consequently, 
"The communal cultivator, whose production was previously for use, 
now becomes a petty commodity producer. At the same time, the 
process of pr0du.ction retains its communal aspects: the prod-
ucer remains united with the means of production, the unit of 
. . 
production remained the family and the technology of productio·n 
was still the hoe. While the process of production retained its 
pre-capitalist nature, the purpose of production underwent a 
radical transformation: the peasant now produced raw materials 
for metropolitan markets. The small commodity producer was not 
just.dominated at the level of exchange (the market) but had 
also lost a measure of autonomy at the level of production •• 
(T)he change in what the peasant produced could. only be brought 
about through the service agency of the state. 112 
The large-sca-le·agricultural. projects envisaged in the NMP and NADP are 
an extension of this process, but the .. , issue remains unanswered. Whilst 
accepting that the ruling class seeks to both maintain the status quo 
and appropriate more surplus value, this contradiction can be resolved 
in the final analysis,only by th~ subjugation of one of the priorities. 
In Tanzania it appears that there is at present room for manouevre. ~e 
contradictions are not critical. However, the process is accelerating .• 
State capitalism may result, but with it the class struggle will also 
intensify. 
Several themes have been presented here. None of them are discrete. 
In fact, all are tightly interconnected. The debate on Tanzania contin-
ues ,. although the evidence presented here comes down firmly on the side 
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of the pessimists. Bienefeld's conclusion is far too circumspect. 
"Tanzania ••• is not a socialist country and yet it would be wrong 
to conclude that its commitment is purely rhetorical ••• The truth 
is that though little has been done in the way of 'building soc-
ialism', options have been kept open through curbing certain 
kinds of development."3 
On the other hand Von Freyhold sees in the interaction between foreign 
capital and Tanzanian political economy only harm for Tanzania. 
"As the state became more powerful as a result of the national-
isations certain sections of the metropolitan bourgeoisie became 
more interested than ever in using this state for their own purp 
-oses. Particularly the provision of international finance for 
economic infrastructure and for the expansion of export agriculture 
grew at an unprecedented rate. Boosted by the finance, expertise 
and guidance provided by the metropolitan bourgeoisie, the govern 
. 4 
-ing class could continue to expand its realm." 
The World Bank Group is the brainchild of the international bourgeoisie, 
and operates in its interest; and, the Bank Group influences Tanzanian 
:. 
planners. 
"At all levels of the state apparatus the annual plans for direct 
production are plans for the expansion of the state economy finan-
ced and assisted by the metropolitan capital in one way or another."5 
Further, 
"Tanzania has a large public sector but no planned economy and the 
shape and purposes of the enterprises both within the public . 
sector and outside it are largely determined in an archaic manner 
by metropolitan capital."6 
Finally, 
"The ruling class which determines the core functions of the state 
and the actual dynamic of the economy is the metropolitan bourge-
oisie represented in Tanzania mainly by the World Bank, Aid Agencies 
of Nordic and other European countries and a variety of transnation 
-al corporations."? 
So, Von Freyhold is more strident in her attack. Bienefeld recogn-
ises that the critical·; contradiction is that between the externally-
based interests controlling the resources of industrial production and 
developing the export-based agricultural sector, and the internally-rooted 
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base of political authority, but fails to draw the logical conclusions 
from this contradiction. In Tanzania, local progressive elements have 
been able only to mitigate the worst excesses of underde~elopment. The 
setbacks and failures of the socialist programme do not augur well for 
Tanzania's future. Necessarily, however, a struggle is continuing,2as 
Loxley and Saul believe. 
"We are he:re focussing upon the manner in which the emergence of an 
appropriate class base for progressive development is beginning to 
evidence itself and the manner in which the actions of this base 
are demanding, in turn, the crystallisation of more appropriate 
organisational and ideological expressions. And ••• it is precis-
ely in such a broader context that many of the most vital keys to 
an.: increasingly effective parastatal performance and to an effect-
ive socialist challenge to international capitalism must eventually 
"8 be seen to. lie - not merely in Tanzania but elsewhere as well." 
Hence, Nyerere's naive desire to avoid class struggle·has been dashed. 
Green's view is possibly the most optimistic, equating socialism with 
state ownership. 
"The mode of investment is already predominantly socialist, as is 
the mode of large-scale production. Well over 60% of monetised 
production is either by public" sector units or by small private 
units effectively controlled by public sector marketing channels."9 
However, h~ warns that, 
"A managerial-bureaucratic-political elite struc.ture •• clearly can 
operate a socialist mode of production for its own benefitandin 
10 
an exploitative manner." 
Green's construction of 'socialist mode of production' is not spelt out, 
but a mode of production incorporates relations of production, and Green's 
structure envisages exploitative relations, and thereby eliminates the 
socialist element. Yet, Green maintains that since 1967 a permanent 
dynamic toward socialism has been initiated. 
The re-evaluation of the theory of the overdeveloped state offered 
by Leys highlights issues of major importance. The class character of 
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the state bureaucracy is not homogeneous; and, struggles have taken place 
within the state apparatus on almost every issue. 
The 1967 and 1971 initiatives were brought in by the Party radicals, 
who recognised the implications of the existing structures. Namely, the 
degree of domination of the political economy by the foreign bourgeoisie 
- in the shape of, particularly, the World Bank Group - and the support 
some sections of the state apparatus gave to furthering its interests. 
For Leys, the question of whether the state bureaucracy is a bureaucratic 
bourgeoisie through its control of state-owned capital is not of major 
importance. This is onl~ half true. In the final analysis, the inter-
national capitalists control Tanzania's economy. But, bec~use the inter 
-national bourgeoisie contr-ols the economy through tying national 
capital into all its ventures, and through its provision of 'experts', 
thereby loading the dice in favour of future co-operation, the~ ideal-
6lical outlook of the state functionaries is of major importance to any 
future attempt to break the relationship. 
Leys' conclusion is wholly acceptable: 
"Rosa Luxemburg's words apply as much to periphery capitalism as to 
capitalism in the metropoles: • •• the fundamental relations of the 
domination of the capitalist class cannot be transformed by means 
of legislative reforms, on the basis of a capitalist society, bec-
ause these relations have not been introduced by bourgeois laws' •• 
To check, let alone eliminate, the dominance of the capitalist class 
could only mean mobilising the working class and the poorer peasants 
to struggle against it at all levels. This was excluded, partly by 
Nyerer.e's resistance to the idea that class struggle was involved 
in the ~uilding of socialism', and partly, one suspects, from a 
reasonable fear that mass struggle would involve the leadership in 
being outflanked on the 'left' by new leaders emerging in such 
struggles, while simultaneously running the risk of a reaction from 
the right within the state apparatus. 1111 
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